Robert Simpson

Avoiding the Afterlife in Theodicy.
Victims of Suffering and the Argument from Usefulness

Article
13/2 - Fall 2008, pages 217–231
Date of online publication: 15 novembre 2008
Date of publication: 01 novembre 2008

Abstract

Contemporary proponents of theodical generally believe that a theodical reply to the evidential argument from evil must involve some appeal to the afterlife. In Richard Swinburne's writings on theodical, however, we find two arguments that may be offered in opposition to this prevailing view. In this paper, these two arguments—the argument from usefulness and the argument from assumed consent—are explained and evaluated. It is suggested that both of these arguments are rendered ineffective by their failure to distinguish between the different ways in which persons may be of-use in the attainment of some good state of affairs.

Keywords

Cite this article

Simpson, Robert. “Avoiding the Afterlife in Theodicy. Victims of Suffering and the Argument from Usefulness.” Forum Philosophicum 13, no. 2 (2008): 217–231. doi:10.5840/forphil200813219.

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