Why skeptical theists are not in a scenario of Olly-style deception

Francis Jonbäck

Why skeptical theists are not in a scenario of Olly-style deception
A new response to the global skepticism objection

Article

23/1 - Spring 2018, pages 59-68

Date of online publication: 18 juillet 2019

Date of publication: 18 juillet 2019

Abstract

According to Michael Bergmann, Skeptical Theism consists of two components: firstly, the belief that there is an all-powerful, all-knowing and perfectly good immaterial person who created the world, and secondly, the skeptical claim that we have no reason to believe that the possible goods and evils we know of are representative of the goods and evils that exist. According to the Global Skepticism Objection, Skeptical Theism entails that we should not be surprised if we are radically deceived by God: there just might be a greater good that can figure in a reason God has for deceiving us about reality. In support of this objection, Stephen Law presents an amusing analogy involving Olly and his reality-projector. In this paper, I outline the Global Skepticism Objection and Law’s case in support of it. I then respond by arguing that the scope of Skeptical Theism should be restricted, and seek to justify this through a narrower construal of Theism and an appeal to common sense.

Keywords

Cite this article

Jonbäck, Francis. “Why Skeptical Theists are Not Involved in a Scenario of Olly-Style Deception: A New Response to the Global Skepticism Objection.” Forum Philosophicum 23, no. 1 (2018): 59–68. doi:10.35765/forphil.2018.2301.02.

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