Abstract. Following Aristotle’s distinction between theoretical and practical rationality, Max Weber holds that beliefs about the world and actions within the world must follow procedures consistently and be appropriately formed if they are to count as rational. Here, I argue that Weber’s account of theoretical and practical rationality, as disclosed through his conception of the disenchantment of the world, displays a confessional architecture consistently structured by a nineteenth century German Protestant outlook. I develop this thesis through a review of the concepts of rationality and disenchantment in Weber’s major works and conclude that this conceptual framework depicts a Protestant account of modernity.

I. INTERPRETING WEBER’S CENTRAL CONCEPTS

One of the major difficulties facing the interpreter of Weber’s works and especially his concepts of disenchantment and rationality is that he applies these central concepts to a vast range of processes and social spheres. Some scholars, such as Friedrich Tenbruch, for example, have suggested that the concept of disenchantment is the central concept of Weber’s whole work such that it gives Weber’s work an “inner unity”.¹ In his Das Werk Max Webers, Tenbruch argued that the previous dominant account of Weber’s work given by Reinhard Bendix had failed to take into account that Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (WuG) was not the key text, as Bendix had argued, but rather that Die Wirtschaft Ethik der Weltreligionen (WEWR) was the guiding text for his work. There followed chronological debates about the composition of Weber’s texts in order to find the earliest use of

the term *Entzauberung* (disenchantment) and to investigate the claims of Tenbruch for finding *Entzauberung* to be the hermeneutical key of Weber’s works. These chronological systematic debates over the work of Weber are important because of the fact that many of Weber’s texts have been published posthumously by his wife Marianne and so one can gain a false impression of Weber without being aware of the unusual *Redaktionsgeschichte* of the Weberian opus. As a result of these debates it is important to stress that in arguing for the importance of the Protestant heritage of Weber’s work I am not claiming to have found the single hermeneutical key to unlock the inner secret of his works but rather that reading them in this light illuminates patterns and motifs which have been under theorised in the past.

The concept of rationality is used by Weber in a number of different ways. Chiefly, it distinguishes the formal rationality of the economic, legal, and bureaucratic systems which subsume decisions under general rules and so allow one to calculate the likelihood of a particular outcome, from the substantive rationality of these systems when they aim to distribute goods in a particular way or to bring about some substantive end that fulfils a publically defined purpose. Moreover, Weber also uses the concept of rationality to distinguish between instrumental rationality or as Weber sometimes refers to it “purposive rationality” (*Zweckrationalität*), which is a form of means-ends rationality that is determined by expectations as to the behaviour of objects in the environment and other human beings, and value-rationality (*Wertrationalität*), which is a teleological mode of thinking and action that is determined by a set of deeply held beliefs chosen regardless of consequences. The challenge of interpreting Weber’s central concept of rationality is to understand just how it is intimately connected to his theory of action and to his analysis of rationalisation in world history.

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2 A good example of the importance of this editorial issue here is demonstrated by the different versions of Weber’s famous *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (PE). The 1904/5 version and the 1920 version together with the various replies to Weber’s critics written between 1907-10, constitute significantly different texts. On this, see David J. Chalcraft and Austin Harrington (eds.) *The Protestant Ethic Debate*, translated by Austin Harrington and Mary Shields, Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2001, pp. 1-19.


4 See WuG, p. 12.

II. WEBER ON DISENCHANTMENT AND RATIONALITY

1. The Protestant Ethic

In the 1920 version of PE, Weber notes:

Disenchantment of the world. On this process see the other essays in my _Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen_. Already, the peculiar position of the old Israelite ethic, as compared with the closely related ethics of Egypt and Babylon, and its development after the time of the prophets, rested, as is shown there, entirely on this fundamental fact, the rejection of sacramental magic as a road to salvation.

Central to Weber’s conception of Disenchantment of the World is the rejection of the sacramental mediation of salvation. For Weber, the human mediation of salvation is magic (as for Calvin), since it implies that humans can have influence on the will of God like ancient magicians influenced the will of the gods by sacrificial practices. Without the route of sacramental mediation the believer could be reassured of their salvation through either being a vessel of the Holy Spirit (Luther) or as a tool of the divine will (Calvin).

The religious virtuoso can make himself sure of his state of grace either in that he feels himself to be the vessel of the Holy Spirit or the tool of the divine will. In the former case his religious life tends to mysticism and emotionalism, in the latter to ascetic action; Luther stood close to the former type, Calvinism belonged definitely to the latter. The Calvinist also wanted to be saved »sola fide«. But since Calvin viewed all pure feelings and emotions, no matter how exalted they might seem to be, with suspicion, faith had to be proved by its objective results in order to provide a firm foundation for the certitudo salutis. It must be a »fides efficax«, the call to salvation an »effectual calling« (expression used in Savoy Declaration).

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6 It should be noted that Weber uses the word _Entzauberung_ four times in the 1920 edition but not at all in the 1904/5 edition. See GARS I, pp. 94, 114, 156, 158 (critical edition: Anhang N. 163, 242, 331, 337.)


8 PE, pp. 108-9. “Der religiöse Virtuose kann seines Gnadenstandes sich versichern entweder, indem er sich als Gefühl, oder, indem er sich als Werkzeug göttlicher Macht fühlt. Im ersten Fall neigt sein religiöses Leben zu mystischer Gefühlskultur, im letzteren zu aske- tischem Handeln. Dem ersten Typus stand Luther näher, dem letztern gehörte der Calvinis-
With this salvation typology, human action is emptied of any positive soteriological significance and we see a resulting twofold separation of grace and nature. Nature can no longer mediate grace and human action can no longer cooperate with grace. Disenchantment thus represents a secularisation of the soteriological significance of human action.

One can also see in Weber the disenchantment motif expressed in terms of a transposition of religious values from the spiritual realm to the secular realm. Thus the idea that once people had a religious vocation to leave the world and enter a monastery becomes understood by Weber (following Luther) as the calling or vocation to secular activity. The disenchantment of religious life leads to a devaluation of special religious activities and rather values the ordinary activities in the world. This devaluing is to be understood by Weber as a result of an alternative conception of rationality that develops as religions themselves go through an inner rationalisation which tends to shift them into the irrational sphere.

The general result of the modern form of thoroughly rationalising the conception of the world and of the way of life, theoretically and practically, in an intellectual and purposive manner, has been that the more this type of rationality has progressed, from the standpoint of an intellectual articulation of an image of the world, the more religion has been shifted into the realm of the irrational.

Central here to Weber’s conception of Disenchantment of the World is his understanding of purposive rationality (instrumental rationality). Purposive rationality has two meanings in the Einleitung:

1. The theoretical mastery of the world as we gain ever more precise and abstract concepts due to the rationalisation of the magical image of the world.

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2. The practical mastery of the world through a means-ends methodological rationality.

Both of these dimensions of purposive rationality are responsible for the Disenchantment of the World. Historically significant for this process has been the combination of religious virtuosos into an ascetic sect as in Western ascetical Protestantism. This dethroned the privileging of contemplation over action and further reinforced the rejection of the sacramental mediation of salvation. The result of this changing scale of value meant that there was a shift of focus for religion from what Weber calls non-rational action oriented away from the present world to rational action oriented towards the transformation of everyday life in this present world.

It was totally different when the religiously qualified virtuosos combined together into an active ascetical sect to strive to shape life in the world according to the will of God… Two aims were completely attained: the disenchantment of the world and the blockage of the path to salvation by a flight from the world. The path to salvation is turned away from a contemplative ‘flight from the world’ and towards an active ascetic ‘work in the world.’ If one disregards the small rationalist sects, such as are found all over the world, this has been attained only in the great church and sect organisation of Occidental and ascetical Protestantism.¹¹

This passage illustrates the role that Weber understands Protestantism to have played in the rationalisation of the world. At the theoretical level, ascetic Protestantism developed an answer to the question of theodicy based on Luther’s notion of the Deus absconditus which rejected metaphysical speculation about God as being the work of the Devil, and which was further elaborated in Calvin’s doctrine of predestination. This led to a rejection of the soteriological significance of human action as in Catholicism, which derived from the scholastic metaphysical view of the grace of God in Creation, and issued in a new non-metaphysical theology (sola scriptura) based on a theologia crucis,¹² which saw salvation as totally out of the


¹² For an excellent discussion of this theological transformation see, , Gerhard Ebeling, Luther: An Introduction to his Thought, translated by R. A. Wilson, London, Collins,
hands of humanity. At the practical level, due to the changed understanding of works, the Catholic conception of the positive contribution to salvation by human action was further undermined and was eventually seen as no longer having any active contribution to make to salvation. Thus, since human thought could no longer penetrate the hidden mysteries of God, and human action could no longer actively contribute to salvation, then the way was now opened for both action and thought to be governed by purposive or instrumental rationality and not according to metaphysical speculation, mystical contemplation and the religious asceticism of the Catholic tradition.

2. Rationalisation in Asian Religions

Weber uses his measurement of the degree of disenchantment as a way of assessing the level of rational advancement of a religion. In his study of Confucianism and Taoism he notes that:

In assessing the stage of rationalisation embodied by any religion there are two particular criteria which are, in addition, in many respects internally related to each other. There is first of all the extent to which a religion has freed itself from magic. Then secondly, the extent of the systematic uniformity brought forth by the religion to the relationship between God and world, and accordingly to the religion’s own ethical relation towards the world.  

In this final chapter of his study of the religions of China, Weber is opposing Puritanism and Confucianism on the basis of a degree of disenchantment and hence of the capacity for generating an inner-worldly ethic. He argues that Protestantism represents the most developed form of religion because it has most systematically eliminated the magical means of salvation, and the ascetic action of Protestantism has most effectively led to an inner-worldly oriented ethic (He considers Confucianism to hold an “enchanted garden” vision of ethics).

In his Zwischenbetrachtung at the end of Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie (GARS I), Weber describes the process of rationalisation...
on the cultural spheres as a journey towards disenchantment. In the clash of religion with the intellectual sphere, he notes:

The tension between religion and intellectual knowledge definitely comes to the fore wherever rational, empirical knowledge has consistently worked through to the disenchantment of the world and its transformation into a causal mechanism. For then science encounters claims of the ethical postulate that the world is a God-ordained, and hence somehow meaningfully and ethically oriented, cosmos. In principle, the empirical as well as the mathematically oriented view of the world develops refutations of every intellectual approach which in any case asks for a ‘meaning’ of inner-worldly occurrences. Every increase of rationalism in empirical science increasingly pushes religion from the rational into the irrational realm; but only today does religion become the irrational or anti-rational supra-human power.¹⁴ (Zwischenbetrachtung)

Thus as the cultural spheres rationalise meaning becomes increasingly scarce. The separation of the original magical-religious traces of knowledge from the developed rationalised spheres of culture, the Disenchantment of the World, thus comes at a price. The objectively given sense of meaning of previous ages is now no longer to be found but must rather be produced.¹⁵

¹⁴ GARS I, p. 564. “Wo immer aber rational empirisches Erkennen die Entzauberung der Welt und deren Verwandlung in einen kausalen Mechanismus konsequent vollzogen hat, tritt die Spannung gegen die Ansprüche des ethischen Postulates: daß die Welt ein gottgeordneter, also irgendwie ethisch sinnvoll orientierter Kosmos sei, endgültig hervor. Denn die empirische und vollends die mathematisch orientierte Weltbetrachtung entwickelt prinzipiell die Ablehnung jeder Betrachtungsweise, welche überhaupt nach einem »Sinn« des innerweltlichen Geschehens fragt. Mit jeder Zunahme des Rationalismus der empirischen Wissenschaft wird dadurch die Religion zunehmend aus dem Reich des Rationalen ins Irrationale verdrängt und nun erst: die irrationale oder antirational überpersönliche Macht schlechthin”.

¹⁵ The question of meaning and how one arrives at something that marks the modern period from its predecessors. The modern opposition between “nature” and “culture” was known to the Greeks but not accepted (Lucretius De rerum natura, Bk V). For the Greeks, true wisdom consists of submitting to nature not in vain attempts to overcome it. This changes in the Italian Renaissance. Increasingly, the idea develops that one should refuse to accept nature as simply given. Thus, for example, Pico della Mirandola’s Oratio speaks of the human as a protean being without a fixed nature and able to assume any. The Christian Middle Ages also followed the Greeks in accepting a rational order to the cosmos as a divinely given reality. Thus the political structure had to conform to the cosmic hierarchy as Thomas’s De Regimine Principium and Dante’s De Monarchia show. This view of the intrinsic rational order of the world begins to disintegrate in the nominalism of the late Middle Ages as notions of the cultural dominance of inert nature come to the fore. On this issue, see Louis Dupré “The Modern Idea of Culture: Its Opposition to Its Classical and Christian Roots”, in Ralph McInerney (ed.) Modernity and Religion, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1994, pp. 1-18.
Weber suggests that the three most rational routes of responding to this are to be found in:

i. The metaphysical route of the Indian religions.
ii. The ontological route of dualism in Zoroastrianism.
iii. The ethical route of Protestantism.

These are the three most consistent ways that Weber sees of responding to the theodicy challenge.

At the end of his consideration of Indian religions, he attempts to pull his findings together by comparing India with the West. In India, Weber finds a privileging of the monastic path to salvation. The consequence of this is that Indian paths to salvation prioritised special knowledge, philosophy or mysticism, which was the privilege of the few. This mystical soteriology thus led to a form of worship of the holy man or guru as the one who knew. Weber considers the power of the guru to be a charismatic power, a form of magic which together with the power of the family and other magical practices determined the course of Asiatic social order. His distinction between magic and a miracle is instructive in this regard because it acts a paradigmatic example for the differences in the modes of religious rationality.

The meaning of the “miracle” is always seen as an act of some rational world-guidance, of a divine conferring of grace and tends to be more interiorly motivated than the “spell” whose meaning is that the whole world is filled with irrationally effective magical powers. These magical powers are stored up in charismatically qualified, but according to their freely arbitrary acting essence, men or supermen, through their ascetical or contemplative achievements.16

Weber’s basic categories developed in speaking of Western rationality are used in his study of the religions of India. The opposition between contemplation and action, mysticism and asceticism structures his whole analysis of rationality, social action and the progress of modernity. He uses the biblical characters of Martha-Mary to represent this in a number of places in his sociology of religion and his use is instructive.

16 GARS II, p. 370. “Das »Wunder« wird seinem Sinn nach stets als Akt einer irgendwie rationalen Weltlenkung, einer göttlichen Gnadsendowment, angesehen werden und pflegt daher innerlich motivierter zu sein als der »Zauber«, der seinem Sinn nach dadurch entsteht, daß die ganze Welt von magischen Potenzen irrationaler Wirkungsart erfüllt ist und daß diese in charismatisch qualifizierten, aber nach ihrer eigenen freien Willkür handelnden Wesen, Menschen oder Übermenschen, durch asketische oder kontemplative Leistungen aufgespeichert sind”.

Contemplation is viewed as being separate from action, as passive and other-worldly. This again is a Protestant motif arising out of the separation of grace and nature. What was there to contemplate when all was a massa perditionis! As grace no longer permeated nature, there opened up an unbridgeable gap between heaven and earth. This was expressed in Luther’s notion of the Deus absconditus, and it structured the Protestant imagination. Catholicism too for Weber stood on the enchanted side of the garden due to its belief in the sacramental mediation of salvation.

3. The Origins of Disenchantment in Ancient Judaism

One would be wrong to see this process of disenchantment as originating in the Protestant Reformation. Weber finds its seeds in his study of Ancient Judaism. Even though the actual word “Entzauberung” does not occur in the text, the process which it describes is clearly present. In Reinhard Bendix’s study of Weber he suggests that the key intuition into the importance of ancient Judaism for his study of Western rationalism was the substitution of law for magic:

Free of magic and esoteric speculation, devoted to the study of law, vigilant in the effort to do “what was right in the eyes of the Lord” in the hope of a better future, the prophets established a religion of faith that subjected man’s daily life to the imperatives of a divinely ordained moral law. In this way ancient Judaism helped create the moral rationalism of Western civilization.17

Thus, for Weber, a process is begun in ancient Judaism which reaches its climax in ascetical Protestantism. The rationalisation of the religious ethic occurs through prophetic movements as the moral principles are codified as the law of Yahweh as a consequence of the Josianic reforms of the deuteronomistic tradition. The upshot of this is a rejection of magic as a response to the theodicy question.

In practice, the rejection of magic meant primarily that, unlike the process elsewhere, it was not systematised by priests for the sake of the taming of the masses…One of the fundamental theses even of the first prophet (Amos) was that Yahweh also sent all evil. In Israel, all evil was punishment or ordainment of the powerful god. Therefore, the development of the magical defence against demons was confronted with that of the purely ethical Torah and with the confession of sins as genuine means of control in the hands of the Levitical

priests. This exerted an all-pervasive influence upon the religious development of Israel.\(^{18}\)

In thus rejecting the magical practices as ways of dealing with the reality of evil, Weber sees Israel’s conscious rejection of the Babylonian dualism to lead to the ethical response to the theodicy question which characterises inner-worldly religions from Judaism to ascetical Protestantism.\(^{19}\) This represents the origin of the process of disenchantment which will eventually lead to its logical conclusion in the Puritanical groups of Protestantism. It also reinforces a central opposition that Weber suggests exists between mystical contemplation, as practiced in India, and inner-worldly asceticism.\(^{20}\) It reinforces this binary opposition because for magic, one can read “mystical contemplation,” whilst for ethics, one can read “inner-worldly rational action and knowledge.” This opposition between magic and knowledge is embodied in the institutionalisation of the legal reforms of the Torah in the deuteronomic tradition. It represents the way in which the contractual agreement of Yahweh and Israel in the \textit{Berith}, or Covenant, is made manifest in the social organisation of the community of Israel.\(^{21}\)

In following the ethical route to salvation spiritual capital was effectively democratised in ancient Judaism and Protestantism. Shifting spiritual capital from the enchanted garden of the monastery to the world of ordinary life was a key development, for Weber, in the Disenchantment of the World. Rather than mystical union being the goal, as in India, the aim of ancient Judaism was right action governed by divine law.

4. Models of Rationality in Weber’s \textit{Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft}

In Weber’s \textit{Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft} (WuG) his use of the concepts of asceticism and mysticism rests upon the differentiation of Lutheranism and


\(^{19}\) As in his study on India, Weber discusses the important difference between miracles and magic in terms of the increase of rationality that the religious understanding of miracles represents. See AJ, pp. 236-237.


\(^{21}\) See AJ, p. 233.
Calvinism as defined by Matthias Schneckenburger in his *Vergleichende Darstellung des lutherischen und reformierten Lehrbegriffs* of 1855. In his sociology of religion section of WuG, he sees asceticism as a religiously guided form of permanent behaviour. Contemplation for him is a certain type of consciousness in which the certainty of salvation is manifested. The categories of contemplation and action, mysticism and asceticism are used as typological markers to chart the progress of Western rationalism in the development from the darkness of magic to the light of reason.

The decisive historical difference between the predominantly oriental and Asiatic types of salvation religion and those found primarily in the Occident is that the former usually culminate in contemplation and the latter in asceticism. The great importance of this distinction, for our purely empirical consideration of religions, is in no way diminished by the fact that the distinction is a fluid one. Recurrent combinations of mystical and ascetic characteristics demonstrate that these heterogeneous elements may combine, as in the monastic religiosity of the Occident. For our concern is with the consequences for action.

This passage brings out clearly the elegant sleight of hand that Weber uses to organise his sociology of religion and theory of action. Since contemplation and action follow the principle of *ora et labora*, then whilst the West has examples of the contemplative type it is really in the East, most especially in India, that these techniques of ensuring a permanent sense of one’s own salvation have been most rationally developed. However, Weber’s typology really understands *ora et labora* as *ora aut labora*, that is to say *either* contemplation *or* action. He rules out *ora in labora* which is one of the key intuitions of the Catholic Reformation or Counter Reformation. This sleight of hand rules out any sociological significance being attributed to mysticism for action, as whilst the distinction may be “fluid”, and combinations have occurred, clearly Weber understands these

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“combinations” within his *ora aut labora* typology, and thus it has no real sociological relevance, since he assumes contemplation and action to be mutually exclusive. That is to say, whilst means (mysticism and asceticism) may combine, ends (contemplation and action) cannot. Moreover, this passage brings out clearly the confusion of the historical and analytical levels in Weber’s sociology of religion which have had major implications for his theory of action. In tying his analytical separation of asceticism and mysticism to the historical distinctions between the Occidental and the Indian salvation religions, he effectively eliminates the historical category of mysticism from having sociological significance in the Western world after the medieval Catholic organic ethics of St. Thomas Aquinas. This, of course, makes the narration of the Disenchantment of the World and of the rise of Western rationalism a much neater tale. However, we can now see more clearly that it distorts the picture of the historical development of the Western world according to the Protestant metanarrative.

As Schluchter notes, Weber’s *Einleitung* even lags behind WuG in regard to precision in separating the analytical and historical levels of analysis. Here Weber drops the distinction of world-rejecting asceticism

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24 Schluchter attempts to correct this assumption of Weber by analytically separating out activity and passivity from a presumed homogeneously constituted passive contemplation and active asceticism. However, he effectively diffuses the sociological potential of contemplation for a theory of action by limiting the attitude to the world held by an active contemplative or a passive ascetic to indifference or accepting one’s fate in the world. See Schluchter, Wolfgang, “Weber’s Sociology of Rationalism and Typology of Religious Rejections of the World,” in Lash, Scott and Whimster, Sam (eds.) *Max Weber, Rationality and Modernity*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1987, pp. 109-115. Thus the potential for a theory of contemplative action in Schluchter’s reconstruction of Weber remains sociologically defused since, while he allows for contemplation and action, in the examples of the medieval Catholicism of Thomism and Brahmsm, a strategy of organic relativisation following Weber’s allusion at the end of the Intermediate Reflections, he sees this within a framework of dualism. Thus, following Weber, he suggests that the combination of contemplation and an inner-worldly vocational ethic, the third form of theodicy dealt with by Weber in the Intermediate Reflections, was peculiar to the Indian intellectuals (see Intermediate Reflections, p. 359). Hence the combination of contemplation and action, by Schluchter, is within a framework of metaphysical dualism (or pluralism) in which this world and the other world remain securely in place, and hierocratic and political power separated (*ora et labora* and not *ora in labora*).

25 See Schluchter, op cit., pp. 106-107. Schluchter suggests that the key point is not simply terminological here, but rather the need to broaden the typology of asceticism and mysticism in order to better understand the impact of the religious rejection of the world for elaborating a better typology of attitudes towards the world and hence more sophisticated action theory. In doing this, Schluchter suggests that three aspects need to be analytically separated. First, the relation between the divine, man and the world. Second, the attitude of the person towards the world: either directed towards the world or away from the world,
and considers both mysticism and asceticism as types of salvation which reject the world. Yet, he continues to contrast the various types of world rejection in the *Einleitung* according to the inner-worldly and other-worldly (flight-from-the-world) schema of WuG. This results in him no longer distinguishing between inner-worldly asceticism and inner-worldly mysticism since inner-worldly is now equated with asceticism and other-worldly or flight-from-the-world with mysticism.26

Schluchtter’s attempt to rescue Weber’s typology from analytical and historical confusion and seeks to broaden the concepts of asceticism and mysticism from their equation with activity and passivity respectively. However, he continues to make the Weberian assumption that the direction of the religious effort of the mystic is necessarily other-worldly. This is seen by the fact that even though he allows for activity in the life of the mystic this cannot be considered as soteriologically significant action within the world.

and third, the content given to these dimensions, that is to say, the end state: active or passive, and the means of getting there: asceticism and contemplation. It is important to note that Schluchter follows Weber in confining this typology to religious virtuosi, since the “masses” tend towards a naïve affirmation of the world. In this sense he remains within Weber’s schema of prioritising the aristocratic model of salvation as sociologically significant for a theory of action. Thus even were one to criticise the innovation of the Catholic Reformation as being confined to the religious virtuosi, this critique would not damage the sociological significance of this innovation for a Weberian typology, which itself is confined to religious virtuosi (cf. Schluchter, op cit., p. 109). Nevertheless, even in his broadening of the types of asceticism and mysticism to be either active or passive in nature (Weber’s tool and vessel typology) and analytically separating these from the soteriological means of achieving these states (which are in turn reliant on a particular conception of God), that is to say, asceticism and mysticism, Schluchter continues to carry through Weber’s assumption of the necessary indifferent attitude to the world of the active contemplative into his own revised typology of means to salvation of the religious virtuosi. This effectively restricts the sociologically significant typology of means to salvation to two “historically and psychologically significant” forms. That is to say, to the inner-worldly active mystic who pursues world mastery (type 1 in Schluchter’s schema) and the other-worldly passive mystic who flees from the world (type 4 in Schluchter’s schema). As Schluchter notes, these two types are the main ones considered by Weber in the *Zwischenbetrachtung*. My critique here, is that in so limiting his typological scheme, Schluchter fails (as does Weber) to appreciate the sociological significance of the inner-worldly active mystic who pursues world mastery for a theory of action. I shall argue that this type is one major innovation of the spirituality of the Catholic Reformation, which has not been theorised in Weberian inspired theories of action which remain, at least implicitly, confined to a Protestant metanarrative of considering the world as a massa perditionis, rather than also a place of grace.

26 This is probably due to his analytic interest in *Einleitung* of contrasting the Christian attitude of action with the Indian attitude of knowledge (and thus not contrasting Lutheranism and Calvinism on the basis of emotionality as in PE).
If we follow our scheme, it appears, at least on the level of the virtuosi, as if cosmocentrism and inner-worldly asceticism as well as theocentrism and inner-worldly mysticism “exclude” one another.27

This is obviously a logical consequence of the Protestant understanding of theocentrism, as the Deus Absconditus of Luther which is implicit in both Weber’s and Schluchter’s typological construction. This becomes clearer a little later in Schluchter’s analysis of the specific contribution of ascetic Protestantism to the process of the disenchantment of the world.

Only in Calvinism and especially in Baptism, in short in ascetic Protestantism, is sacramental grace completely devalued in favour of a spiritual attitude and system of personal sanctification. With this spiritual turn ascetic Protestantism carried the “religious disenchantment of the world to its ultimate conclusion.” In Weber’s view, ascetic Protestantism combines five characteristics, which up to the Reformation no other salvation movement had successfully fused in Asia or the West: theocentrism, asceticism, inner-worldliness, personal sanctification and virtuosity. Only this combination produces the religious motivation for world mastery.28

5. Legal Rationalisation and Disenchantment

No less significant in Weber’s understanding of Disenchantment of the World is his sociology of law. Central to this is his Protestant conception of eschatology.

As a consequence of the New Testament’s eschatological withdrawal from the world, the basic writ of Christianity contains only such a minimum of formally


binding norms of a ritual or legal character that the way was left entirely free for purely rational enactment.29

Weber follows here the more Protestant understanding of eschatology defended by Luther and particularly Calvin in rejecting the realised eschatology in ecclesiological and sacramental form. This found new form in the Protestant History of Religion school conception of eschatology. The publication in 1892 of Johannes Weiß’s Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes (The Sermon of Jesus on the Kingdom of God) had marked a crucial moment in nineteenth-century Protestant theology.30 Weiß rejected the view put forward by his stepfather Albrecht Ritschl, that eschatology found its embodiment in the ethical action for the kingdom of God and rather, like Calvin, saw the kingdom of God as an eschatological future-oriented transcendental reality which found no trace in present historical reality. This clearly fitted well with Weber’s conception of legal rationalisation as being allowed by the eschatological withdrawal from the world as interpreted by the liberal Protestant eschatology of Johannes Weiß. It left morality and law the eschatological freedom to be grounded in secular reason and, in this way, Weber interprets Luther’s opposition between “the law and the Gospel” as being prefigured in New Testament eschatological rejection of the world. The consequence, of course, is that the way is opened to rationalise the legal procedure of the world since, whilst the Gospel concentrates on the world to come, secular rationality serves the needs of this world.31 The withdrawal of eschatology from the world thus

29 WuG, p. 480. “und das Neue Testament enthielt nur ein solches Minimum formal bindender Normen rituellen oder rechtlichen Charakters – eine Folge der eschatologischen Weltabgewandtheit -, daß eben dadurch die Bahn völlig frei war für rein rationale Satzung”.


31 Indeed Weber’s argument here also resembles that of Rudolf Sohm’s critique of the Catholic understanding of canon law. Sohm argued (following Luther and Calvin) that because any visible church was not the church of Christ but merely a human community, then the true church of Christ was invisible and guided by the Spirit directly through the various charisms which the Spirit freely gives. This meant that canon law was simply a human creation with no justification in the Gospel since the old law (in the Pauline sense) was in opposition to the new freedom of the children of God. The “Justification by Faith” teaching of Luther provides the framework in which this understanding of canon law was developed by Sohm. It sees a clear opposition between visible and invisible church, history and eschatology, and the kingdom of God and the world. This Protestant tradition informs Weber’s own categorisation and once again positions his theory of legal rationalisation firmly within the liberal Protestant tradition. For a systematic discussion of Sohm’s work and its critique of the Catholic tradition of canon law see, Reinhold Sebott, Fundamentalkanonistik. Grund und
serves the advance of Weber’s Protestant conception of modernity and its legal rationalisation.32

6. Disenchantment and Rationality in the Munich Speeches

In his two famous Munich speeches: Science as a Vocation, Science, and Politics as a Vocation, Politics, Weber raises the question of how one can follow a vocation when one is no longer charged with the task of showing “the path of God”. This is the modern condition of the Disenchantment of the World for Weber.

Under these internal presuppositions, what is the meaning of science as a vocation, now after all these former illusions, “the way to true being,” the “way to true nature,” the “way to true God,” the “way to true happiness,” have been dispelled? Tolstoy has given the simplest answer with these words: “Science is meaningless because it gives no answer to our question, the only important question for us: What shall we do and how shall we live?” That science does not give an answer to this is indisputable. The only question that remains is the sense in which science gives “no” answer, and whether or not science might yet be of some use to the one who puts the question correctly.33

Interesting also in Science is that Weber defines his concept of disenchantment as mastery of the world through calculation, a consequence of the rationalisation and intellectualisation of the modern world.

The increasing intellectualisation and rationalisation do not, therefore, indicate an increased and general knowledge of the conditions under which one lives. It means something else, namely, the knowledge or belief that, if one but

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32 Weber also notes the importance of the strong universalistic Roman law tradition in Italy which served the Italian bourgeoisie in the Italian city states in limiting the universalistic pretensions of the Papacy and in this sense, allowed for a secular legal space to be preserved. See WuG, p. 481.

wishes, one could learn it at any time. Hence, it means that principally there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one can, in principle, master all things by calculation. This means that the world is disenchanted. One need no longer have recourse to magical means in order to master or implore the spirits, as did the savage, for whom such mysterious powers existed. Technical means and calculations perform the service. This above all is what intellectualisation means.34

Thus the capacity to calculate provides a non-magical or disenchanted form of the mastery of the world. Again one hears echo’s of Weber’s notions of asceticism, of personality, and of the anti-sacramental understanding of existence. The typically Protestant notion of the removal of all traces of God from the cosmos, the so-called Catholic notion of vestigium trinitatis, is a necessary condition for Weber’s understanding of disenchantment, intellectualisation and rationalisation.

Friedman Voigt has looked at the indebtedness of Weber to Protestant theology in his Munich speeches, noting the particular influence of the Old Testament scholar Julius Welhausen on the prophets. Weber employs the idea of the prophet that he had used in his study of ancient Judaism in his Munich speeches to speak of the uncompromising, honest individual who has special knowledge and is charged with communicating this knowledge to the people.

This conception of the prophet essentially becomes Weber’s model for the “man of vocation” in both Science and Politics. The prophet represented the individual who stood against the compromises of the institution, the charismatically inspired man of conviction who felt called to speak the truth regardless of the consequences. This intellectual honesty of the Jewish prophets was the sign and the embodiment of reason, of a process of rationalisation in which Judaism clearly represented an advance over the sacrificial practices of the mythological priesthoods of the other ancient Near Eastern peoples. The ethical demands of these prophets, to care for the poor and the weak, for foreigners and widows and orphans replaced the

priestly demands for sacrificial appeasement of the gods through ritually
controlled practices. The price paid by the prophet for such uncompromising
honesty was separation from the ordinary life of the people in order to
ensure the preservation of the integrity of his message. It was this ascetical
picture of the prophets of Israel which became for Weber the paragon for
the man of vocation under the conditions of disenchantment, that is, in the
modern secular world. This image of the prophet was a typical one in the
Protestant History of Religion school at the end of the nineteenth century
and clearly provided Weber with a framework for his notions of personality
and asceticism that feature so prominently in his works from the Protestant
Ethic to his Munich speeches.35

The figure of the prophet is also used by Weber as symbol of true
academic research free of the intellectual compromises of the dogmatically
bound thinkers he found so repugnant. This notion of value-free science
propagated by Weber was strongly critical of what he considered to be
value-bound science as propagated by Catholic intellectuals and those that
used their own academic posts to sell their own ideological positions. The
Kulturkampf background to the German university system is clearly a major
Protestant influence on Weber which sets the framework of his views. It is
thus not surprising that we should find a theological critique in Weber’s
Science, as theology represented par excellence that academic discipline
in which the history of Germany in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries had shown was most susceptible to the dangers of indoctrination.
Protestantism is thus represented by Weber as the inheritor of the honesty
and intellectual rigour of the Jewish prophets against the ideological and
institutionally compromised position of the Catholic Church which only
propagated the decadence of intellectual dilettantism. Consequently, the
separation of religious convictions from scientific research, the major form
in which Science conceives the disenchantment of the world and the process
of secularisation under the modern conditions of intellectualisation, is
itself a Protestant position which Weber inherits from Schleiermacher and
much of nineteenth-century Protestant thought and adopts in his address
to the students in Munich as his vision of the vocation of an academic in
modernity.

This lack of objectivity in science is characteristic of Catholicism, for
Weber, and found its embodiment in the Catholic Centre Party, the Zentrum.

35 See, Friedemann Voigt, “Das Protestantische Erbe in Max Webers Vorträgen über
‘Wissenschaft als Beruf’ und ‘Politik als Beruf’,” Zeitschrift für Neuere Theologie Ges-
chichte, 9, 2, 2002, p. 255.
The confessionalisation of political parties and science was something Weber strongly resisted. He was outraged, on this front, by the appointment of a Catholic professor at the University of Strasbourg and this was an influence on his stress on objectivity in his Munich speeches. Thus in Science and Politics we find different routes for the elimination of religion from these spheres in the process of secularisation. For Science, on the one hand, religion is eliminated because of the need for intellectual honesty, as freedom from value commitment ensures methodological objectivity. For Politics, on the other hand, religion is to remove itself from political engagement because the politics of responsibility, which alone can make the necessary compromises required for parliamentary democracy, are incompatible with the politics of conviction which are inevitable for the religious believer. Even more than that, Weber suggests that for religious convictions to remain pure, the religious believer has to remove himself from the political sphere, as Jeremiah did from the community, in order to preserve these convictions from contamination with the compromises of the world. In both Science and Politics then the consequence is a retreat of the religious sphere into the privacy of the inner convictions of the heroic individual. A retreat mirrored in Weber’s own political convictions after the failure of his political career and his retreat into the scientifically pure world of academia. In a disenchanted world the compromises of instrumentally rational politicians are to ensure that power remains in the hands of the state, whatever the cost.

III. CONCLUSION

In the philosophical discourse of modernity the concept of rationality has provided a framework which orchestrates a dominant account of the emergence of Western civilisation. Beginning with the Pre-Socratics or the reform movements within ancient Judaism this narrative has mixed together normative and descriptive elements in ways which have often purported to be simply the neutral march of science and progress. I have argued that Max Weber’s version of this account has fused a Protestant normative vision together with a philosophical and sociological description of the developmental dominance of formal and instrumental rationalities in the Western world. Revealing the particularity of this account of modernity

opens up a fascinating research program which has recently been called “sub-altern”\textsuperscript{37} studies or “multiple-modernities.”\textsuperscript{38} Essentially, the core idea here is, following a well rehearsed intuition of Charles Taylor, accounts of modernity are empowered by a normative vision which grounds their conceptions of the good, and provides civilisations with a measure of their own worth.\textsuperscript{39} Uncovering the normative vision of the West reveals the often hidden normative presuppositions that embody this particular account of modernity.

In articulating a Protestant account of modernity Max Weber has provided a general narrative account of the emergence of the Western world that has influenced thinkers such as Jürgen Habermas, Michel Foucault, and John Rawls. However, these normative visions fall into the trap of providing overly homogenised accounts of Western modernity which are blind to their own particular normative presuppositions.\textsuperscript{40} In locating the normative presuppositions of Weber’s concepts of disenchantment and rationality in a nineteenth century Protestant account of modernity one cannot help but ask, what other conceptions of modernity might illuminate about both the particularity and singularity of the West?\textsuperscript{41}

\textbf{LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS OF WEBER’S WORKS}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{AJ:} \textit{Das Antike Judentum} in GARS III.
  \item \textbf{Einleitung:} In \textit{Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen}, GARS I: 237-275.
\end{itemize}


Science: Wissenschaft als Beruf, in GAW, 582-613.
Politics: Politik als Beruf, in GPS, 505-560.
WEWR: Die Wirtschaft Ethik der Weltreligionen. In GARS I.