The Face of the Soul, the Face of God
Maximus the Confessor and Prosōpon

Marcin Podbielski

Abstract This paper offers a comprehensive examination of the language of “prosōpon” in Maximus the Confessor. It emerges that “prosōpon” almost never has an autonomous meaning in Maximus’ Christology and anthropology. While “person” is either a synonym for “hypostasis” or a term expressing heretical Christological doctrines, it may be used in its own right when Maximus emphasizes the fact that human actions make each of us recognizable as a unique individual. This usage cannot be separated from the colloquial meanings of “face” and “character,” or from instances of “prosōpon” in Maximian Biblical exegesis. “The face of the intellect,” identified with “the face of Christ” within us and reflected in our actions as “the face of the soul,” is the perfect image of the eternal Divine logoi of virtues, impressed by grace in the intellect of saints and reflected in their actions. Possessing one’s own “persona” or “face,” and building one’s uniqueness through one’s own decisions, is of less interest to Maximus than assimilation of oneself to Christ.

Keywords Byzantine philosophy; hypostasis; Maximus the Confessor; person

1. PUTTING TOGETHER A PICTURE, RECONSTRUCTING A THEORY
While many words have been written about Maximus the Confessor’s view of human nature and persons, none of the seriously respected studies have been informed by a complete investigation of his vocabulary. In my opinion, it is precisely this omission that makes those studies prone to the serious error warned against by Jean-Claude Larchet, when he says that “it is not methodologically correct to wish to pronounce judgments on ancient usage [of terms] on the basis of present usage.”¹

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It must be admitted that studying a Patristic author like Maximus, who wrote either polemical texts or Biblical commentaries, and whose conceptions are rarely developed into any form of systematic exposition, presents many challenges. Contemporary investigations into Maximus’ thought seem to be modeled on the approach of classical works, like Hans Urs von Balthasar’s Cosmic Liturgy² and Lars Thunberg’s Microcosm and Mediator.³ Those scholars sought to propose synthetic pictures of Maximus’ views by organizing his remarks, set forth in various works, into a logically cogent order. Their method was possibly a necessity in studies that aimed at reawakening interest in this theologically important and inspiring author. Nevertheless, in later investigations, their method should have been completed by a truly analytical approach, so that the reconstruction of Maximus' views would then itself crown a detailed and comprehensive analysis of his texts, performed from philological, philosophical and theological angles. Yet the scholars who try to explain what being a person, a hypostasis, an individual, or having a nature, means in Maximus—or, at least, the majors scholars whose work I have been able to consult—give their inquiries the structure of global and consistent pictures, created out of a patchwork of quotes and references.⁴ The internal consistency of those


3. Lars Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator: The Theological Anthropology of Maximus the Confessor, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Open Court, 1995).

pictures and references to various works is probably considered to constitute a guarantee of the methodological correctness of the interpretations they are proposing of personhood in Maximus. One might even argue that this is the appropriate method for studying an author like him, as it is impossible to grasp his views clearly without building a whole out of the many sets of ideas he tossed around in his work.

It can be admitted that assembling a consistent picture on the basis of a multiplicity of remarks appears similar to putting pieces of jigsaw puzzle next to one another. In a given puzzle, however, there is a pre-ordained place for every such piece. In a synthetic doctrinal picture, shown in a short paper or a chapter, there is (a) no possibility to take all elements into consideration, (b) no guarantee that the elements actually fit together in the manner in which they are being organized, as this would require logical and doctrinal analysis of the arguments in which they figure, (c) no guarantee that those elements constitute parts of such a postulated picture at all, especially if the person who created them never bothered with establishing such a picture himself, and (d) no guarantee that the consistency of the theoretical image created in this way does not stem from a superimposed idea. The building blocks of ideas, like the physical building blocks, do not have to fit one to another, and those which do can be arranged according to almost any plan or preconception whatsoever.

Precisely for this reason, we may suspect that someone who finds personhood defined in Maximus as a self-determining reality is superimposing a modern view of personhood on him. What appears closely linked to a modern view of personhood is, especially, the insistence that Maximus refrains from referring the term person to non-intelligent beings, and that he asserts the ontological primacy of persons in respect of nature, or that, when speaking about the Divine grace which elevates human beings above nature, he suggests that this consists, actually, in liberating persons from nature.⁵

In this paper, I wish to approach the issue of personhood in Maximus in a manner in line with the methodological principles of classical studies,

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which do not allow one to proceed immediately to a more or less summary overview. Quite obviously, though, I can only propose to perform one single task out of the many in fact required before any synthetic image could be offered by way of conclusion. This will be the task of comprehensively analyzing the usage of the term “πρόσωπον” in the Maximian corpus. I view it as an initial, but also unavoidable, stage within any comprehensive inquiry into the issue of personhood.

2. Patristic Investigation and the Methodology of Classical Studies

The proposal of conducting an analysis of occurrences of a word and its cognates, as an initial task forming part of an extended investigation into personhood in Maximus, stems from accepting a notion which is, ostensibly, obvious and hardly questioned at all: that patrological inquiries should apply the contemporary methodology of classical studies in all its integrity. Let me point, below, to some components of this methodology, and explain how they apply to investigations of the problem of personhood in Maximus.

(1) Correct textual basis

Practically all major ancient Greek authors can be read nowadays in modern editions, which take into consideration all known manuscripts and recent textual findings. This will, hopefully, also be the case with Maximus, once the new complete edition of his works has been produced by the classical and Byzantine scholars from the Catholic University of Leuven and their collaborators.⁶ At the moment, Peter Van Deun, Basile Markesinis, and Bram Roosen are working on new editions of the so called minor works of Maximus—his opuscula and epistles. Some of their proposals and new editions are already accessible in their papers. Bram Roosen’s unpublished thesis⁷ allows one to glimpse future volumes of Maximus’ Opera. It is already clear that certain opuscula and letters considered important for Maximus’ view of personhood must be rejected, as without a doubt they do...

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⁶ I mean here former and current scholars from KU Leuven Michel Van Esbroeck, Geerard Maurits, Noret Jacques, Constant De Vocht, Carl Laga, Carlos G Steel, Gysens Steven, Bart Janssens, Peter Van Deun, Basile Markesinis, Bram Roosen, and also José H. Declerck from Gent and Christian Boudignon from Université d’Aix-Marseille.

not represent his views. The list shown below only contains those works in which instances of “πρόσωπον” or related vocabulary can be found. Roosen’s important editorial decisions, pertinent to the issue of personhood, are discussed in the next section.

1. The text usually referred to as Theologica et polemica 23;
2. The first part of Theologica et polemica 26;
3. Loci Communes (CPG 7718);
4. Diversa capita ad theologiam et oeconomiam spectantia deque virtute et vitio (xxvi–d) (CPG 7715);
5. Scholia in Ecclesiasten (CPG 7711/05).

In my search I will be labeling as dubious the two important texts—both of which have been attributed by many (though not all) distinguished scholars to Maximus:

6. The passages ascribed by Beate Suchla⁸ Paul Rorem, and John C. Lamoreaux⁹ to Maximus within the Scholia in Corpus Aeropagiticum;

In line with the tradition originating from the Combefis edition, I retain within the Maximian corpus some of the texts relating events from his life and adducing his purported utterances. These are Relatio Motionis, Disputatio Bizyae, and also Disputatio cum Pyrrho. This inclusion must be done, however, with caution. As Jacques Noret shows, there are reasons for treating the last work as having been written well after the events it depicts, and possibly in order to make a statement in the theological politics of that era. In turn, as Noret holds, other reports regarding Maximus’s discussions and speeches can be accepted with rather less scepticism.¹⁰ For

those reasons, I classify all works of this kind as a separate group of “re-
lata.” It is worth also mentioning here that all works of Maximus adduced
or cited in this paper are enumerated separately in the bibliography only.¹¹

(2) Comprehensive lexical inquiry
Modern classical scholarship does not rely any more on thesauri, either
of Greek literature as a whole or those devoted to particular major au-
thors. They used to be necessary for establishing the meaning of key terms
in philosophy and theology— terms that also had a plethora of everyday
meanings, preserved from antiquity until the present day. Now, in the era
of digital classical scholarship, these thesauri can easily be replaced by
computerized searches of texts. This development is even more important
for Maximus, whose works were never indexed completely on paper. New
editions of Maximus’ works are in the process of being successively in-
cluded into the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae database, while works that
can be consulted in the Combeﬁs edition only have been digitalized in a
separate project."¹² There are no obstacles anymore for Maximian schol-
ars that would prevent them from supporting their claims about Maximus’
terminology through comprehensive studies of his word usage.

As I believe, undertaking this is particularly important in the case of the
issue of personhood. The very word usually rendered as “person,” “τὸ πρό-
σωπον,” has never lost, in Greek, its original meaning of “face,” while ac-
quiring, according to the dictionary of Dimitrios Dimitrakou,¹³ altogether

11. The bibliography shows the editions referred to for each text, preceded in each case
by the corresponding abbreviation. In the case of texts for which Combeﬁs’ edition is used,
as well as for Scholia in the Corpus Areopagiticum, Migne’s volume is omitted in citations, as
it is mentioned in the relevant bibliographical entry. An abbreviation may be followed by
the parenthesis “( )” with a number in between, corresponding to one of the chronological
numbers attributed to the majority of extant texts by Polycarp Sherwood in An Annotated
Date-list of the Works of Maximus the Confessor.

12. This work has been performed as a task of the EU Regional Development Project
Interreg IIIA “Δρόμοι της πίστης-ψηφιακή Πατρολογία,” at the Aegean University,
Department of Cultural Technology and Communication, in 2006. All materials pro-
duced in the project can be freely used, provided their source is pointed to. It is a
pity that those materials are not any more available at the former official site of the
project http://patrologia.ct.aegean.gr. Cf. the short pieces of information at http://www.i-
m-patron.gr/i-m-patron-old.gr/news1/news_2007/dromoi_pistis.html; http://www.ct.aeg-
ean.gr/tpetools/external_pages/ext_programms.php. Some of them may be found at
http://www.myriobiblos.gr/texts/greek/maximos/index.htm. Still, all unofficially pub-
lished materials produced by the project remain in the public domain.

13. Dēmētrios Dēmētrakou, Mega lexikon holēs tēs hellenikēs glossēs (Athens: Ekdoseis
Domē, 1964), s.v. “πρόσωπον.”
twelve other related meanings. Its technical theological meaning is only the last of these. All those meanings are interconnected. Besides, the word has great metaphorical potential due to its frequent usage in the Septuagint. The Septuagint regularly re-literalizes the Hebrew verb "לֵצָן" (meaning “to turn, to face”) as "πρόσωπον," and "מפני" (meaning “from, in favor of,” or, in the Bible, also “because of, due to, as expression of”) as "ἀπὸ προσώπου" or “from the face.” For all those reasons, focusing a priori only on theological contexts should be considered an error. The scale of the error it may actually engender is something that will only emerge in the final part of this paper.

In this text, I will offer a detailed study of the vocabulary of “πρόσωπον” in Maximus. Unlike the recently published article of Jean-Claude Larchet,¹⁴ it scrutinizes all kinds of instances and is based on a study of the complete Maximian corpus. It uses the methods of classical philology, in that it proceeds by grouping and comparing instances. The study covers 373 instances, distributed unevenly among 46 out of the 169 Maximus’ works and opuscula: 242 in authentic works, 15 in dubia, 40 in spuria, 76 in re-lata. Metaphorical usages are set apart and their meaning is analyzed with all the attention they deserve. The philological approach is completed by preliminary textual analysis, which allows one to pass from the study of word usage to definitions of the concepts expressed in the terminology. While final theoretical conclusions cannot be reached in this way, several building blocks that contribute to our picture of personhood in Maximus are reconstructible using this approach.

(3) Comparative theoretical inquiry and synthetic reconstruction
This kind of analysis is usually followed, in classical studies, by a comparative study, which itself involves various kinds of analysis. Terms used in various contexts should be set one against another, and possible conclusions evaluated comparatively. Analyses of logical consistency, external influences, and internal development, are performed at this stage of the investigation. Concepts are viewed at this juncture as functioning within arguments and claims.

A synthetic reconstruction of the views of an author normally follows on from all those earlier stages. At this point, arguments and claims are viewed as a whole. This stage of investigation is concerned with the theory of the author being scrutinized. While logically different from the inquiries of the preceding stage, the sort of analysis that examines a theory as a

¹⁴. Larchet, “Hypostase, personne et individu.”
whole can also be intertwined with detailed comparative analysis. This is because any theory must be recovered from the texts being studied rather than being imposed on them.

Most obviously, it is impossible to contain the theoretical part of the examination of personhood in Maximus in one short paper. Thanks to the lexical analyses presented below, however, it is possible to rule out the idea that Maximus held views somehow similar to modern forms of personalism. I can already assure the reader that the analyses I wish to offer here are, somewhat surprisingly, by no means dull and technical. They point to some groups of usages overlooked by all of the authors who have studied the issue, and which shed much light on their strictly anthropological discussions. It turns out that preliminary conclusion based on a comprehensive analysis can overturn a complex and consistent, still purely synthetic, picture.

3. “Person” in the Ontology of Christology and Trinitology

Not only is it the case that none of the studies of the issue of personhood in Maximus are based on a complete scrutiny of the vocabulary relating to “πρόσωπον:” none of the respected studies tries to look beyond the contexts of Christological and Trinitological discussions. Thus it is that those discussions and theoretical considerations of the concepts used therein have become the place to go for those seeking a definition of “person” in Maximus. Various authors deliberate as to whether the meaning of “πρόσωπον” differs from that of “ὑπόστασις” or “ἄτομον”—and, if so, in what respects it differs and what conception of persons it conveys. Even the most comprehensive study, while very balanced in the conclusions it draws from those contexts, does not look into most loci of Maximus’ work.¹⁵

I am not going to engage in this kind of discussion of the meaning of “person,” even if I could bring into those debates a complete survey of the usage of “πρόσωπον” in the contexts in question. My reluctance has a very simple reason: the way in which the word was used in those contexts is rooted in a figure of speech that becomes canonical through its prominent place in the Chalcedon statement, but which actually dates from much earlier. The relevant passage of the Chalcedon, whose content and letter were staunchly defended by Maximus, is not long:

15. I mean here the aforementioned paper of Jean-Claude Larchet, “Hypostase, personne et individu.”
Following thus the Holy Fathers, we also all affirm univocally in our teaching one and the same Lord of us, Jesus Christ, who is the same perfect in divinity and in humanity, . . . one and the same only-begotten Christ, known as being unconfused, unchangeable, undivided, inseparable in two natures—as the difference of the natures is by no means destroyed because of the union, but rather the peculiarity of each of the natures is preserved and concurs into one person and one hypostasis—[we affirm the Christ] who is neither split nor divided into two persons, but is the one and the same only-begotten Son of God, the Word, Lord Jesus Christ. . . .

This formulation, rooted in the doctrines of Cyril of Alexandria but encountered very frequently since Gregory of Nyssa, places the terms “ὑπόστασις” and πρόσωπον in a hendiadys. In a classical hendiadys, the two terms brought together create a new meaning and receive a new reference. It is not exactly the case here. Rather, the two terms are used in this way in order to point to the fact that their extension (if one can use this term in respect of the Trinity) is identical. The emphasis brought about by their usage in the hendiadys points to the fact that the two terms are, in a way, imperfect in their applicability to the mystery of the Trinity, and should not be separated. This in turn means that while their referents are identical, their import is somewhat different.

This interpretation of the Chalcedon statement’s hendiadys—obvious if one considers the rhetorical customs of Ancient Greek, but possibly less incontrovertible in the case of a Patristic text—is, in fact, confirmed by one of the first texts in which the two terms show up together. In his Panarion, Epiphanius of Salamis quotes a letter from George of Laodicea. George, after having summarized the orthodox doctrine of the Persons in the Trinity (73.14.3, = III.286.22–27), explains that “The easterners say ‘hypostases’ as an acknowledgment of the subsistent, real individualities of the persons.” In other words, he points to the fact that the doctrinal emphasis of “ὑπόστασις” is different from that of “πρόσωπον,” which is treated in his

16. All translations whose author is not mentioned are mine.
17. See eg. Ad Graecos ex communibus notionibus 3,1.31.18, 33.4; Contra Eunomium 1.1.228.2, 229.6, 503.6; Epistulae, 24.7.7.
synopsis as a standard label for the members of the Trinity, pointing as he does to their differing in respect of their properties.

An important Maximian definition would seem to confirm this kind of reading. It contains a double hendiadys, and allows for a difference in the meanings of the terms. It also situates the two concepts in a theoretical framework:

Hypostasis and person are the same, for both [are identifiable with] particular and the proper, as far as it concerns their description [περιγραφή], but they do not possess their own predication, in the manner of natures, referable to the multiplicity [of things]. (TP14 (50), 152A1–4)

Firstly, the definition affirms that the two words have the same reference. This is clear, since the two, used in a generic manner, are attributed the features conveyed by the terms “particular” and “the proper,” but their meaning is not identified with the meaning of those terms. Furthermore, they are explained through their place in predication. As they are not predicable of multiple objects and cannot point, in this way, to any kind of nature, the two terms are shown to function in a manner similar to that of proper names. This means that both “ὑπόστασις” and “πρόσωπον” are characterized here as metalinguistic terms, referable to all kinds of names of individuals, by virtue of emphasizing the fact of particularity and the uniqueness of an individual. Yet, it does not seem that particularity and uniqueness describe either “ὑπόστασις” or “πρόσωπον” separately. Rather, they are used as a common περιγραφή—i.e. description—of one and the same type of reality with two names and, possibly, two different meanings.

While Maximus is well aware that some things can differ either conceptually or actually,¹⁹ and that, because of that, one ought to be able also to distinguish between conceptual and merely verbal differences between two co-extensive terms, he does not bother, at least in this definition, to distinguish between the meanings of “ὑπόστασις” and “πρόσωπον.” If this

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¹⁹. Such a distinction may be found in a later text of Maximus, TP19 (75), 221D8–224A1. One encounters there a passage devoted to the issue of whether the wills of Christ are known merely “in conceptual division, without verifiable evidence,” “ἐν τῇ κατ᾽ ἐπίνοιαν διαίρέσει, ψυλώς” and the Incarnation is “viewed in the mode of separation [i.e, abstraction] and of imagination,” “κατά διαίρεσιν . . . λαμβανομένη καὶ φαντασίαν,” or those wills are known “properly and as realities,” “κυρίως καὶ πραγματικῶς γνωρισθήσονται,” and, as a result, the Incarnation is considered as something φυσικόν, i.e., present in nature. See also Ep12, (66) MPG91, 468C14–D2. Cf. also TP16 (74), MPG91, 189A1–10.
were his practice in the rest of his work, then it would make sense to explain the meaning of each of them separately, in order to go back to the hendiadys. If the definition reflects the typical way in which the terms are used by Maximus, the next step would not be analyzing their theological hendiadys, but, instead, placing them within the context of Maximus’ logical remarks and his views of how the terms are predicated. The concluding remark in the definition adduced above can be viewed, actually, as a simplified reference to Porphyry’s *Isagoge*, where the only reality not predicated of other things is individual, ἄτομον, while the proper, ἴδιον, can be predicated of both genus and individual.²⁰

Naturally, such a course of action can be taken only if Maximian usage of “πρόσωπον” in Christological and Trinitological contexts is related, in actuality, to the Chalcedonian hendiadys. If it is so, tracing down other, non-theological contexts of “πρόσωπον” will make even more sense. Thus, in this study, I will limit myself to verifying the patterns of Maximus’ deployment of the terminology of persons in just those contexts.

It can be said that those patterns do conform broadly to the one established by the Chalcedonian statement. My claim requires, however, some qualifications. Firstly, it is so, providing we accept the textual findings of Bram Roosen. Secondly, there are some peculiarities and significant exceptions to the pattern of hendiadys.

A very frequently adduced definition, which differentiates between “πρόσωπον” and “ὑπόστασις” and relates them to each other, can be found in a text re-edited and athetized by Bram Roosen, *Capita de substantia*, formerly referred to as the first part of *Theologica et polemica 23*, i.e., *Capita de substantia seu essentia et natura, deque hypostasi et persona*.

Ὁτι ἡ μὲν ὑπόστασις⟨,⟩ πρόσωπον ἀφορίζει τοῖς χαρακτηριστικοῖς ἰδιώμασι.²¹

[He says] that a hypostasis determines a person through characteristic properties.

There can be no doubt that this passage is a quote from a statement of Leontius of Byzantium. The text shown above differs from a phrase in Leontius’ *Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos* merely by the fact that its author replaced “καὶ” by “ὅτι,” making it clear in this way that his phrase

²¹. TP23a, 261A13–14 = CSu, γ[δ]’ 1–2, comma in “Ο”-type angle-braces added by Roosen.
is a kind of quotation. However, the complete passage from Leontius, on which the notes that constitute CSu are based, is much more easy to read. The author of the CSu cuts into pieces, among others, the following Leontian sentences, in an effort to turn them into a set of ostensibly definitional claims:

(a) Οὐ ταὐτὸν, ὡς ταῦτα ὑπόστασις καὶ ἐνυπόστατον, ὡς τε ἑτέρον οὐσία καὶ ἐνούσιον. | (b) Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὑπόστασις τὸν τίνα δηλοῖ, | (c) τὸ δὲ ἐνυπόστατον τὴν οὐσίαν. | (d) καὶ ἡ μὲν ὑπόστασις πρόσωπον ἄφοριζε τοῖς χαρακτηριστικοῖς ἰδιώμασι, τὸ δὲ γε ἐνυπόστατον τὸ μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸ συμβεβηκός δηλοῖ, | (e) ὡς ἑτέρῳ ἐχεῖ τὸ εἶναι, καὶ οὐκ ἐν ἑαυτῷ θεωρεῖται. | (f) — οὐδετέρα ἐς τὴν οὐσίαν. | (g) ὡς χρῶμα ἐν σώματι καὶ ὡς ἐπίστημη ἐν ψυχῇ. (CNE, Daley 8.20–28 = MPG86, 1277C13–D6)

In the text adduced above, the author focuses on distinguishing between “hypostasis” and “the in-hypostatic.” The first term is referred to “the someone,” i.e., to human beings, whom we, but not the author, call “persons.” “The someone,” defining hypostasis, is not identical with “πρόσωπον.” Being “πρόσωπον” appears to be a consequence of the fact that every human is a hypostasis, as it is thanks to her or his hypostasis that a “person” is determined by characteristic properties. It seems, thus, that those characteristic properties, while being ontologically linked with the hypostasis or the substance, also shape a functional reality called the “person.” The “in-hypostatic,” in turn, refers to the substance as something which is not an accident in a hypostasis. Substance is different from hypostasis, but is also a “subsistent thing”—i.e. something which has the kind of being proper to a hypostasis. It seems, thus, that the two terms point to two sides of a reality that is an irresolvable and organic composition of being “substance” and “hypostasis”—to its independent existence and to its possession of a “substance” in the sense of a set of defining, non-accidental properties. This substance-and-hypostasis is thus an independent, complete thing, not just a collection of properties. The latter is a feature of persons, which turns out to be a kind of functional expression of the hypostasis itself.

Such an interpretation is very difficult to reach on the basis of the version of the text contained in the Maximian Corpus. In the quote above, vertical bars point to the places in which Leontius’ argument was cut into
phrases and dispersed over CSu.²² The “⟨⟩”-type angle braces show the text which has been significantly altered by the author of CSu. The first alteration can even change the subject of the phrase. As a result, various interpretations of the ostensibly Maximian passage have been offered, aimed most frequently at demonstrating his personalism along lines similar to the modern view of a person as “someone”—i.e. a unique human being. A conclusion of this sort could, however, only be derived from the distorted text. CSu, even if drafted by Maximus, neither presents his authentic thought nor makes any consistent interpretation possible. Therefore, I do not consider it necessary to introduce considerations of “the work formerly known as Theologica et polemica 23” into debates about the Maximian understanding of persons.

The next text affected by the findings of Bram Roosen is the one formerly known as Theologica et Polemica 26, Ex quaestionibus a Theodoro monacho illi propositis. The definition of hypostasis in this work is adduced by almost every scholar dealing with the issue of personhood in Maximus, as it appears to identify hypostasis with a particular human “being personally distinguished from other people”:

\[ \text{Ὑπόστασις δὲ ἐστὶν, κατὰ μὲν φιλοσόφους, οὐσία μετὰ ἰδιωμάτων· κατὰ δὲ τοὺς Πατέρας, ὅ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἄνθρωπος, προσωπικῶς τῶν ἄλλων ἄνθρωπων ἀφοριζόμενος. (TP26, 276A1–B3)} \]

This may be read as suggesting that, according to the Fathers, hypostasis is the metaphysical principle of specifically human personhood. However, the text, as corrected by Roosen on the basis of a wider range of manuscripts, is somewhat different:

\[ \text{Ὑπόστασίς ἐστι, κατὰ μὲν φιλοσόφους, οὐσία μετὰ ἰδιωμάτων, κατὰ δὲ τοὺς πατέρας, καθ᾽ἕκαστον ἄνθρωπον προσωπικῶς τῶν ἄλλων ἄνθρωπων ἀφοριζόμενον. (QThGFr2, 11–13)} \]

The definition “according to the Fathers” in the corrected version only completes the definition “according to philosophers.” While the philoso-
phers say that hypostasis is substance with properties, the Fathers add that this hypostasis is something that distinguishes personally a particular human being from other humans. The meaning of “προσωπικῶς” is not explained. The text clearly states, though, that being “personally distinguished” is a result of being a hypostasis. This definition, then, allows for the extensional synonymy of “person” with “hypostasis,” as in the Chalcedonian hendiadys. Yet it also suggests that the term “personal” has, by itself, a different meaning from “hypostatic,” as personal determination in a human is caused by, but not identical to, hypostasis.

As a matter of fact, the Chalcedonian hendiadys shows up frequently in the texts and establishes an indubitable extensional identity between the two terms. The exceptions to this pattern point, in turn, to a different sense of person. The latter, however, cannot be discovered on the basis of exclusively scrutinizing the Trinitarian and Christological contexts. This is because “person” as such is not defined in the indubitably authentic Maximian works.

There are, altogether, 30 instances of the hendiadys of person and hypostasis in the Maximian corpus analyzed for the purposes of this paper: 28 in authentic, and two in spurious passages.²³ There are a few texts in which the hendiadys is particularly frequent: TP14, with three instances, including the one adduced above, Ep12 with four instances, and Ep15 with 13 instances. The minority of cases follow the Chalcedonian pattern exactly,²⁴ while the majority, dominated by the 12 cases in Ep15, move “ὑπόστασις” to the front position.²⁵ This is consistent with the broad Maximian tendency to give priority to the language of hypostasis in these contexts. In a quick search, 549 instances of ὑπόστασις-language showed up in the Maximian Corpus, including instances in the titles added by the scribes. All of them are used in the context of Trinitology, of Christology, or of theoretical contexts that serve to explain theological concepts. There are, in turn, 150 instances, including 112 authentic Maximian usages, of person-language in those contexts.²⁶

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²³. CSu, α’2, in the inauthentic part of the text, drawn from Ef22/CSu, 70.11; QThGFr2, 2, 17, in the text not contained in TP26, corresponding broadly to Ef20/QThGFr, but in a line not known to Epifanovich, reversed hendiadys.

²⁴. 11 cases in authentic works: TP13(b) (15) 145C2; TP14 (50), 149C3; 152C15; TP16 (74), 192C1; TP19 (75), 221C8, an imperfect instance; TP21 (39), 249C12; TP24 (62), 59 (MPG91, 269C14); Ep12 (66), 469D5; 469D10; 492C3; Ep15 (46), 533D3.

²⁵. TP1 (80), 37B12; TP2 (81), 40C7; TP14 (50), 152A1; QThGFr2 (65), 9 (MPG91, 276A14); Ep12 (66), 468D3; Ep15 (46), 545A4; 549B12; 549C13; 549D2; 549D10; 549B6; 549B13; 549C8; 552A5; 552A8; 552C3; 568C12.
The pattern established by the hendiadys also seems to inform the contexts in which “πρόσωπον” and its cognates are used as stylistic replacements of “ὑπόστασις.” There are, altogether, 30 instances belonging to this type in the authentic works of Maximus (41 altogether in the Corpus, including eight occurrences in spurious passages and three in the relata). The work in which the greatest number of cases of this type can be found is also the one with the most instances of hendiadys: Ep15. Throughout the entire Epistle, the stress is laid on hypostasis. There are many more instances of “ὑπόστασις” there than of “πρόσωπον”: 119 usages of “ὑπόστασις” (occurrences in the titles added by the scribes and in the scholia having been excluded) versus 22 instances, and 8 cognates, of “πρόσωπον.”²⁷ Maximus regularly inverts the Chalcedonian hendiadys in Ep15. Through those cases of inverted hendiadys he reminds the reader that he is speaking about one and the same thing: the very same person or hypostasis that the Fathers, whom he adduces in extenso in the first section of the Epistle (545A1–49A9), spoke of. By doing this, he turns “πρόσωπον” in Ep15 into a mere stylistic equivalent of “ὑπόστασις.” There is no other text with so many cases of “πρόσωπον” used in place of hypostasis-language. In TP3 and TP13, there are just four such usages in each work.²⁸

More emblematic is the language of Ep13 (44), where a single instance of “πρόσωπον” (517D14) stands in the company of 37 Christological usages of “ὑπόστασις” (including third-person usages in section titles).²⁹

A different pattern, less frequent, consist in using the language of “πρόσωπον” rather than that of “ὑπόστασις” when speaking about Sabelians or Nestorians. This is related to the fact that Gregory of Nazianzus and Basil the Great “preferred the word ‘hypostasis’ [to the word ‘πρόσωπον’], because of the links that the word ‘prosôpon’ still had in their era with the Sabelian modalism, and because of the risk of confusion that using it

²⁶. There are also 27 such instances in “relations,” 12 cases in spurious works, and one occurrence in a passage of dubious authenticity (SchD, 212B5, RL212.2, S18).

²⁷. Other occurrences of “πρόσωπον” in Ep15 (46) are: 545B3; B8; 549B14; C2; 552A6; 553B11; 557A3; 560A12; 568C6. There are also instances of “προσωπικός” in 552B10; C7; 553B13; D5; 556B6; D11; 557A1; 565D7.

²⁸. TP3 (82), 49A3; 53C9; 56B5; TP13 (15), 145B8; B10; B12; C2.

²⁹. Other authentic usages: AT (26), 1.13 (however, this is a special case, based on a quote in EPHθ, 1.16, which will be discussed below); TP5 (40), 64C11; TP15 (87), 173B15 (used to express an orthodox claim, yet in the context of speaking about heretics using “πρόσωπον,” as discussed below); TP16 (74), 200D8. Usages in relata, discussed below in more detail: DP (78), 289D10; 340B7; B9. Usages in spuria: SchD, 212A5 (RL209.11, S5); CDiv, 1329D1; CSu, α’ 3; α’ 5; α’ 9; α’ 10; α’ 12; γ’ [δ] 1–2 (MPG 91, 261A13).
could have entailed for some readers.” Accordingly, 35 instances of “πρόσωπον” in the Corpus express the heretical claims, while “ὑπόστασις” is either absent from the context or appears in juxtaposed orthodox assertions. It must be admitted that the majority of such cases occur in DP (78), a work composed in order to defend Maximus from charges of heresy.

In DP there are, altogether, 21 instances of “πρόσωπον” being employed in Christological contexts. There are also 20 cases of “ὑπόστασις,” whose only purpose is to discuss issues pertaining to Christology. Most frequently, when the disputants speak about Nestorius, they adopt his language, as Maximus does in 336D5–337A13. When he opposes the heretics in this passage through an orthodox claim, he goes back for a moment to the language of “ὑπόστασις.” Yet the heretical conclusion, shown as such by Maximus, mentions a person. In some such cases it is Pyrrhus who avails himself of person-invoking language. In one utterance attributed by the composer of the dialogue to Pyrrhus, a premise that the speaker adopts, and which leads to a conclusion denounced by Maximus as heretical, refers to human beings by means of “πρόσωπον.”

This custom of reserving the language of persons especially for Nestorians, Sabellians, and Severians is followed by Maximus himself in many of his works, especially in TP25 and TP15. In TP2 (81), however, Maximus refers to the views of Severus through a hendiadys of “ὑπόστασις” and “πρόσωπον” (40C7). The custom is reflected also in the usage of the term

30. “Il faut cependant noter que chez Grégoire de Nazianze et plus encore chez Basile l’usage du mot prosôpon reste rare (il est symptomatique que Maxime cite le nom de Basile, mais aucun texte de lui contenant le mot même) et que ces deux Pères lui préféraient le mot hypostasis, en raison de liens que le mot prosôpon avait encore à leur époque avec le modalisme sabellien et des risques de confusion que son usage pouvait comporter pour certains lecteurs.” Larchet, “Hypostase, personne et individu,” 42.

31. Usages: D5; D7; D7; 337A2; A9; A10.

32. These are occurrences in 292A3; A6. Other similar instances in DP: 289D10 (with “ὑπόστασις” one line before, in a conclusion from Sabellius), 305A14; B2; B3; 313C1; 336A5 (Pyrrhus speaks); B3; D1(Pyrrhus speaks); 337A14; B4; B5; B7; B11; D2; 340B7; B9. The last two instances belong to the larger context of 340A13–B12, where “ὑπόστασις” is used for orthodox statements.

33. All similar instances: PN (12), 424; QThal (36), sch. 1, 62.3, to 62.43; TP20 (49), 232A14; TP24 (62), 45 (MPG91,269B6); TP25 (63), 273A14; B3; B6; B8; B8 (second instance in the same line); TP2 (81), 45B2; B5; TP15 (87), 173B6 (quote from Nestorius); 180A12; 184B9; DB (91), 287 (MPG90, 148C15); 487 (MPG90, 156C1). There is also an instance of “μονοπρόσωπος” in this work in 173B15, after the quote from Nestorius. In this place, the heretical doctrine of Paul of Persia is discussed. Very closely, hypostasis “ὑπόστασις” is used in expressions of orthodox doctrine. Cf. also “μονοπρόσωπος,” “πολυπρόσωπος” and “ἀπειροπρόσωπος” in TP3 (82), 53B9; C3; C12; C14.
“πρόσωπικός.” The Nestorian “personal difference” is mentioned in *Ep12* (66), 493C8, when Maximus speaks about the errors of Nestorius, Apollinarius and Eutyches, who did not know the natural difference in Christ, or in *TP3* (82), 56C5, where it is linked with Nestorians and Severians, and opposed to hypostatical union.⁴ In *TP19*, the discussions of “hypostatical or personal wills” aim to show that adopting this idea and accepting “personal otherness,” as the Severians and Apollinarians seem to do, would lead to “cutting Christ into persons.” Yet “personal difference” also appears in a short outline of orthodox views in *TP7* (73) (73C4; C6).

In almost all of the passages mentioned up to now, Maximus makes his usage of “πρόσωπον” dependent on an external factor. Either he tries to emphasize that any reference to a person in a context relates, as a matter of fact, to a hypostasis, or he makes the person, or a “personal” feature, a part of the statement he is rejecting. While the term is accepted in the language of his Christology and in auxiliary theoretical considerations, it is adopted with caution.

There are, however, a few passages devoted to Christological issues in which “πρόσωπον” seems to be used as the proper and primary term. One of them is the passage of *TP16*, 201C1–204A5. Not only is “πρόσωπον” identified there with “ἄτομον” in a hendiadys (201C4–5), but also the limits of this identification are pointed out.

The passage apparently identifies the “person and individual” with a human being, or at least the reality of the compound being of two natures, as it begins with the claim that there is no difference between existence (ὕπαρξις) and natural activity (φυσικὴ ἐνέργεια) in substance and nature, but there is such a difference in “person and individual.” It is so because there are many natures and many natural activities in a person. Such a person/individual resembles the Patristic human uniting the two natures of the body and the soul, and the Patristic Christ unifying in himself the human and the Divine natures. Maximus emphasizes this inner difference in the person, who is composed of “other and other,” establishes (παριστᾶ) “the other and other” of her or his natural activity, and even “knows himself” by performing those activities:

καὶ διαφόρους τε γὰρ φύσεις, τὰς ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκεν, καθορώμεν, καὶ τὰς φυσικὰς κινήσεις, αἷς ἐνεργοῦν κατὰ φύσιν γνωρίζεται, τὴν οἰκείαν πιστούμενος ὑπαρξίν. (C6–9)

34. See also *Ep12*, 484A10.
35. *TP19* (75), “προσωπικός”; 225A8; A9; A13; C3; “πρόσωπον” 225C3.
Such an individual is not enclosed (περικλείεται) in one natural activity, and because of that, neither is it enclosed in one nature (D1–3). Therefore, as Maximus seems to conclude, the number of its natures equals the number of its substantial movements (D4–6).

In this context, the concept of “person/individual” seems referable to the reality we now call “a person”—a self-conscious being recognizable by her or his actions. Only the idea that this kind of individual is also the individual of logic may seem strange. Actually, Maximus rejects this linkage of logical and human individuality a few lines later, where Christ is concerned. Christ cannot be called “individual” because He does not belong to a division from the most general genus to the most specific species—a division which would inscribe Him into His own “procession.” Because of that, as Cyrillus says and Maximus appears to re-affirm, the name of Christ has no power of definition (D7–204A3).

I will return later to the Neoplatonic term “procession” used in this context. Let me only remark here that, for the first time in the scrutinized material, the choice of the vocabulary of persons in a broad Christological context is made on Maximus’ own terms. Here, what matters is what he wants to say, as opposed to emphasizing what he wants to avoid saying. Furthermore, the reason why the term “πρόσωπον” is used both for a human individual and for Christ here seems to be the fact that it describes a composite, active, and self-cognizant being.

There are a few more instances of this kind. Almost none of them, however, occurs in a passage that is so rich in content and so clear about intentions. The only exception is the text of TP10, 136C10–137B1. This text offers a marginal critical remark on the work of Theodore of Faras, who may be identified with Theodore Rhaïthu. Maximus criticizes him for providing the authors of the Ekthesis with an unorthodoxly worded, and even inconclusive, formulation on which they then built their theses. His mistake consists in “introducing hypostatical actualization,” or “activity,” (136D3) and “giving to the person as person an actualization which characterizes, or marks distinctively, their nature” (D8–10). What he should have attributed to persons was “the quality, and a precise qualification, of the mode in which [acts] flow according to nature” (136C10–137A1, “ἐκβάσεως” is verbalized in translation).

The term “πρόσωπον” ostensibly acquires a metaphysical meaning—that of modality. This meaning, however, must be regarded in both an epistemological and an ethical light, as the following lines of the passage declare:
[B]y this [flow] the difference between those who act and the things that are done, whether they are according to nature or against nature, is recognized. For, chiefly as something, and not as someone, everyone of us is actualized: i.e., as a human, and as someone, like Peter or Paul, [everyone] shapes the mode of actuality, which may happen to [occur] through setting or relaxing [the tenor of the soul, the latter] being molded so or otherwise depending on his judgment. Because of that, it is in the [determination of the] mode that the differentiation of persons in respect of their actions is known. For neither is someone more nor someone else less actualized or rational, but we equally possess reason and its actuality [in the sense of “faculty”], arising according to nature. More and less, and in this way and in another way, someone is just or unjust, by the virtue of one following more what is according to nature and the other abstaining from this [course of action]. (137A1–B1)

The text speaks quite clearly about how differentiation between persons arises. The key word of the text is “τρόπος,” understood both as a modality and in the later sense of “temper.” Maximus claims that there are two levels of actualization of potentialities that are rooted in human nature: we have faculties, at the level of our humanity, and we happen to have specific kinds of action, at the level of being a “someone.” The latter is described through the pair of words “ἐνδοσίς” and “ἐπίδοσίς.” Emmanuel Ponsoye remarks that those words correspond in Maximus to the ethical terms “θύμος” and “ἐπιθυμία,” “anger” and “desire.” They appear to be being used here, though, along the lines of Stoic ethics, very broadly conceived. “Ἐνδοσίς,” in one of its principal meanings, refers to the action of “striking the key-note.” I assume that “setting a proper tone” (ἐνδοσίς) and “relaxing that tone” (ἐπίδοσίς) is the proper meaning of the text. According to the Stoic understanding of ἐπιθυμία, it consists in irrational stretching, in being “ὀρέξις” in its literal meaning. In turn, virtue is a good disposition of the soul. As “ἐνδοσίς” does not show up in any other place

within the Maximian corpus, while “ἐπίδοσις” can actually refer to desire in his works (eg. Ep1 (46), 365B15), one may conclude that Maximus is speaking here, as a matter of fact, about the modality/temper of virtue, as opposed to that of desires. The choice of a language dependent on an interpretation of Stoic ethics allows him to view particular actions as building up our characters through modifying, “impressing,” yet not altering, the substance of what we are. That view, which is both anthropological and ethical, is expressed in the final lines of the passage.

As a result, personhood turns out in this passage to be (1) an ethical reality, (2) rooted in our choices and our evaluation of those choices, (3) also, however, modifying our substance—our “what we are” into “who we are,” and (4) thus making it possible to discern one human from another.

It seems that some elements of this view of persons in TP10 can be recognized in some other passages. In the hendiadys of TP16, 192C1, “πρόσωπον” precedes “ὑπόστασις” and is rhetorically emphasized. Maximus speaks there about the gnomic will as the definitional feature of the person. The very same idea is mentioned in a rhetorically similar manner in TP3 (82), when Maximus paraphrases and criticizes the arguments of Severus (53C9). More importantly, it seems to inform the definition of hypostasis in QThGFr2, 11–13, adduced above. Hypostasis, according to this definition, distinguishes a particular human from other humans “προσωπικῶς”—i.e. “personally.” Apparently the personal features, while rooted in the hypostasis, cannot be identified with being a hypostasis.

Across the entirety of these passages, “person” turns out to be something we call “character”—i.e. a particular set of features that emerges in human life through those of our decisions that make us good or evil, and thanks to which we differ from other people and can be characterized as such. If “πρόσωπον” can be defined in this way, it is an extensional synonym of “ὑπόστασις.” However, being such a person is only a manifestation of being a hypostasis. If this is the sense that Maximus associates with the very word “πρόσωπον,” his avoidance of this word in Christological contexts and his emphasis on “ὑπόστασις” can be better explained. The term is both necessary, when the manifestation of being a hypostasis is at issue, and potentially misleading, given that manifestation can be confused with being.

It must be emphasized, however, that this solution to the problem of “πρόσωπον” in Christological contexts is, in many respects, imperfect. It is so because it is not clear whether being such a person can be identified with being an individual, and what the relation is between a hypostasis and an individual. The second part of the passage on persons and individuals
in *TP16*, in 201D7–204A10, presents ἄτομον in the manner in which it is discussed in Porphyry’s *Isagoge*—i.e. as the lowest and undefinable object of predication (4,1.2.–3.20). This view of individuality is consistent with the picture of hypostasis in *Ep15*, and with the definition of “hypostasis and person” in *TP14*. Yet, in the passage of *TP16* scrutinized above, and in the lines which follow it (up to 204D6), the person of Christ is not only presented as different from an individual, due to its not belonging to a genus and species and not possessing a definition, but also identified with the compound hypostasis of Christ. Besides, the process through which an individual is defined in a manner consistent with Porphyrian logic, is referred to through “πρόοδος,” a metaphysical term borrowed from Plotinus and Porphyry that is usually rendered in modern scholarship as “procession” and never used by Porphyry in his own logic. The term describes the generation of lower genera from higher intellectual principles, and cannot, because of that, be applied to the philosophy of individuals. Its usage by Maximus echoes the language of Gregory of Naziansus (*Or*. 29.2), which Maximus quotes in *EPTH* (26), 1.16. Gregory speaks there, in broadly similar terms, about the procession of persons in the Divine Monad. Maximus adopts this language in *EPTH*, 1.25, 1.37 and in *AT*, 1.13. However, in the *Ambigua ad Thomam* he switches over almost immediately to speaking about hypostases. All of this means that an explanation of the sense of “πρόσωπον” in Maximus’ Christological and Trinitarian discussions will not itself resolve the problem of what the reality actually is that is being named by this word “person” or “character”, and whether it should be construed in line with Neoplatonic metaphysics and logic. Furthermore, as there are very few contexts in those discussions where the meaning of “πρόσωπον” is clearly affirmed, one has no option but to relate this specific usage of the language of persons to other more frequently occurring applications of that same language.

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4. “Πρόσωπον” and “Face”

(1) The Primary Sense of “Πρόσωπον”

It should be remembered that Christological and Trinitarian contexts of the language of persons, as well as such theoretical considerations as clarify the meanings of terms used in those contexts, represent only one of the tertiary functions of the word “πρόσωπον.” Its basic meaning, “face,” does not occur frequently in Maximus’ authentic works, and most instances of that kind belong to a text that Maximus himself only adduces. There are altogether 45 more or less literal instances of “πρόσωπον” in the scrutinized corpus. 19 of them belong to indubitably authentic Maximian works, two may be found in dubious passages, four in relations, and 19 in spurious works.

Maximus himself, unlike the authors of spurious texts, in most cases does not seem to have been misled by the re-literalized and nominalized instances of “πρόσωπον” that occur frequently in the Septuagint. When he uses the word literally, he usually means a face: either the face of the brother (CCchar (11), 3.89.1; 4.34.2), or that of an enemy (Ep12 (66), 461A7), or the faces of friends, seen in imagination (Ep22 (2), 605C9), or—apparently also imagined—the benign face of God (Ep1 (69), 381C10), at which the imagined angels do not look, turning their faces down (381C8). The physical and visible face of Moses (AI (26), 10.4, 1117C5)—or, for that matter, that of Christ (10.18, 1125A8; D6)—may be marked by the light of grace. This light cannot be looked at, because this physically visible light exceeds, in actuality, the domain of the physical. As Moses becomes the type, or impression of a deiform type, so this light becomes the basis of the metaphorical meaning of “face,” important for the Maximian view of the human person.

41. The two instances in Ef11/GnCn (0), 46.32; 51.1; quoted from Jgs 6:1 (6:2) and 16:1 (16:3).
42. DP (78), 288B4; 353A6; DB (91), 652 (MPG90, 164B2); 723 (165C11); used in the meaning of “face” in narrations and/or in utterances of speakers other than Maximus. In the second instance in DP, “by face” may also be understood as “personally”: Pyrrhus wants to visit the sepulchers of the Apostles and become worthy of viewing the most holy Pope “by face,” and giving him a book about the absurdities they discussed.
43. These are the following instances: (1) “face” tout court, (a) used by the author, SchE, 7.64; CDiv (37a), 1360C12; (b) quoted, SchE, 7.20; 7.210; 7.211; LC, 740C1; 756A7; 917D3; 925C5; 945A13; 996C14; 997A5; (c) adopted SchE, 7.30; CDiv, 1197C3 (from 2 Cor 3:12); (2) literalized Hebrew meaning of “facing,” quoted, SchE, 8.2; 8.133; (3) literalized Hebrew meaning of “surface,” quoted, ibid., 10.31; (4) nominalized Hebrew verb “turn,” quoted, SchD, 133C7 (RL.133.2); (5) with a possible metaphorical value of “characteristics,” LC, 913B4; B6.
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More frequently, however, Maximus quotes passages in which “πρόσωπον” is used in the literal meaning of “face,” sometimes before asking and answering the question of the metaphorical value of the adduced text.⁴⁴ In many such cases, it is not even clear whether, in some Scriptural passage or other he is quoting or paraphrasing, “πρόσωπον” has any literal significance at all. I have therefore not included those 10 instances in authentic works, or the single instance in a dubious one, in the count of literal uses of “πρόσωπον.”⁴⁵ In three instances, two of which belong to a quote, “face,” used with a preposition, conveys the idea of personal presence. In the text he writes himself as a commentary to Gn 3:24 (QD (13), 158.16), the fiery sword is also a metaphor for the power of discerning the costs of wrongdoings. As it stands before our faces, it also examines our conscience.⁴⁶ The way leading from a literal to a secondary or tertiary usage of “πρόσωπον” is short.

(2) Secondary Usages of “Πρόσωπον”
Under the heading of “secondary usages,” I am grouping many kinds of different instances that present a kind of natural extension of the primary meaning of “πρόσωπον.” I am discerning altogether 88 instances of this kind, 54 of them in authentic texts, nine in relata, three in dubious works, and 21 in spurious ones.

It must be admitted that in some cases my grouping could be open to being questioned. This is the case, especially, with instances in which the literal meaning of “face” seems to have been superimposed with the metaphor of human “character.” Such instances are only two, and the two are rooted in the usage of the Septuagint (QThal (36), 50.147; 50.7). Still, even those two instances share the basic feature of all “secondary” instances: a metaphorical sense of “face” is fixed in them.

This metaphorical power of “πρόσωπον” is something Maximus is well aware of, and also ready to use in contexts in which this power is given a well-defined reference. In a scholion to QThal, authored most probably by Maximus himself, we find the following statement:

As the face is the characteristic [component] in a particular, so spiritual

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44. Maximus asks such a question in respects of instances in QThal (36), 54.3; 54.8; 54.47; and does not ask in quotes in QD (13), 70.1; 92.17; 191.4.; neither he does in QThal, 65.34 (adopted language rather than a quote).
45. Authentic instances, all in QThal (36): 5.5; 5.8; 9.32; 9.33; 10.94; 10.95; 56.42; 55.52; 65.4; 65.277. The dubious instance comes from SchD 036C6 (RL36.2).
46. Similar instances in quotes: Ep1 (69), 372C9; 381A13.
cognition characterizes expressively the divine. The one who searches for it searches for the face of God. (QThal, sch. 65.21.98–101 to 65.277)

The metaphorical power of “πρόσωπον” resides in the face’s capacity to express what is hidden in humans.

While this statement justifies an important metaphorical usage, discussed in the next section, this usage becomes almost fixed, in the later part of QThal 65, as a secondary sense of “πρόσωπον.” The “face of the Lord” stops being explained there, and appears to adopt the meaning of “manifestation of God in knowledge.”⁴⁷ Most of the secondary meanings of “πρόσωπον” are, however, taken over by Maximus from current usage. Certainly we should count as such the 18 instances where he cites or paraphrases the language of Scripture, and in which “πρόσωπον” completely loses the meaning of “face,” and instead means “surface”⁴⁸ or, together with a preposition—like in Hebrew, which was translated extremely literally in the Septuagint—“to” or “from.”⁴⁹

Probably the best known among secondary usages of “person” is its use to convey the concept of a “representative.” However, in the case of Maximus the meaning of “representative” is conveyed in all of the four instances in his corpus by the expression “ἐκ προσώπου.” It is worth emphasizing that Maximus uses this expression to emphasize in whose name the Scripture speaks: according to Maximus, in Ps 60:11 (59:13) the prophet asks for salvation in the name of the entire fallen human nature (Ps59 (12), 322); in Dt 32:22 Moses speaks in the name of God (LA (10), 473 [27.6]); the passage from Hos 12:11, which Maximus adduces, is uttered in the name of God (Ep2 (6), 401B10), and this is how the Scripture speaks in Lv 26:27–28 (QThal (36), 44.30).⁵⁰ It is possible that the idea of calling humans

⁴⁷. 65.283; sch. 21, 65.98 and 65.100, to 65.277; 65.286; 287.
⁴⁸. Five instances in authentic works: AI (26), 42, 1321A4; QThal (36), 62.6; 62.128; Ep43 (28a), 641A5; Ep24 (28b), 612B8. Two instances in dubia: SchD,112B11 (RL112.7); 112B13 (RL112.7). Three instances in spurious works: SchE, 1.53 (the author speaks himself); 11.1; SchD, 336C9 (RL336.4, S36).
⁴⁹. 13 instances in authentic works: LA (10), 492 (27.26); 499 (27.33); 790 (37.78); 816 (38.2); 898 (40.48); CChar (11), 2.22.4; Ps59 (12), 118; 132; QD (13), 80.27; 147.3; AI (26), 10.31a, 116B7; 41, 1309C14; QThal (36), 49.3. There is also one instance in relata, DP (78), 312B12; and there are five instances in spurious: SchE, 3.80; 10.15; LC, 732C3; 865D6; 964A11. Cf. also “ἀντιπρόσωπος” quoted in SchE, 929B5 from Basil’s Enarratio in prophetam Isaiam, 3.120.14.
⁵⁰. There is also one instance in authentic Ep18 (67), 584D3, placed by the scribes in the title. There are also six cases in relata, none of them referring to the Bible: two in DP (78), 328C2; 329A8, where Maximus speaks himself; four in DB (91), 17 (MPG90, 137A8); 19
“persons” stems from this usage, combined with the Trinitarian application of the word “πρόσωπον.” As the human writers of Scriptures speak “from the face of” the Lord, or as distressed humans turn towards God, the word “face” starts to refer to the person represented by the speaker. There is nothing strange, therefore, in Theodosius’ trying to explain in DB (91), 424 (MPG90, 153B13) why the Synod did not “anathemize personally” —i.e. did not mention particulars in its anathema.

The sense of being “someone’s representative” should not be confused, therefore, with that of “mask”—not, at least, in the era in which Maximus was writing. The word which Maximus uses for “mask,” and to which he grants the metaphorical meaning of deception, is “προσωπείον.”⁵¹

The old sense of an actor’s facial mask, identified with a character of a drama, is reflected, though, in the approach to people presented in the Scripture. Since Maximus is most interested in the symbolic meaning of the Bible, those characters turn out to also be “figures” —types of a different reality. In a lengthy passage of AI (26) 37, 1293A13–1296A5, Maximus sets outs the principles for symbolic interpretation of the Scripture. As he says there, the scriptures possess a single spiritual significance, but this may be amplified in ten modes. These are place, time, genus, person, and social position (or employment), which are reduced, by the three modes of practical, natural, and theological philosophy, and, subsequently, by the modes of presence and future, into Logos, who embraces all of them.⁵²

Ezekias, whom we can imitate in his role in the sacred history, is treated as such a character in the Scriptures in QThal (36) 51.216, as is Jonas in scholion 31 (64.116) to line 710 of QThal 64. Maximus may even have wondered whether he should explain allegorically the words of blamable characters (QThal 38.6). In some cases, he just offers his exegesis.⁵³

In other cases, he emphasizes features of characters when speaking about such Biblical “persons.” Thus, the spiritual meaning of the characters of the perjurer and the thief in Zachariah 5:4 may be explained as different

(137A11); 590 (161A5); 744 (168A7), all in the narration of the dialogue. Only in a spurious passages of SchD, 48A4 and A9 (RL45.4) the expression is referred to the Scripture speaking “in the name of the Lord.”

51. QD (13), 32.7; 54.3; TP9 (86), 129C6. Cf. also the spurious instances in LC, 789A7; A12; A13; A13; 896A9, all in quotes attributed to John Chrysostomus.

52. Instances of “πρόσωπον” in 1293B3; B9; D10. There is also a similar passage in QThal (36), 64.11–15, with an instance of “πρόσωπον” at 64.12.

53. QD (13), 33.1, 33.3; 35.26; 54.3; 172.1; 172.4; AI (26), 50,1369C4. Similar instances in dubia, SchD, 181A13 (RL181.4); in spuria, ibid., 85C4 (RL85.6); CGn (37a), 1336 C2.
“τρόποι τῶν ἐνεργειῶν,” (*QThal* 62.275)—modalities of the activities of the devil (instances in 62.268, 274, 306).⁵⁴

Such a confusion of a person and her or his character results in assigning the name of “πρόσωπον” to important characters in real life (*AI* (26), 7, 1089C15; *Ep44* (70), 648C4),⁵⁵ and, moreover, to any person we might perceive: the latter meaning appears when Maximus discusses visions occurring in solitude. It is phrased as “μὴ παρόντος προσόπου” (*AI*, 19, MPG91, 1236A2) and “ἀπροσώπως” (1233D5). That extension of the literary term obviously predates Maximus, and is reflected, as a matter of fact, in passages of the New Testament of the sort that he might be expected to have commented on, such as Rom 2:11, which contains the word “προσωπολήψια,” meaning “wrongful respect of persons,” and which is discussed in *QThal* 27.156.⁵⁶

This development of the idea of an actor into that of a symbolical character in the Bible on the one hand, and that of an active character in life on the other, does not destroy the primary metaphorical power which “πρόσωπον” possesses as “face.” Moses, who “carries sometimes the person of God and Father, and sometimes that of our nature,” “τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ πατρὸς πρόσωπον ἑπέχει, ποτὲ δὲ τῆς ἡμετέρας φύσεως” (*QD* (13), 1.11) is not only a symbol, but also an actual representative and a physical expression of both human and divine natures—in his words, in his actions, and sometimes, even, as Maximus says in other places, in the aspect of his face. When we see God “in a mirror and dimly” (1 Cor 13:12), then, in actuality, the disposition of virtues within our soul turns into a synthetic “face of God” within us. It is not a symbol, but a kind of remote similitude to God (*QThal*, 46.6–8). It is an ethical similarity, showing outside what He is like inside. This idea, in which “face” means, apparently, “expression” and “resemblance” grows in Maximus into the complex metaphor of the face of the soul and the face of God.

(3) The Metaphor of the Face

The word “πρόσωπον” occurs in a number of metaphorical contexts in Maximus, yet the metaphor of the face of God, which is also the face of Christ, the face of the soul of the saints, and their persona, being reflected in their physical faces, plays a central role in Maximus’ metaphorical usage of the vocabulary of persons. This metaphor even seems, in some places, to

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⁵⁴. Cf. also spurious *SchD*, 181A13 (RL181.4); *LC*, 964A2.
⁵⁵. Cf. also *DP* (78), 352C11.
be connected with the meaning of “person” that emerges from the anthropological considerations that constitute the backdrop to Maximus’ Christological discussions.

It must be emphasized that the idea of the “face of the soul,” or “the face of God within us,” as it is developed in various Maximian works, shows a peculiar Maximian approach to the question of human personality as it assimilates to God. It does not appear in the works considered spurious by at least some authors, yet it permeates all truly Maximian exegesis. A brief summarizing of the relevant statistics may be helpful in understanding the role of this metaphor within the Maximian approach to the issue of personhood.

There are altogether 76 metaphorical usages of “πρόσωπον” in the corpus scrutinized for the purposes of this work. 45 of these can be found in the indubitably Maximian works, eight in passages that may be considered dubious. The spurious passages can be divided into three groups. In the first group, one should include all eight instances in SchE, in which the Bible, speaking about “the face of God,” seems to be read as speaking in a metaphor, yet the metaphor is either left in a quote without any explanation⁵⁷ or explained, very broadly, as some complete future knowledge of archetypes.⁵⁸ In the second group we should count the eight instances of the Maximian metaphor of the face of the soul in CDiv, which are adopted from his other works, even though it is difficult, without very detailed analysis, to refer them to particular passages in Maximus. It is distinctive of all those passages that the aspect of scriptural exegesis is neglected by their author.⁵⁹ Within the last group, it is possible to enumerate the metaphorical instances in those passages of SchD that have been attributed by Paul Rorem and John C. Lamoreaux to John of Scythopolis. Among those metaphorical usages, one is a broad explanation of the concept of “the face of God” (189A14), one can be considered a literal usage within a symbol, which is the uncovered face of a bishop (153B11) and the four that occur in the two passages not ascribed by Beate Suchla to John of Scythopolis explain, very broadly, “face of the glorified people” as “intellectual vision” (two instances in 345D8, two in 413.3, quoting 1 Cor 13:12).

⁵⁸. 8.30, in ref. to 1 Cor 13:12 (2 instances).
⁵⁹. Other instances, ordered by the metaphor and its meaning: “Face of the intellect,” as it knows the heights of truth, 1272D4; “face of the soul,” referred to people born in spirit, 1341C2; to the purified souls, informed by knowledge impressed in them, 1356A6; 1356B9; “face of Christ” as Christ, exemplar of virtues, 1360C8; C9; D1; 1373A5.
In turn, the seven out of eight instances in the passages of SchD usually attributed to Maximus explore the idea of the many faces of Seraphim, explaining it consistently as their cognitive powers.\(^6\)\(^0\) By contrast, in most indubitably Maximian passages in which a metaphor of face can be found, virtue or vice are also at stake. At least, that is so when the meaning he attributes to an instance of “πρόσωπον” is clear. Sometimes, a quote or biblical paraphrase seems to require a metaphorical or figurative reading, but this meaning must be guessed by the reader.\(^6\)\(^1\) In all other cases, there is an ethical element. All but six are linked with the metaphor of the face of the soul.

Four out of six instances mentioned above occur in Ps59 (12), 136–146.\(^6\)\(^2\) There Maximus explains the expression “πρός τὸ φυγεῖν ἀπὸ προσώπου τόξου” from Ps 60:4 (59:6). These days the line is translated as “to rally out of bowshot” (NRSV), or, more frequently, “to be displayed because of the truth” (NASB), in line with the traditional and Talmudic meaning of the Hebrew verb “בַּשֶּׁת”. The Septuagint offers, as it usually does, an extremely literal translation of the verse. It renders as “from the face” the Hebrew expression “מפני,” whose secondary and most frequent meaning is “from” or “due to,” and associates it with the literal meaning of identically pronounced “בַּשֶּׁת,” i.e., with “τόξον,” “bow,” rather than with the idea of truth as direct as a bow shot, which “בַּשֶּׁת” conveys here. In this way, the Hebrew “because of truth” becomes the Greek “the face of the bow,” and is explained by Maximus as an “appearance of the bodies that awakens sensitivity” and leads to a “demoniacal passion.”

In most of the remaining 29 instances, matters revolve around virtues rather than vices. Those instances are inspired by, and sometimes explain, such Biblical passages as 1 Cor 13:12, where Paul speaks about seeing God “face to face,” or 2 Cor 3:18:

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60. The exception is “πρόσωπον” in 197C3 (RL197.4, S31), referring to the face of God, whose metaphorical meaning is not explained. The instances in which the words refer to the many faces of Seraphim are: 81B3 (RL81.3), “πολυπρόσωπος,” not explained, in ref. to Ez 9:5 and 1:10; 89C14 (RL89.4), “πρόσωπον,” expl. “approaching God”, in ref to Ps 22(23):6; 100C1 (RL100.10), “πρόσωπον,” also C5 (RL100.10), “πολυπρόσωπος,” and C11 (RL100.13), “πρόσωπον,” expl. as “cognitive powers of the Serafim”; 156C14 (RL156.19), “πρόσωπον,” and D1, “πρόσωπον,” also “cognitive powers of the Serafim.”

61. Instances with “face of God”: LA (10), 828 (38.15), quoted from Is 64:6; 858 (40.8), quoted from Ps 95:2 (94.2); 866 (40.15), quoted from Is 59:2; Ps59 (12), 94; in ref. to Ps 60:1 (59:3); QD (13), 184.3, paraphrasing Jon 1:3; Al (26), 7, 1073A5, quoted from Ps 42:2 (43:3); EPB (71), 85.3, author’s own wording. Instances with “human face”: QD (13), 187.23, paraphrasing Joel 2:20; QThal (36), 65.763, quoted from Luke 2:31.

62. Instances of “πρόσωπον” in lines 137, 139, 143, 145.
But we all, with unveiled face (ἀνακεκαλυμμένῳ προσώπῳ), beholding as in a mirror the glory of the Lord, are being transformed into the same image from glory to glory, just as from the Lord, the Spirit. (NASB)

According to those lines, viewing the glory of God also alters who we are. This is the core idea which Maximus incorporates into his vision of assimilation to God and translates, in his metaphorical exegesis, into the terms his soteriology and aretology, doing so as he proceeds to explain the meaning of Scriptural references to the human face, the face of God, the face of Christ, the faces of glorified people, the face of the soul, the face of intellect—but also, by opposition, the face of laws, the face of pleasure and the face of Darius. This meaning is best summarized in the final lines of chapter 7 of the Mystagogy, where the vision Paul speaks about in 2 Cor 3:18 is explained as “the treasures of knowledge” (cf. Col 2:3) written by grace in the Spirit—on the tablet of the human heart. The ethical and intellectual aspects of this vision of the blessed are, for Maximus, inseparable (Myst (27), 597 [7.61]).

This kind of interpretation can also be found in QD (16), TP1 (80), TP7 (73), and AI (26), but it is most conspicuously present in QThal (36), in 14 instances—where, moreover, it is also propounded by means of a theoretically complex hermeneutics. It is on QThal that my exposition below is based, albeit with references, when appropriate, to other Maximian works.

The most meticulous formulation of the idea of the “face of the soul” may be found in QThal 54, 49–56, in the commentary to 1 Esd 4:58–60. The narrative about Zorobabel leaving the court of Darius and turning his face to heaven in the direction of Jerusalem receives a complex exegesis, in which the face of Zorobabel becomes the ethical face of the human intellect: i.e., something we might call a “persona.” This persona, however, does not exist in everyone. In Maximus’ approach, almost no one would have such a πρόσωπον. This ethical face of the human intellect exists only in those who display in themselves the ethical persona of God.

In order to sketch a complete picture of how such a persona emerges in a human being we must start reading the text of QThal 54 a little bit earlier, from line 24. Maximus claims there that Zorobabel symbolizes human philosophical intellect, which is lifted above the dispersion of its powers in the senses through the works of justice (cf. 24–28). In this manner, it is

63. Only in TP7, 73A4 (2 instances), is viewing God “face to face” from 1 Cor 13:12 not linked explicitly with ethical transformation.

64. QD: 6; TP1: 1, TP7: 2; AI: 5; QThal: 14. To the latter can be added 5 cases of the “fixed” metaphor of “manifestation of God in knowledge,” mentioned in note 47.
“at rest” (ἀνάπαυσις), having created all kinds of peace and connected the soul’s practical part to that which is, by nature, good, and the theoretical part to the truth which is truth by its nature (29–32). Such an intellect is not disturbed: neither in the practical component of the soul, nor in the theoretical one, because it is clad in God himself, the only good and true reality, which is above all essence and intellec­tion (34–39). This intellect recognizes where its grace comes from and turns its face to heaven (40–49). Zorobabel’s face, turned to the heavens, symbolizes the inner disposition of such an intellect:

Maximus explains, subsequently, that “person” in 1 Esd 4:58 stands for a specific disposition, of an intellectual kind, of the hidden place in the soul. This place holds the paradigmatic impressions of all of the virtues (49–51). We turn it towards heaven, i.e., towards the heights of intellec­tion (52), while remaining in front of Jerusalem, i.e., in the state of impassibility (ἀπάθεια), which has the character of a disposition (51–53). An intellect, in this disposition of impassibility, looks for an abode “in heaven” (2 Cor 5:2) and “in the city of those inscribed” (Hbr 12:23) in heaven (53–56).

The “hidden place of the soul” is not mentioned any more—neither in QThal, nor any other text of Maximus—even though the Biblical phrase “τὸ κρυπτὸν τῆς καρδίας” shows up a dozen times in his works. As it emerges from the lines that follow the definitional passage, this “hidden place” can hardly be identified with the highest part of the soul—the intellect—contemplating God. The “persona” or “face” of the intellect is only a pre­condition for this kind of contemplation. Maximus says that being lifted up to the height of contemplation and cognition in the state of impassibility is the only possible mode of praising God. This “non­hostile and peaceful constitution” (56–58) serves as a re­definition of the persona of the intellect—or rather, as we read here, of the soul. Impassibility is the “persona,” or “face,” of the disposition in which our soul finds itself, and which amounts to a composition of multiple and different virtues. They assume the modalities of “χαρακτήρες,” impressions or engravings, which means that the virtues are impressed in us from without. The latter can only be read in this context as referring to the intellect’s being impressed by the eternal types of the virtues.

This reading is clearly confirmed by a passage in QD, 99.1–23. Maximus quotes and interprets the text of Gregory of Naziansus’ Or. 40, MPG36, 412.6–14. Gregory speaks about the “Sodomian” punitive fire which is prepared for the devil and his angels, and which never ends. This fire burns before the face of God. Maximus sees in this fire divine energies, like goodness, love of men, gentleness and others alike—characteristics of the “face
of God." They work as fire, because they illuminate those who are close to God as his family, while they burn those who are of an opposed disposition and alienate their similarity to God.⁶⁵ The face of human intellect meets the face of God.

God is not the only power that has a “face” that influences human actions. Both the devil and laws may also have a kind of invisible face. The face of the devil, found by Maximus in the “face of shame” with which the vanquished Sennacherib returns to Assyria (2 Chr 32:20–21), is the “smooth appearance of pleasure,” through which the devil rules the souls that prefer sensible enjoyment of sensible things (QThal, 50.178; 50.182). However, the expression may refer to no more than evil human actions (QD, 187.29). The “face of Darius,” in turn, is discussed in QThal 55 as the figure of natural law. Zorobabel, symbolizing the theoretical intellect, turns away his face from the face of Darius (QThal, 48–69, instance of “πρόσωπον” in 55).

The idea that Maximus is presenting in all these passages amounts to saying that our actions are informed by what our intellect contemplates. Our virtues come from outside, from their eternal paradigms, from the Divine energies, that we both contemplate and express in our actions. This is our inner persona, which, as a matter of fact, is the persona of God in virtuous people. Yet, in those who live without God’s grace, it is the persona of natural laws, or even that of the Devil, both of these being powers that lead us to condemnation and consumption by the eternal fire.

The idea of “the face of the intellect” is simplified in other passages of QThal 54,⁶⁶ and never reappears in precisely this formulation in other Maximian texts. It is discussed in its external expression as “the face of virtues,” and the faces of the people who are glorified, “the face of the soul,” and as “the face of Christ.”

65. Instances of “πρόσωπον” at 99.4 (quote); 99.17; 99.19.
66. In question 54, we encounter an instance in which “πρόσωπον,” quoted in the Septuagint’s version of Lam 4:20, seems to be understood as “the face of the intellect,” thanks to a slight alteration of the standard Greek text of the Scripture (QThal, 54.223). In q. 55, the same passage from the 1st book of Esdras is read as referring to a cognitive disposition of the theoretical intellect “in line” or “in accordance” with virtue (55.74). In scholion 1 to 65.33, an intellect, purified through the virtues, gains in this way knowledge of the λόγοι of virtues. This divinely impressed cognition of the virtues is its “face.” (sch. 1, 65.1–4, “πρόσωπον” in line 4). See also sch. 3, 54.17, to 54.40; 55.74. Cf. also usages in QThal. epist. 402, 420, 423: with the “covered face” of 2 Cor 3:18, we view sensible things through sensuous perception, as appearances and a source of passions. The uncovered face of discursive cognition can see the glory of God. A similar instance can be found in Al, 10.22a, 1148D9, where it is referred to the viewing powers of reason in Moses, who typifies a soul going up to God.
In *QThal* 65.659, olive oil is identified with a face filled with cheerfulness. It is explained as an external expression, “χαρακτηριστικόν,” of the brilliance in the intellect, which stays “in line with the impassibility of spiritual grace.”⁶⁷ In scholion 7 (63.30) to *QThal* 63.350 it is called the “face of the soul” and attributed a perceptible nature. It is the visible external expression (χαρακτήρ) of God having been born in the virtues of saints, which can be seen in the alteration of their modes of life (τρόποι). Above, a number of similar usages, of a more straightforward nature, were counted as literal instances. Such a confusion of literal and metaphorical senses is possible, because

> [o]ur face is the life, which expresses, like the external appearance, what kinds of people we are in respect of the internal man. (*QD*, 70.3)

Yet, as our life expresses the inner man, so it expresses, or is the face of, the Divine Logos, who is the true nature of this life (*TP1*, 9A16). The “face of Christ” symbolizes the good exemplar of virtue for all believing nations (*QThal*, 65.769, commenting on Luke 2:31), but also is the expression of the truth of the eternal λόγοι of being that reside in Him (65.776).⁶⁸ Christ is expressed in us, because he is present from within, through the action of Divine energies, which are His eternal λόγοι. Yet He himself, when seen in the Transfiguration scene (Matthew 17:1–2, Mark 9:2–3, Luke 9:28–29), with a shining face, symbolizes “the external noetic expression of His hidden essence, at which it is impossible to look through arguments” (*QD*, 191.47) His shining face is the symbol of His unperceivable secrecy, as He transgresses all potency and activity of the intellect (*AI*, 10.31a, 1160B13). What He is himself is hidden from us. We see only an external expression. The “persona” is not who he is.

5. Conclusion

The issue of person and personhood cannot be separated from Maximian usage of the language of “πρόσωπον.” This language, in turn, is deeply permeated by the primary sense of the word “πρόσωπον”—that of the face. It is the face that expresses who we are, through our actions. Yet, this external expression is never identical with the inner man. The few cases in which “πρόσωπον” is referred by Maximus to a human being as the

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⁶⁸. Cf. also *AI* 10.27, 1156B5.
proper term, and not a stylistic replacement, or a heretical expression, emphasize the fact that we create an “external persona” through our actions. We are recognized through this persona, but, as a matter of fact, are something more. The issue of whether the proper Maximian term for expressing the conception of the metaphysical principle of individual human being is ὑπόστασις goes beyond the limits of this study. Yet the metaphor of the face, which points to the ethical “persona” both of the human being and of Christ, makes it clear that no metaphysical principle of individuality such as Maximus might speak of leads to any kind of modern idea of person and individuality.

This is so because, in Maximus, the truly ethical persona we build and display is not something we create ourselves. Our decisions, even if they shape our persona, do not stem from our powers. We are a part of the universe, whose nature was created by God, yet also need to be raised up by God after the Fall. Our decisions can have their roots, therefore, in three different powers, and none of them is ourselves. We can either let God act in us and raise us from our fallen state, or turn to the powers of nature and its law, or to the power of the devil. Each of them only impresses our intellect and our behavior, but never appears contained within the limits of our being. God, especially, while granting us an impression of His eternal λόγοι and energies, remains transcendent. What is created in us, thanks to meeting Him in the persona of his energies, is a “face of the intellect,” a reflection of the perfect order. The latter becomes expressed in our life, in our actions, even in our face. Thus, we have an inner persona and an external one. Yet both are, as a matter of fact, an expression of the persona of Christ, of His image, which He creates first in our cognition, then in our actions.

As a result, the more we are such a persona, the less we are ourselves. We may remain the individuals that logic speaks about, but we are not persons in the sense of self-relying actors. Such may seem to be those who try to decide themselves, using their gnomic will, what is good and bad. Yet our true persona, the true expression of our virtues, can be rooted only in the grace that impresses in us a complete picture of the entire logically connected system of virtues. The more we have this kind of persona, the less we decide for ourselves. Intellection of complete eternal truth replaces the partial and relative γνώμη on which our will used to rely. We cannot look for self-expression or self-realization, because we express and realize Him. Through this persona—His persona in us and the only one Maximus deems worth writing about—we are more similar to Christ than to ourselves, and we are less persons and more an image of God.
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