Forum Philosophicum Opis...2 fr A Reconstruction of John the Grammarian’s Account of Substance in Terms of Enhypostaton The concept of enhypostaton was introduced into theological discourse during the sixth-century Christological debates, and aimed to elucidate the orthodox doctrine of the unity of two natures in the singular hypostasis of Christ. In spite of the fact that the conceptual content of the term is recognized by contemporary scholarship as pertaining to the core of Christology, the notion of enhypostaton is often described as obscure and not clearly defined. The coining of the term is often ascribed to Leontius of Byzantium, whereas in fact he only followed and developed solutions already introduced into Christological discourse by John the Grammarian. The article aims to clarify the notion by offering a philosophical account of the meaning and theoretical origins of “enhypostaton,” as introduced by John the Grammarian in the context of his discussion of substance as en-hypostatical being. Enhypostaton emerges as the proper way of describing the ontological complements of a particular entity. This seems to be a significant development in the philosophical explanation of substance. Wed, 11 Jul 2018 00:00:00 +0200 Hegel’s Phenomenology of Unhappy Consciousness Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit is a careful description of the progressive unfolding of Spirit. Its dialectic is the education of consciousness. There are three stages of unhappy consciousness: external beyond, changing individual, and achieved reconciliation. Being aware of its own mutability, the self yearns for reconciliation, which can only come from the external beyond, from the unchanging. The quest of unhappy consciousness for reconciliation is characterized by the three stages of devotion, sacramental desire and labour, and self-mortification. The self, constituted by what is other, is never able to achieve lasting satisfaction; it desires the unity of self-consciousness. Through the experience of itself, the self comes to a clearer self-awareness and transgresses its own limits. Wed, 11 Jul 2018 00:00:00 +0200 Effect Anticipation and the Experience of Voluntary Action Control This paper discusses the issues surrounding voluntary action control in terms of two models that have emerged in empirical research into how our human conscious capabilities govern and control voluntary motor actions. A characterization of two aspects of consciousness, phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness, enables us to ask whether effect anticipations need be accessible to consciousness, or whether they can also have an effect on conscious control at an unconscious stage. A review of empirical studies points to the fact that willed actions are influenced by effect anticipations both when they are conscious and when they remain inaccessible to the conscious mind. This suggests that the effects of conscious voluntary actions—in line with the ideomotor principle proposed by William James—are anticipated during the generation of responses. I propose that the integration of perceptual and motor codes arises during action planning. The features of anticipated effects appear to be optionally connected with the features of the actions selected to bring about these effects in the world. Wed, 11 Jul 2018 00:00:00 +0200 Matyáš Havrda. The So-Called Eighth Stromateus by Clement of Alexandria: Early Christian Reception of Greek Scientific Methodology. This article reviews the book The So-Called Eighth Stromateus by Clement of Alexandria: Early Christian Reception of Greek Scientific Methodology, by Matyáš Havrda. Wed, 11 Jul 2018 00:00:00 +0200 The Conscious Brain The goal of this article is to review some aspects of brain anatomy and neurophysiology that are important for consciousness, and which hopefully may be of benefit to philosophers investigating the conscious mind. Taking as an initial point of reference the distinction between “the hard problem” and “the weak problems” of consciousness, we shall concentrate on questions pertaining to the second of these. A putative “consciousness system” in the brain will be presented, paying special attention to diffuse projection systems. The “center of gravity” will be brain connectivity, since consciousness must, critically, be dependent on coherent activity and timing. “Detectors” of synchronicity and coincidence, like NMDA receptors, also necessarily play a role here. To be conscious, we do not need an entire brain. While even large hemispherectomies need not unequivocally affect consciousness, far smaller brain-stem lesions may be devastating in this regard. Even so, the recent discovery by Matthew F. Glasser et al. of 180 separate areas in the human brain cortex is intriguing from a teleological perspective, as it is quite unthinkable that any of them could be “redundant. Wed, 11 Jul 2018 00:00:00 +0200 Subscriptions Paper Version Since 1 January 2018, subscriptions are managed by the Academic Publishing House of Jesuit University Ignatianum (Wydawnictwo Ignatianum). The annual subscription fee rates are: Libraries and Institutions: 60 PLN (Poland), € 40 (rest of Europe), $ 60 (rest of the world) Individuals: 40 zł (Poland), € 20 (Europe), $ 30 (rest of the world) Subscription requests should be sent to the address: Academic Publishing House of Jesuit University Ignatianum ul. 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Kopernika 26, 31-501, Kraków Tytuł przelewu Forum Philosophicum Imię Nazwisko i adres subskrybenta All payments should be accompanied by an e-mail or a letter confirming the mailing Tue, 27 Mar 2018 00:00:00 +0200 Reviewers 2016 John R. Betz University of Notre Dame Dmitriy Biriukov Saint-Petersburg State University of Aerospace Instrumentation; Russian Christian Academy for the Humanities, St Petersburg Tara CollingtonUniversity of Waterloo, Ontario, Canada Patrick J. Connolly Iowa State University, USA Paul DeHart Vanderbilt University Alexandre Dessingué University of Stavanger, Norway Travis Dumsday Concordia University of Edmonton, Canada Marcus Duwell Utrecht University, Netherlands Lorne Falkenstein Western University, London, Ontario, Canada Gary Gabor Hamline University, Saint Paul, Minnesota, USA Gregory E. Ganssle Biola University, California, USA Adam Grobler University of Opole, Poland Douglas Hedley University of Cambridge John Henry University of Edinburgh Rafał Ilnicki Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań, Poland Muayyad Jabri University of New England, Australia Paweł Kawalec Catholic University of Lublin, Poland Andrzej Kiepas University of Silesia in Katowice, Poland Jeff Malpas University of Tasmania, Australia Petr Moiseev The Higher School of Economics at Perm, Russia Olha Mukha Dragomanov National Pedagogical University, Kyiv, Ukraine R. David Nelson Baker Academic & Brazos Press, Grand Rapids, Michigan, USA Michael Northcott University of Edinburgh David Novak University of Toronto, Canada Graham Oppy Monash University, Australia Michał Paluch Collegium Joanneum—Pontifical Faculty of Theology in Warsaw David E. Pratt  Saint Martin’s University, W Mon, 27 Nov 2017 00:00:00 +0100 Omniscience, Free Will, and Religious Belief In this paper, I examine a standard foreknowledge argument and some interesting ways of handling it, along with some criticisms. I argue that there are philosophically interesting notions of free will that are compatible with determinism. These are the notions of free will that matter to ordinary life, and I argue that these generate a way for a philosophically interesting understanding of free will to be compatible with belief in God’s infallible foreknowledge. I discuss two key questions—the empirical question and the divine interference question—that are often neglected in the contemporary debate on foreknowledge and free will. Finally, I provide some answers to these questions that I hope can advance the debate. Wed, 15 Nov 2017 00:00:00 +0100 Schmalenbach on Standing Alone before God: A Philosophical Case-Study in Ontologico-Historical Understanding This article explores the clarificatory potential of a specific way of approaching philosophical problems, centered on the analysis of the ways in which philosophers treat the relationship between ontological and historical forms of commitment. Its distinctive feature is a refusal to begin from any premises that might be considered “ontologistic” or “historicistic.” Instead, the relative status of the two forms of commitment is left open, to emerge in the light of more specific inquiries themselves. In this case the topic in question is furnished by an essay from the early twentieth century German philosopher Herman Schmalenbach, entitled “Der Genealogie der Einsamkeit” (somewhat problematically translated as “On Lonesomeness”). The aim is to show how the import of Schmalenbach’s historico-philosophical treatment of certain features arguably central to the spiritual practices and religious beliefs of Christianity can be more effectively grasped when approached in these terms. The first part provides an overview of the key points of Schmalenbach’s essay, while the second presents some conceptual-analytic considerations as a basis for exploring relations between ontological and historical forms of commitment as these figure in his text. Some possible broader implications for Christianity and its relationship to modern society are then also briefly sketched.   Wed, 15 Nov 2017 00:00:00 +0100 Intersections between Paul Ricœur’s Conception of Narrative Identity and Mikhail Bakhtin’s Notion of the Polyphony of Speech Proposing his conception of narrative identity in Oneself as Another, Paul Ricœur holds that human life is comprehensible, once the story of a man’s life has actually been told, and it is the narrative of one’s life which constructs one’s identity. Developing his theory of heteroglossia and the polyphony of human speech, explicated chiefly in Speech Genres and The Dialogic Imagination, Mikhail Bakhtin recognizes the intrinsically intertwining character of utterance and response. According to him, utterance is always addressed to someone and antedates an answer. Bakhtin’s “addressivity,” as well as his view of discourse as fundamentally dialogic, are convergent with Ricœur’s elucidation both of man’s answerability to the Other and of narrative identity. The dynamic character of narrative identity, as construed by Ricœur, converges with the dynamic nature of language as viewed by Bakhtin. The aim of this article is to study the intersections of Ricœur’s narrative theory and Bakhtin’s recognition of the polyphonic nature of speech. I view these as inherently interrelated, and as testifying, respectively, to the philosophical and linguistic aspects of one and the same phenomenological vision. That vision accounts for selfhood, understood as vulnerable and contextualized, while also recognizing that it is conveyed by means of language with its essentially dialogic openness.  Wed, 15 Nov 2017 00:00:00 +0100