Józef BremerORCID id

Metafizyczny solipsyzm według „wczesnego“ Ludwiga Wittgensteina
[Metaphysical Solipsism according to the “Early” Ludwig Wittgenstein]

Article
10 - 2005, pages 191–216
Date of online publication: 15 June 2015
Date of publication: 01 November 2005

Abstract

This article discusses the understanding of solipsism in the “early” Wittgenstein. By this concept he did not understand the Cartesian metaphysical-methodological question of whether there is someone/something outside of my consciousness, nor the question of whether there is a Kantian “external world”. Wittgenstein did not assume that he had privileged access to his own self, or that “I” exists in the world as other objects do – nor did he hold that he has any empirical access to his own “I”. I can only comprehend the world as my world, language as my language. Wittgenstein rejects the soul as a complex object, a thing.

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Cite this article

Bremer, Józef. “Metafizyczny solipsyzm według ‘wczesnego’ Ludwiga Wittgensteina.” Forum Philosophicum 10 (2005): 191–216. doi:10.5840/forphil20051027.

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