Czeżowski's Axiological Concepts as Full-Fledged Modalities.

Manuel Rebuschi

Czeżowski's Axiological Concepts as Full-Fledged Modalities.
We Must Either Make What Is Good, Or Become Revisionists

Article

13/1 - Spring 2008, pages 103-110

Date of online publication: 15 juin 2008

Date of publication: 01 juin 2008

Abstract

This short paper provides a tentative formalization of Czeżowski's ideas about axiological concepts: Good and Evil are conceived of as modalities rather than as predicates. A natural account of the resulting “ethical logic” appears to be very close to standard deontic logic. If one does not resolve to become an antirealist regarding moral values, a possible way out is to become a revisionist about deontology: convert to intuitionism or some other kind of revisionism in deontic logic, and remain classical in ethical logic.

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Cite this article

Rebuschi, Manuel. “Czeżowski's Axiological Concepts as Full-Fledged Modalities: We Must Either Make What Is Good, Or Become Revisionists.” Forum Philosophicum 13, no. 1 (2008): 103–10. doi:10.35765/forphil.2008.1301.07.

Bibliography

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Łukasiewicz, Dariusz. “Metaphysics of Axiological Realism.” Philosophia Scientiae 12, no. 1 (2008): 57–74.

McNamara, Paul. “Deontic Logic.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta. Stanford, CA: Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University, 1996. Last modified February 7, 2006. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2006/entries/logic-deontic/.

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