TY - JOUR AB - The objective of the paper is to seek clarification on the relationship between epistemic relativism and scepticism. It is not infrequent to come across contemporary discussions of epistemic relativism that rely upon aspects of scepticism and, vice versa, discussions of scepticism drawing upon aspects of relativism. Our goal is to highlight the difference(s) between them by illustrating (1) that some arguments thought to be against relativism are actually against scepticism, (2) that there are different ways of understanding the relationship between relativism and scepticism, and (3) that a commitment to either relativism or scepticism does not entail commitment to the other. The paper focuses upon the works of Peter Unger and Paul Boghossian to show how this terrain can be variously conceived and to illustrate that Boghossian's conception of the landscape is incorrect. AU - Amini, Majid AU - Caldwell, Christopher DO - 10.5840/forphil201015120 KW - relativity; skepticism; Unger, Peter; Boghossian, Paul M1 - 1 M3 - Article N1 - Boghossian, Paul Artin. Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. Burnyeat, M. F. “Can the Sceptic Live his Scepticism?” In Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology, edited by Malcolm Schofield, Myles Burnyeat, and Jonathan Barnes, 20–53. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. Feyerabend, Paul. Farewell to Reason. London: Verso, 1987. Fumerton, Richard A. Metaepistemology and Skepticism. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995. Harré, Rom, and Michael Krausz. Varieties of Relativism. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996. Scanlon, Thomas M. What We Owe To Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998. Sedley, David. “The Protagonists.” In Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology, edited by Malcolm Schofield, Myles Burnyeat, and Jonathan Barnes, 1–19. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. Sextus Empiricus. Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Translated by Robert Gregg Bury. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933. Sextus Empiricus. Outlines of Scepticism. Translated by Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Unger, Peter, K. Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975. Unger, Peter K. Philosophical Relativity. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984. PY - 2010 SN - 1426-1898 (paper) 2353-7043 (online) SP - 103–118 ST - Does “One Cannot Know” Entail “Everyone is Right?” The Relationship between Epistemic Scepticism and Relativism T2 - Forum Philosophicum TI - Does “One Cannot Know” Entail “Everyone is Right?” The Relationship between Epistemic Scepticism and Relativism UR - http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=53739336&lang=pl&site=ehost-live http://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=forphil&id=forphil_2010_0015_0001_0103_0118 VL - 15 ID - 41 ER -