Martin LembkeCorresponding authorORCID id

Grim, Omniscience, and Cantor’s Theorem

17/2 - Fall 2012, pages 211-223
Date of online publication: 10 December 2012
Date of publication: 10 December 2012


Although recent evidence is somewhat ambiguous, if not confusing, Patrick Grim still seems to believe that his Cantorian argument against omniscienceis sound. According to this argument, it follows by Cantor’s power set theorem that there can be no set of all truths. Hence, assuming that omniscience presupposes precisely such a set, there can be no omniscient being. Reconsidering this argument, however, guided in particular by Alvin Plantinga’s critique thereof, I find it far from convincing. Not only does it have an enormously untoward side effect, but it is self-referentially incoherent as well.


Cite this article

Lembke, Martin. "Grim, Omniscience, and Cantor’s Theorem." Forum Philosophicum 17, no. 2 (2012): 211–23. doi:10.35765/forphil.2012.1702.14.


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