TY - JOUR AB - This article discusses the understanding of solipsism in the “early” Wittgenstein. By this concept he did not understand the Cartesian metaphysico-methodological question of whether there is someone/something outside of my consciousness, nor the question of whether there is a Kantian “external world”. Wittgenstein did not assume that he had privileged access to his own self, or that “I” exists in the world as other objects do – nor did he hold that he has any empirical access to his own “I”. I can only comprehend the world as my world, language as my language. Wittgenstein rejects the soul as a complex object, a thing. AU - Bremer, Józef DO - 10.5840/forphil20051027 KW - Wittgenstein, Ludwig; solipsism; subject; metaphysics; ethics; language M3 - Article PY - 2005 SN - 1426-1898 (paper) 2353-7043 (online) SP - 191-216 ST - Metafizyczny solipsyzm według „wczesnego“ Ludwiga Wittgensteina T2 - Forum Philosophicum TI - Metafizyczny solipsyzm według „wczesnego“ Ludwiga Wittgensteina TT - Metaphysical Solipsism according to the “Early” Ludwig Wittgenstein UR - http://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=forphil&id=forphil_2005_0010_0214_0216 VL - 10 ID - 207 ER -