How Does the Akratês Intentionally Do What He Intended Not to without Changing His Mind?

Mark Sultana

How Does the Akratês Intentionally Do What He Intended Not to without Changing His Mind?

Article

14/1 - Spring 2009, pages 101-108

Date of online publication: 15 juin 2009

Date of publication: 01 juin 2009

Abstract

The article discusses the concept of akrasia, which is defined as a condition when one acts contrary to his or her convictions due to weakness. The views of philosophers G. E. M. Anscombe and Aristotle about akrasia are tackled. It presents an example of akrasia in a biblical story, in which Saint Peter denied any relationship with Jesus Christ when the latter was under arrest. The feelings and views of Saint Peter, who is referred as the akratês, about his own action of infidelity to Jesus Christ are examined.

Keywords

Cite this article

Sultana, Mark. “How Does the Akratês Intentionally Do What He Intended Not to without Changing His Mind?” Forum Philosophicum 14, no. 1 (2009): 101–8. doi:10.35765/forphil.2009.1401.07.

Bibliography

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