Majid AminiCorresponding authorORCID id and Christopher CaldwellCorresponding author

Does “One Cannot Know” Entail “Everyone is Right?” The Relationship between Epistemic Scepticism and Relativism

Article
15/1 - Spring 2010, pages 103-118
Date of online publication: 15 juin 2010
Date of publication: 01 mai 2010

Abstract

The objective of the paper is to seek clarification on the relationship between epistemic relativism and scepticism. It is not infrequent to come across contemporary discussions of epistemic relativism that rely upon aspects of scepticism and, vice versa, discussions of scepticism drawing upon aspects of relativism. Our goal is to highlight the difference(s) between them by illustrating (1) that some arguments thought to be against relativism are actually against scepticism, (2) that there are different ways of understanding the relationship between relativism and scepticism, and (3) that a commitment to either relativism or scepticism does not entail commitment to the other. The paper focuses upon the works of Peter Unger and Paul Boghossian to show how this terrain can be variously conceived and to illustrate that Boghossian's conception of the landscape is incorrect.

Keywords

Cite this article

Amini, Majid, Caldwell, Christopher . “Does “One Cannot Know” Entail “Everyone is Right?” The Relationship between Epistemic Scepticism and Relativism.” Forum Philosophicum 15, no. 1 (2010): 103–18. doi:10.35765/forphil.2010.1501.07.

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Copyright

Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License