ARTICLES

Husserl on How to Bridge the Gap Between Static and Genetic Analysis

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ABSTRACT   The author argues that static and genetic phenomenological methods are complementary rather than opposite, and in the course of defending this claim enters into discussion with Derrida's interpretation of Husserl's philosophy. It is asserted that for an adequate understanding of the two forms of the phenomenological method to be arrived at, one must take into consideration, especially, Husserl's B III 10 manuscripts. By referring to these, the author reconstructs the object, limits, presuppositions, aims and character of both approaches to inquiry. Moreover, he claims that the differentiation of the two forms of the phenomenological method stems from Husserl's inquiries into the concept of consciousness, as defined in *Ideas I.*

KEYWORDS   habituality; Husserl, Edmund; monad; phenomenological method; subjectivity; time

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1. Introduction

In his talk given in 1959 at a conference organized in Cerisy-la-Salle, Derrida (2001, 205–6, 209) tracks and deconstructs elements of the famous (or infamous) metaphysics of presence in Husserl's philosophy. In this regard, Derrida claims that static analysis serves Husserl as a methodological device for investigating the structural which, in the end, presupposes objectivity as its basis. Nonetheless, this is only a part of the story, since "[t]here are layers of meaning which appear as systems, or complexes, or static configurations, within which, moreover, are possible a movement and a genesis which must obey both the legality proper to and the functional significance of the structure under consideration" (Derrida 2001, 194). For this reason, the static analysis—as it seems—has to be supplemented or extended by a genetic one which will enable one to ask about the genesis of the structural. In brief, genetic analysis makes the question of the origins of the structural possible. As Derrida (2001, 206) states, however, "the necessity of this transition from the structural to the genetic is nothing less than the necessity of a break or a conversion." Derrida's thesis is that the two seemingly complementary approaches in Husserl's phenomenology are in fact contradictory, and as a result lead towards two different forms of phenomenology. In this context, Derrida is well aware of Husserl's outspoken aversion to dividing phenomenology, and—as he declares—he "wagers" that if Husserl had had to choose "structure or genesis," "he would have been quite astonished to see himself called into such a debate; he would have answered that it depends upon what one intends to speak about" (Derrida 2001, 194). In this article, my ultimate aim is to explore to what extent static and genetic analyses can be regarded as intertwined in Husserl's phenomenology, and how, if at all, both approaches are elements or moments of one analytical strategy. Thus, whereas Derrida focuses in his text on Husserl's attempts to break with psychologistic geneticism,[1] I focus on methodological issues instead. By doing so, I attempt to show that Derrida, speaking metaphorically, would have won the bet, since Husserl indeed seems to introduce both approaches as complementary. To show this, I focus on the B III 10 group of Husserl's research manuscripts (from 1921–3), which—as Welton (2003, 261) rightly claims—furnishes "one of those rare passages where Husserl attempted to define his own operative terms at a time when he was reframing the systematic scope of his phenomenological method."

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1. See also (Derrida 1989; 2003). For more on Derrida's reading of Husserl, see (Lawlor 2002).

As is well known,[2] the authentic meaning of Husserl's philosophy (i.e. phenomenology *in statu nascendi*, or at work) lies—as Husserl emphasizes in his rich epistolary exchange[3]—in his research manuscripts, rather than only in the works published during his life. Of course, by referring to the few books that Husserl did publish before his death in 1938, one can outline relatively strict borders between, e.g., descriptive-eidetic phenomenology (as presented in Husserl's *Logical Investigations*)[4] on the one hand, and its transcendental reformulation (as introduced in *Ideas I*) on the other.[5] Given that the development of Husserl's philosophy has to be defined also within the context of his research manuscripts, however, the situation becomes more complex and problematic. One can even risk the thesis that, from the viewpoint of Husserl's research manuscripts, phenomenology presents itself as a permanent elaboration of doing and redoing research on consciousness, and in this sense there is no radical breakthrough, shift, or gap within Husserl's phenomenology. Therefore, it is hard to indicate clearly when a new form of phenomenology is established. This seems to hold especially for Husserl's methodological considerations, including the critical differentiation between static and genetic analysis. Nonetheless, Husserl scholars (Bernet, Kern and Marbach 1996, 181; Steinbock 1995, 37; Welton 1997, 266; Zahavi 2003a, 94; Därmann 2004, 220–1; Mohanty 2011, 305–6) agree that even if Husserl was using both methods as early as 1908,[6] a critical discussion of the two forms of phenomenological method was only pursued by him between 1917 and 1921, after his move to Freiburg im Breisgau, on the occasion of an elaboration (together with Stein) of the Bernau manuscripts on time (Hua XXXIII).[7] Although genetic analysis plays a crucial role in the Bernau manuscripts, one cannot find in the text

2. As Zahavi (2003b, 158) states, "[i]f there is anything that contemporary Husserl scholarship has demonstrated, however, it is that it is virtually impossible to acquire an adequate insight into Husserl's philosophy if one restricts oneself to the writings that were published during his lifetime." See also (Zahavi 2003a, 142–4).

3. See, e.g., Husserl's letter to Natorp dated 2nd February, 1922 (Hua Bw V, 147–52), and to Albrecht dated 14th September, 1924 (Hua Bw IX, 62–4).

4. On the use of static analysis in the theory of meaning, see (Byrne 2017; 2021).

5. In this regard, see the classic reading of De Boer (1978).

6. In his letter to Natorp dated 29th June, 1918, Husserl refers to the fact that static and genetic analysis are present in his work, but in his opinion, he had been using both methods even ten years earlier, when—as Husserl emphasizes—he overcame "static" Platonism, and he defined the main topic of phenomenology as "the idea of transcendental genesis." See (Hua Bw V, 137).

7. In this text I use the system of abbreviations of Husserl's works employed in the scholarly literature. As regards all abbreviations, see the bibliography below.

itself any systematic comparison of both approaches. In this context, the
B III 10 research manuscript offers a critical reading of the issue at stake,
and for this reason seems to afford us a unique insight into the foundations
of Husserl's method. By referring here to this group of manuscripts, then,
my ambition is to shed further light on phenomenology, understood from
a methodological viewpoint. In addition, I suggest that we put to one side
the historical questions pertaining to Husserl's static-genetic differentia-
tion in the context of his discussion with Natorp (Welton 2003; Luft 2004;
Staiti 2013). Instead, the general question I shall be considering here is as
follows: does the duality of static and genetic analysis justify the thesis that
there are two phenomenological methods? To address this, I first outline
Husserl's critique of the concept of ego-pole (Sect. 2). As will be shown
in what follows, this critique leads Husserl towards a multi-layer model
of subjectivity. What I attempt to demonstrate here is that the static and
genetic approaches thematize different aspects of subjectivity: whereas
static analysis concerns the activities or achievements of pure conscious-
ness, the genetic account explores the passivity of a monad. Next, I explore
the scope of static analysis by describing its object, method, presupposi-
tions, and tasks (Sect. 3). The result is an attempt to define a basic under-
standing of static analysis. Finally, I redefine the static approach via Hus-
serl's genetic analysis, and ask in what sense genetic analysis exceeds the
static view as regards consciousness (Sect. 4). By examining these issues,
I hope to address the question of how Husserl attempted to overcome the
gap between the two forms of his method (Sect. 5).

2. TOWARDS A MULTI-LAYER MODEL OF SUBJECTIVITY

The B III 10 research manuscripts contain 31 stenographic sheets, under the
following joint title: "Genesis. Neue Beilagen: Statische und genetisch phän-
omenologische Methode. Eingeborenheit. Genesis von Apperzeptionen.
Allgemeinster." The majority of the manuscripts were critically elaborated
and partially published in three different volumes of the *Husserliana* series,
these being as follows: (1) as the text entitled "Statische und genetische
phänomenologische Methode" (originally written in 1921) attached to the
passive synthesis volume (Hua XI, 336–45; Hua CW IX, 624–34) (original
pages: 22–30a); (2) as "Beilage I" (originally written in June 1921) in the
second volume of Kern's edition on intersubjectivity (Hua XIV, 34–42;
Hua CW IX, 635–45) (original pages: 11–17); and finally (3) as "Beilage XIV"
(originally written in 1922–3) in the *Einleitung in die Philosophie* volume
(Hua XXXV, 407–10) (original pages: 19a–20b). Of course, the manuscripts
are not the only texts in which Husserl examines the methodological basics

by questioning the relationship between static and genetic analysis. In this context, one can refer to "the genetical tracing of predicative evidences back to the non-predicative evidence"[8] (Husserl 1969, 209), as formulated in *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, or to Husserl's confrontation of genetic phenomenology with eidetic inquiry in *Méditations Cartésiennes* (Hua I, 103–6; Husserl 1960, 69–72). In both texts, however, Husserl only generally refers to static analysis, and for this reason he in fact leaves open the question of how to understand genetic in relation to static analysis. Therefore, the reason why the B III 10 manuscripts are unique is that, as Welton (2003, 261) states, Husserl presents here a systematic approach to his method. This systematic approach is strictly connected with Husserl's examination of consciousness. In this part of the essay, I seek to explain why it is that Husserl differentiates the static and genetic approaches by referring to his inquiries into the phenomenon of consciousness.

It is no overstatement to claim that phenomenology is about consciousness. After all, the cornerstone on which Husserl builds his philosophy is the Brentanian thesis that consciousness is characterized by intentionality. Nonetheless, Husserl's way of understanding what consciousness and intentionality amount to continue to develop throughout his attempts to reformulate phenomenology.[9] In this regard, it is instructive to recall Husserl's shift from the thesis that consciousness is no more than a set of contents or lived experiences, as stated in the first edition of his *Logical Investigations* (Hua XIX/1, 363–4; Husserl 2001, 85–6), to his later criticism—expressed in the second edition of the "Fifth Investigation" (published in 1913)—that it is necessary to include the ego as a unifying principle of the stream of consciousness.[10] Thus, Husserl abandons a non-egological theory of consciousness in favor of an egological one. The egological approach conceives of consciousness as a structure consisting of the I-pole and its contents, thereby stressing the "pure" status of the self. Husserl develops the theory of "pure" and egological consciousness in *Ideas I*, but this view regarding consciousness was later redefined: he finally adopts a multi-layer model

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8. "[D]ie genetische Rückführung der prädikativen Evidenzen auf die nichtprädikative Evidenz" (Hua XVII, 217).

9. On the Brentano–Husserl discussion, see (Bejinariu 2022).

10. Husserl clearly declares, while commenting on his own theory of consciousness as presented in the first edition of his *Logische Untersuchungen*, that "Opposition gegen die Lehre vom 'reinen' Ich billigt der Verf., wie aus den oben zitierten Ideen ersichtlich ist, nicht mehr" (Hua XIX/1, 364, fn.) ("[t]he opposition to the doctrine of a 'pure' ego, already expressed in this paragraph is one that the author no longer approves of" [Husserl 2001, 352]). On Husserl's concept of the ego, see (Marbach 1974).

of consciousness. As Husserl states in his letter to Ingarden from 1925, the evidence of *ego cogito*—as presented in *Ideas I*—requires further critique, especially with regard to its foundations.[11] This seems to suggest that the egological structure of consciousness reflects only one layer or aspect of subjectivity, and other "foundational" layers still require further analysis.

Given that Husserl redefines consciousness, and as a result conceives of it as a multi-layer phenomenon, it seems also that his differentiation between the static and the genetic stems from a recognition of the complex structure of consciousness. In the B III 10 research manuscripts he indeed formulates an explicit critique of the egological model of consciousness as presented in *Ideas I*. In a remarkable passage, where he criticizes the egological theory of *Ideas I*, he writes:

> In den *Ideen* habe ich das reine Ich sozusagen als identischen Pol für alle Akte, für jederlei cogito in der Einstellung der phänomenologischen Reduktion bezeichnet. Dieses reine Ich als Pol ist aber nichts ohne seine Akte, ohne seinen Erlebnisstrom, ohne das lebendige Leben, das ihm selbst gleichsam entströmt. Das reine Ich ist auch nichts ohne seine Habe, die die seine ist, die ihm jeweils passiv vorgegeben ist, es affizierend; es ist nichts ohne das Ichfremde und dem Ich Entfremdete (wie alles dem Ich Entsprungene, aber nachher zur passiven Habe Gewordene) das doch im Rahmen der phänomenologischen Einstellung vorfindlich und, obschon nicht ichlich, nicht Ich-Entquellendes, doch "subjektiv" ist. (Husserl 1921, 5a)[12]

In these manuscripts, then, Husserl affirms the egological theory of consciousness by emphasizing that the self is a necessary element of the act-consciousness: that is, he recognizes the value of the so-called "correlative thesis," while indubitably deepening the view in question. His claim is that the self is nothing without its habitual foundation (*Habe*), which consists in passively co-constituted and pre-given (*passiv vorgegeben*) elements. Next, he describes this habitual structure as something that is strange to the self (*Ichfremde*). Paradoxically, however, the habitual structure is an element of subjectivity. All in all, it is impossible to claim that the egological theory

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11. "Natürlich gehört Erkenntnistheorie als Theorie der Vernunft ganz und gar in die Transzendentalphilosophie hinein. Aber so wie diese in den 'Ideen' behandelt ist, verbleibt sie auf einer Stufe der 'höheren' Naivität: die Evidenz des Ego cogito und damit die Evidenz des Bodens egologischer reiner Möglichkeiten ist eine naive Evidenz, die der Kritik bedarf" (Hua Bw III, 228).

12. I am grateful to Ullrich Melle, the Director of the Husserl-Archives Leuven, for permission to cite this unpublished manuscript.

of consciousness—at least, as presented in *Ideas I*—describes subjectivity adequately. Instead, one should deepen the concept by including further aspects of how the subjective is constituted. In consequence, Husserl proposes employing a broader concept: that of a monad. A monad denotes a unified subjective structure which contains both acts and a background such as habitual foundations; this unity is a result of the process of genetic constitution, in which further layers constitute subjectivity as a whole. Husserl states that monads have a dual-layer structure: (1) unity of conscious activities or dispositions, and (2) what is "unconscious" (*Unbewusste*) (Hua XIV, 34; Hua CW IX, 635). The two layers, however, are not in contradiction. Instead, they co-constitute monads as individual beings that constitute themselves in temporal phases (Hua XIV, 35–6; Hua CW IX, 636–7). Thus, from a phenomenological viewpoint, what is not given (passively pre-given) "determines" or co-constitutes what is given.

Already, in *Ideas I*, Husserl recognizes that it does not mean anything to claim that consciousness is intentional; rather, it is a preliminary remark that invites one to deepen analysis, "because nothing is accomplished by saying and discerning that all objectivating relates to something objectivated, that every judging relates to something judged, etc."[13] (Hua CW II, 211). In *Ideas I*, however, he does not develop this foundational analysis of intentional consciousness. It may be stated that the B III 10 manuscripts refer to this dual structure of subjectivity by employing various phenomenological methods that allow one to describe two different layers of subjectivity. It is true, as Lohmar states, that "[t]he difference of [static phenomenology] and [genetic phenomenology] lies not solely in the incorporation of new methods, but also in the extension of the field of phenomenological research" (Lohmar 2012, 267). If this is indeed the case, then the two methods have the same object—i.e., subjectivity or the monad—but concern different aspects of the constitution of the subjective. In the next two sections of this article, I aim to develop this view.

3. The scope of static phenomenology

In the B III 10 manuscripts Husserl incorporates static analysis into a "descriptive" phenomenology, where this means—as he explains—that the description does not ask about the genesis of the constitutive process.[14]

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13. "damit ist so gut wie nichts getan, daß man sagt und einsieht, jedes Vorstellen beziehe sich auf Vorgestelltes, jedes Urteilen auf Geurteiltes usw." (Hua III/1, 200).

14. "Die Beschreibung ist statisch, das sagt: wie bisher immer ist nach der Genesis dieser Konstitutionen nicht gefragt" (Husserl 1921, 18b).

Moreover, he defines the subject matter of these descriptions as structures of pure consciousness, and states that as a result of this analysis one can expect an eidetic-ontological systematization of the given objects. This, in turn, finally enables one to formulate a theory of absolute pure types of individual objects. For Husserl, the theory formulated via this procedure ultimately furnishes one with the leading clue for a theory of the constitution of objects of these very types.[15] Husserl's clarification also emphasizes the essential character of static analysis, since—as he claims—analysis is focused on possible but "essential shapes (no matter how they have come to pass) in pure consciousness and their teleological ordering in the realm of possible reason under the headings 'object' and 'sense'"[16] (Hua CW IX, 629). If this is the case, then static phenomenology (1) explores the realm of pure consciousness, and (2) is an eidetic-ontological procedure. In this regard, in his comments on the B III 10 manuscripts, Steinbock explains that "[b]y static we understand two things: first, a constitutive approach that is concerned with how something is given or *modes* of givenness, and second, a concern with *essential structures*" (Steinbock 1998, 129). In what follows, I deepen this general description by exploring the scope of static phenomenology.

   In *Ideas I*, as we recall, Husserl employs a method which enables one to present an eidetic systematization of the general constitutive structures of pure consciousness. This seems to give rise to static analysis, which concerns eidetic structures of pure consciousness. Indeed, in the B III 10 research manuscripts Husserl employs vocabulary familiar from *Ideas I*, claiming, for instance, that "[e]very apperception exhibits the structure of noesis and noema"[17] (Hua CW IX, 628). If one acknowledges that static analysis explores pure consciousness, then one is adopting the transcendental attitude, and in addition using transcendental terminological devices. In other words, Husserl's use of vocabulary from *Ideas I* not only emphasizes the continuity of static analysis, but first and foremost shows, in so doing, that the ultimate objects of analysis are possible but general (or eidetic)

15. "Man entwirft ein System der gegenständlichen Gattungen, und zwar der absoluten reinen Gattungen individueller Gegenstände: das System des Onta, und nimmt jede Gattung als Leitfaden für eine Theorie der 'Konstitution' von Gegenständen dieser Gattung, deren theoretische Hilfsmittel also im Voraus schon bereit liegen" (Husserl 1921, 18b).

16. "[I]mmer gewordenen Wesensgestalten im reinen Bewußtsein und ihrer teleologischen Ordnung im Reich der möglichen Vernunft unter den Titeln 'Gegenstand' und 'Sinn'" (Hua XI, 340).

17. "Jede Apperzeption hat eine Struktur nach Noesis und Noema" (Hua XI, 339).

structures of consciousness which, in turn, are characterized by intentionality: i.e., they can be described as noetic-noematic correlations.

In the "Beilage XIV" text, this general task of describing the "essential shapes of pure consciousness" is spelt out as the question of the essential structures of acts of perceiving directed towards "my own lived-body" (*eigener Leib*) and "the lived-body of another person" (*fremder Leib*) (Hua XXXV, 407). Although it seems that in this type of act one perceives one object (a body) from a phenomenological point of view, the following essential difference must be emphasized: it is quite evident that one perceives one's own lived-body in a different way than the body of another person. After all, my lived-body taken as an intentional object (*Körper*) is only apparently different from the body of another person (Overgaard 2003, 60–3), but given that my body is grasped precisely as a lived-body, it constitutes a radically different sense than the body of another person does. To phrase it differently, by asking about the essential structures of acts of perceiving directed towards the body, Husserl is in fact asking about how—meaning the ways that—the body is constituted: i.e. which sense is given in this very experience. Once again, static analysis concerns the constitution of perceived objects here. According to Husserl:

> Die 'K o n s t i t u t i o n' des Wahrnehmungsgegenstands, die Aufklärung der Struktur der Wahrnehmungsmannigfaltigkeit, die ihn als wahrnehmungsmäßig daseienden (oder als Gegenstand möglicher Wahrnehmungen) ausweisen, ist das P r o b l e m   d e r   s t a t i s c h e n   A n a l y s e. Das Statische hierbei ist, dass hiermit ein wie immer in der 'Historie' des Ich Gewordenes, eine f e s t - g e b i l d e t e   H a b i t u a l i t ä t und eine zu ihr gehörige Wahrnehmungsart, Art der Apperzeption, beschrieben wird. (Hua XXXV, 407)

The main task of static analysis is therefore to address the question of constitution. In Husserl's text this issue calls for descriptions of "permanent habitualities" or, as stated above, dispositions. Husserl's use of the term "permanent" in this context seems intended to emphasize the essential character of the structures described. Nonetheless, the very object of analysis is not the perceived object, but the ways of experiencing. Therefore, a constitutive analysis, as Steinbock emphasizes, "inquires into the way or how something is given and not what something is" (Steinbock 1995, 38). Static analysis is not interested in the constituted object as such (a body as such), but rather in ways in which it is constituted (a sense of the body as object and as lived-body). According to Husserl, a description of the *modi* enables one to achieve a "clarification" of the structures of possible acts (e.g., an act

of bodily apperception), so it expresses the essence of this type of act as such. This is possible, as what is being described here are "the correlations between constituting consciousness and the constituted object-like formation, and exclude genetic problems altogether"[18] (Hua CW IX, 640).

If one acknowledges that consciousness is constituted as a noetic-noematic correlation, then one must accept that there is a noematic side to this analysis as well, and that if static analysis concerns pure consciousness, it can be applied to certain spheres or regions of being. For Husserl this means that static analysis is to be developed as a regional (or material) ontology. The task of a static phenomenology is "to account for the relation between the act and the object. It usually takes its point of departure from a certain region of objects (say, ideal objects or physical objects) and then investigates the intentional acts that these objects are correlated to and constituted by" (Zahavi 2003a, 94). This aspect of the phenomenological method is clearly pinpointed by Husserl in a text from 1933, in which he ties static analysis to the idea of ontological investigations conceived as inquiries into certain regions of being. He writes as follows:

> Die "statische" Phänomenologie—die systematische Methode der Herstellung einer vollkommenen Weltanschauung in eins mit der apodiktischen Erkenntnis der Bedingungen ihrer Ermöglichung—die Aufsuchung derjenigen Wesensstruktur der welterfahrenden Subjektivität, welche die Bedingung der Möglichkeit ist für eine Konstruktion einer vollkommenen Anschauung von der Welt als einer überhaupt möglichen—nach ihrer ontologischen Wesensform: das alles gehört zusammen und ist untrennbar. (Hua XV, 617)

In the B III 10 manuscripts, however, Husserl was already clear in stating that static analysis is a preliminary method which provides the "leading clue" (*Leitfaden*) for further essential descriptions.[19] For this reason, "[s]tatic analysis grasps the individual from the side of the essence" (Welton 1983, 170). To use Husserl's own terminology, static analysis can be comprehended by analogy with descriptions of "natural history[ies], which concern particular types and, at best, arrange them in their systematic

18. "Korrelationen zwischen konstituierendem Bewusstsein und konstituierter Gegenständlichkeit nachgehen und genetische Probleme überhaupt ausschliessen" (Hua XIV, 38).

19. "Man entwirft ein System der gegenständlichen Gattungen, und zwar der absoluten reinen Gattungen individueller Gegenstände: das System des Onta, und nimmt jede Gattung als Leitfaden für eine Theorie der 'Konstitution' von Gegenständen dieser Gattung, deren theoretische Hilfsmittel also im Voraus schon bereit liegen" (Husserl 1921, 18b).

order"[20] (Husserl 1960, 76). In a word, the ultimate aim of static analysis is a systematization of certain regions of being constituted in corresponded types of acts.

With these ideas in mind, static analysis can be characterized as follows: (1) it is a descriptive method of analysis; (2) it concerns pure consciousness, and so (3) requires the transcendental attitude; (4) as such, it is focused on how—meaning the ways that—something is given; (5) it adopts a noetic-noematic viewpoint on consciousness; (6) it is therefore to be developed as a regional (or material) ontology (noema), but (7) also explores essential structures inherent in constituting acts (noesis); (8) it is founded on intuition, and (9) strives towards essences; finally, (10) it does not ask about the genesis of constituted (or given) objects, but (11) can furnish a leading clue for further genetic analysis. In short, static analysis is a descriptive, transcendental, eidetic and ontological methodological device which is useful at a preliminary stage of analysis. But in what sense is static analysis static? I think that the answer to this lies in its eidetic character: after all, from a static point of view objects are intuitively present or given in intuition. If this is the case, then a "static" description is based on what is intuited in this particular here and now. Even though eidetic variation is temporal through and through, its point of departure is static.

4. A genetic reformulation of static consciousness

Given the scope of static analysis, we can see that the object—an achievement of pure consciousness—is static inasmuch as it is grasped in its essence. This, however, engenders a series of limitations. First, it may suggest that objects are non-temporal: i.e., constituted once and for all. After all, every question concerning the history or genesis of constitution thus far is to be abandoned. In addition, static analysis only ties essence to direct intuition; yet consciousness is dynamic, and exceeds intuitively given objects. Even more, objects are constituted in a multi-layered process of sense-giving, and as such this is essentially non-self-evident. In short, objects are temporally constituted, and this dynamic process cannot be given in direct intuition (Luft 2004, 227–8). For this reason, one needs a method which deepens the static perspective. To show how genetic analysis fits into this picture, in the present section of this article I shall examine the principal reformulations of the static view of consciousness that Husserl introduces in the B III 10 manuscripts.

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20. "[N]aturhistorischen, die den einzelnen Typen nachgehen und sie allenfalls ordnend systematisieren" (Hua I, 110).

As stated above, whereas static analysis concerns the activities or achievements of pure consciousness, genetic analysis enables one to explore the "unconscious." Accordingly, while static analysis is limited to objects present and given, genetic phenomenology seems to be regressive and reconstructive. Indeed, in the B III 10 manuscripts Husserl claims that "[d]ie genetische Analyse ist die verstehende Aufklärung der genetischen Konstitution, d. i. der Konstitution dieser Konstitution, der Genese der betreffenden Habitualität und habituellen Apperzeptionsart" (Hua XXXV, 407). Of course, as we may recall, static analysis enables one to describe the structure of this constitution as "permanent habituality," but it does not explore its foundations—i.e., the genesis of this constitutive process. According to Husserl, "[A]nything built by activity necessarily presupposes, as the lowest level, a passivity that gives something beforehand; and, when we trace anything built actively, we run into constitution by passive generation"[21] (Husserl 1960, 78). In other words, Husserl is claiming that subjective activity has a genesis of its own, which forms the "lowest level" of subjectivity as such. Thus, the genetic process is not directly given, but "conditions" the actual constitution in the sense that it is a passive condition of the possibility of conscious activities. As Husserl emphasizes in the B III 10 manuscripts, "[z]um Wesen der Monade gehört eine Genesis, vermöge deren die Monade nicht nur ist, sondern für sich ist, ihrer selbst bewußt ist. Alles, was in ihr als 'Erlebnis' ist, ist nicht nur, sondern ist, wie das Wort schon andeutet, 'erlebt,' bewußt" (Husserl 1921, 7a). Genetic analysis is focused precisely on the "lowest level" of subjectivity, and asks about conditions of possibility for consciousness *tout court*. To phrase it differently, it is an instance of the transcendental method, as it investigates the ultimate conditions of consciousness.

Husserl's use of the term "genesis" suggests that the analysis of the "lowest level" of subjectivity relies on a reconstruction of conditions and cases that rest on the foundation of concrete acts of consciousness. This suggestion, however, is misleading, as it presupposes that genetic analysis must be defined by analogy with the natural sciences. Although one can understand static analysis by analogy with natural history, genetic phenomenology is rather an autonomous method. Therefore, we should accept Derrida's (2003, 163) remark that genetic analysis does not consist in reconstructing the chain of causes that led to a given achievement. Such

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21. "Jedenfalls aber setzt jeder Bau der Aktivität notwendig als unterste Stufe voraus eine vorgebende Passivität, und dem nachgehend stoßen wir auf die Konstitution durch passive Genesis" (Hua I, 112).

an exposition would reduce genetic analysis to the sort of methods used in the natural sciences, and in consequence would lead to relativism and, ultimately, skepticism. However, genetic analysis does not ask about brute facts, but instead concerns the realm of meaning. Given that this is the case, the method is best comprehended as an extension of transcendental methodology.

According to Husserl, the ultimate task of genetic analysis is to help us gain a better understanding of, and furnish a richer account of, the constitutive processes that ground certain objects. At bottom, these processes seem to be hidden. Nonetheless, the passive process co-constitutes the given object. As already shown above, subjectivity is a kind of nexus of conscious activities and passive "unconscious" pre-givenness. The general task of genetic analysis is a clarification of passive processes.[22] In the B III 10 manuscripts, Husserl specifies this task by listing seven particular theses of—as he writes—"the doctrine of genesis in 'explanatory' phenomenology"[23] (Hua CW IX, 631–3). First, the genesis of passivity is to be comprehended as a lawful process that regulates the becoming of what is given; here one is concerned with "special types" of genesis, not particular cases. Second, genetic analysis investigates "relationships between activity and passivity," and asks how one might understand the ego in this context. Next, the question of the foundations of pure activity arises, which is of primal importance given that, as well, activity as such becomes habitual and habituality belongs to passivity; here lies the problem of the constitution of ideal objects. Fourth, given the types of genesis and its internal laws, genetic analysis investigates the individuality of the monad, the unity of its "development." Meanwhile, in addition, the analysis asks about *a priori* laws of the possible constitution of types of individual monads. Fifth, the genetic account explores the ways of being constituted of a plurality of united monads, and from this point of view asks about "our" world. Sixth, the analysis examines how the world constitutes itself for a monad as a unified nature. Finally, there is the attempt to explore the problem of how "the same time" is constituted for a plurality of monads.

One cannot ignore the plain fact that the list of seven tasks, as presented above, defines the order of genetic analysis. After all, one starts with basic

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22. As Husserl claims in Die Bernauer Manuskripte über das Zeitbewusstsein, "[e]s wäre also genetisch die Aufgabe, verständlich zu machen, wie sich überhaupt vor der vollzogenen Bildung eines konstitutiven Prozesses, also vor dem Bewussthaben eines Zeitgegenstandes, ein solches Bewussthaben, ein konstitutiver Prozess bilden kann und bilden muss" (Hua XXXIII, 13).

23. „[Die] Lehre von der Genesis, in der 'erklärenden' Phänomenologie" (Hua XI, 342–4).

genetic problems, such as the phenomenon of habituality, and then pro-
ceeds towards the complex questions of "objective" time and the world. At
bottom, however, the "doctrine of genesis" can be divided into three main
groups of questions. The first encompasses the problems of passivity and
activity, and corresponds to the basic task of genetic analysis: i.e. that of
shedding more light on the passive constitution of objects given in acts of
consciousness. The second thematizes the issue of "development" and time;
by posing the question of how the individuality of a monad is constituted
as a unity in time, genetic analysis exceeds the limits of the static account.
Indeed, "[t]hat structure which static analysis does not grasp is temporal
structure" (Welton 1983, 172). The third group concerns the problem of the
world grasped as "our" world and as nature.

From what has been stated above, it should be clear that the phenom-
enological significance of genesis consists precisely in its disclosure of the
temporal foundation of the individual monad, which is embedded in "our"
world as historically embedded and essentially intersubjective.[24] On the one
hand, then, genetic analysis enables one to ask about the "unconscious" as
a "development" of the individual monad. On the other, we also encounter
Husserl's strong inclination towards including intersubjectivity within
the phenomenological framework. There is thus a clear tension within
genetic phenomenology between a monadic and an inter-monadic account.
However, both such tendencies are complementary, and they deepen the
static account. In what sense, then, does genetic analysis take us beyond
the static view where consciousness is concerned? The main points of the
genetic account can be described as follows: (1) it takes static structures
as furnishing a leading clue, but (2) raises the question of the genesis of
those structures; therefore (3) it is a regressive analysis that seeks to pass
backwards from such structures to their origins; (4) it concerns a monad,
and thus (5) calls for the transcendental attitude; (6) as such it is focused
on the question of time and habituality; (7) it explains how the unity and
individuality of a monad is possible by showing how the meaning of the
monad is constituted; (8) it (i.e. genetic analysis) conceives of the monad as
historically and intersubjectively embedded; and, finally, (9) it asks about
types of genesis. All in all, genetic analysis is an explanatory, regressive,

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24. "Phenomenology of genesis then is the phenomenology of the original or primordial
becoming in time, of the genesis of one shape of consciousness emerging from another,
acquiring a historical opacity through the processes of motivation, apperception, affection,
and association" (Steinbock 1998, 132).

historical yet transcendental methodological device which provides a clear systematization of types of genesis.[25]

5. Conclusion: one or two methods?

In the foregoing I have sought to show how Husserl critically elaborates static and genetic analysis in the B III 10 manuscripts by defining its objects, methods, presuppositions and tasks. There is no need to recapitulate here the detailed descriptions of the two approaches presented above in Sections 3 and 4. Instead, let me remark that the duality of the two of them stems from the complex structure of subjectivity. In this regard, Husserl's strategy refers to his general methodological rule that the object defines the method, and not *vice versa*. After all, as he insists, "[t]hrough a clarification of the problems and through penetration into their pure sense, the methods adequate to these problems, because demanded by their very essence, must impose themselves on us"[26] (Husserl 1965, 83). Thus, "a clarification of the problems" of subjectivity seems to lead to "the methods adequate to these problems." To phrase it differently, given the dual structure of subjectivity, one is faced with at least two methods, which correspond to different aspects of subjectivity. If so, then static analysis (1) describes (2) the activity of (3) pure consciousness as (4) non-temporal and (5) constitutive structures. In turn, genetic analysis (1) regressively explains (2) the passivity of (3) monads as (4) temporal and (5) constitutive processes.

   With regard to this, as we may recall, Derrida (2001, 206) argued that both approaches lead towards the necessity of a break or a conversion, which means that the two approaches are in fact contradictory and, moreover, develop two different forms of phenomenology. So far, we would accept Derrida's claim. Nonetheless, he bet that if Husserl had had to choose "structure *or* genesis," he would rather have argued for the complementary status of both approaches than make a final decision as to how to develop phenomenology—as either static or genetic analysis (Derrida 2001, 194). In the present study, my ambition has been to show that Derrida, speaking metaphorically, would have won the wager, as Husserl indeed introduces both approaches as complementary. Derrida, however, makes

   25. It can be noted that Husserl employs the genetic approach in his later analysis of the crisis (cf. Heffernan 2017).

   26. "Soll also die Idee einer Philosophie, als strenger Wissenschaft von den bezeichneten und allen wesensverwandten Problemen, nicht kraftlos bleiben, so müssen wir klare Möglichkeiten vor Augen haben, sie zu realisieren, es müssen sich uns durch Klärung der Probleme, durch Vertiefung in deren reinen Sinn, volleinsichtig die Methoden entgegendrängen, die solchen Problemen adäquat, weil durch ihr eigenes Wesen gefordert sind" (Hua XXV, 11).

a few mistakes, or depends on some shortcuts, in his argumentation. In other words, I claim that the static and genetic approaches are indeed intertwined in Husserl's phenomenology, and provide the elements of *one* analytical strategy. First, I think that Derrida's main premise, that static and genetic analyses are contradictory, is false. According to Derrida, genetic analysis seems to question the evidence of what has been described from the static point of view. Yet, on the contrary, without the question of genesis, such evidence appears to be a "higher" naïveté, as Husserl puts it in a letter to Ingarden from 1925 (Hua Bw III, 228). Therefore, it is pointless to describe any phenomenon without reference to the question of how it was constituted—which is as much as to say, without the question of genesis. Second, Derrida (2001, 196) goes too far in claiming that evidence equals objectivity. From a transcendental viewpoint, evidence is an achievement (*Leistung*) of consciousness, and for this reason is subjective through and through. As such, however, it has its own genesis, which is hidden and non-present. Thus, phenomenology as rigorous philosophy must question preliminary evidence, which is never given once and for all. Genetic analysis shows that evidence is historically embedded in the common and intersubjective world. Third, Derrida does not tie the two approaches together by claiming that static analysis can provide a leading clue (*Leitfaden*) for genetic inquiry. Looked at from this point of view, we should argue for the continuity of both methods in phenomenology (e.g., Lohmar 2012, 270–2). Once again, static and genetic approaches support each other.

In one of his late manuscripts, Husserl asks, rhetorically: "K a n n s i c h ü b e r h a u p t, w e n n m a n d a s G a n z e n i m m t, s t a t i s c h e u n d g e n e t i s c h e K o n s t i t u t i o n u n t e r s c h e i d e n ?" (Hua XXXIX, 477). Indeed, static and genetic analyses are intertwined, and static descriptions give a leading clue for further regressive or indirect reconstructions of what is pre-given. Why, then, is it at all justified to differentiate between the two approaches? Steinbock claims that the answer lies in Husserl's rigorous methodology. As he insists:

> The fact that Husserl actually began from a static research perspective betrays the following two-fold methodological prejudice. First, it was assumed that it is better to begin with constitutive questions rather than taking the being of things for granted, that is, it is more helpful to see how sense as constituted is given to the constituting pole of experience, and then to proceed to structural or ontological questions. Second, it was assumed that it is better, constitutively, to proceed with something at rest rather than something in

motion. In other words, it is advantageous to begin with the "simple," and then advance to the "complex." (Steinbock 1998, 129)

It is arguable that static and genetic phenomenology are moments of one complex analytical strategy which aims at a systematization of the sphere of givenness thematized as a whole that incorporates both evident and non-evident moments of subjectivity. One can even claim that the differentiation of the two aspects of subjectivity is provisional or operative,[27] while they form a whole which essentially connects up the different aspects. For this reason, in his B III 10 research manuscripts Husserl shows us that any analysis exclusively focused on evident or static consciousness will require further genetic reformulations. Otherwise, static phenomenology would be naïve. And, *vice versa*, genetic questions without preliminary static descriptions would be pointless. Therefore, instead of talking about two methods, one should rather refer to two attitudes within one phenomenology, or two forms of one phenomenological method; both attitudes or forms enable a systematic thematization of different aspects of subjectivity, and so also an adequate analysis of the given phenomena. Ultimately, both forms of the method used by Husserl reflect a clear tendency within his philosophy, which is to seek to deepen preliminary results by questioning them, and by redoing reduction.[28]

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27. "Die zwischen passiver und aktiver G[enesis] getroffene Grenzziehung ist als eine provisorische nicht zuletzt deshalb anzusehen, weil sich jeder actus, jegliche Leistung des Ichs nur auf dem Untergrund vorgegebener Passivität erheben kann. Alle einmal aktiv hervorgebrachten und habitualisierten Sinnstiftungen sind zudem grundsätzlich einer passiven Weckung und apperzeptiven Übertragung aufgegeben" (Därmann 2004, 223).

28. This aspect of Husserl's phenomenology was discussed, e.g., in (Płotka 2012; 2018).

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