Fernando Martínez ManriqueCorresponding authorORCID id

The Amodality of Language
Abstract Concepts and Core Cognition

Article
29/2 – Fall 2024, pages 277-292
Date of online publication: 23 décembre 2024
Date of publication: 23 décembre 2024

Abstract

Amodality is the thesis that concepts are not constituted by modal-specific representations. In this paper I assess the prospects for uncovering support for this claim in language by two different means. First, I examine the question of the amodal character of abstract concepts, but find it to be inconclusive pending a clearer account of the role of sensorimotor representations in language processing. Second, I evaluate the possibility of there being amodal primitive concepts in the context of Carey’s account of representational primitives in core cognition. Despite their alleged iconicity, which seems to favor a modal view, I contend that there are grounds for regarding them as amodal in nature. I also challenge the discontinuity thesis that regards early primitives as being unrelated to mature, newly linguistically created primitives.

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Cite this article

Manrique, Fernando. 2024. "The Amodality of Language: Abstract Concepts and Core Cognition." Forum Philosophicum 29 (2): 277–92. doi:10.35765/forphil.2024.2902.03.

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