mem wywodów tego niemieckiego idealisty. Negatywna reakcja Feuerbacha, Marx’a, Nietzschego oraz niektórych przedstawicieli filozofii analitycznej na taką postać metafizyki nie jest zaskoczeniem.

Książka kończy się umiarkowanie optymistycznym akcentem. Autor stwierdza, że krytyka metafizyki nie oznacza jej końca, lecz tylko co najwyżej koniec metafizyki bezkrytycznej. Jeśli bowiem narzucimy umysłowi ludzkiemu takie ograniczenie, że będzie zmuszony unikać programowo problematyki metafizycznej, to pytania metafizyczne pojawią się wbrew woli człowieka, ponieważ nie ma takiego prawdziwie ludzkiego działania, które by nie zakładało jakichś rozwiązań metafizycznych. Ostatnie zdanie wyraża przekonanie Autora, że człowiek, chcąc czy nie chcąc, jest „homo metaphysicus”.

Czytelnik obeznany w pewnej mierze z poglądami filozofów omawianych w książce Disse’a może stwierdzić, czytając tę Krótką historię metafizyki zachodniej, że autor oddaje poglądy wiernie, podkreślając w nich to, co najbardziej istotne. Może trudno się zgodzić z komentarzem Autora do argumentów św. Tomasza na istnienie Boga. Zdaniem Disse’a największą trudność w ich przyjęciu stanowi rozdział między współczesnymi naukami przyrodniczymi a filozofią. Twierdzi on, że te nauki obchodzą się bez zasad metafizycznych, takich jak: zasada sprzeczności, wyłączenia środka, negacji ciągu nieskończonego. Można to zdanie Disse’a kwestionować. To prawda, że nauki przyrodnicze w swoim programie nie mają na celu wypowiadać się na temat pierwszych zasad, ale w praktyce one się nimi posługują. Juz zaś wyraźnie Autor nie ma racji, kiedy zasady komplementarności (na przykład korpuskularno-falowej natury światła) uważa za pogwałcenie zasady sprzeczności. Komplementarność to przecież nie jest sprzeczność. Gdy zaś idzie o zasadę negacji ciągu nieskończonego przyczyn i skutków, to można ją łatwo obronić, wykazując, że mnożenie czynników zależnych, nawet przez nieskończoność, nie sprawi, że staną się one niezależne (0 mnożone przez $\infty$ = 0).

Książka Disse’a, która jest owocem jego wieloletniej pracy dydaktycznej, stanowi bardzo pożyteczny przewodnik po europejskiej filozofii, której metafizyka jest najważniejszą częścią. Zainteresuje ona z pewnością studentów filozofii i teologii, ale także może przyciągnąć uwagę zwykłych czytelników, dla których słowo „metafizyka” brzmi może egzotycznie. Ich też zaintryguje pytanie, co takiego kryje się w filozoficznych dociekaniach, że poświęcały mu się jedne z najtęższych umysłów w dziejach europejskiej kultury.

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Can science, theology and spirituality cooperate with each other? Moreover, can each of them help the other to understand reality? Is it possible to create a coherent view of our world emerging from such different points of view? Some
theologians, well-educated both in theology and science and aware of questions that arose in the history of relations between science and theology, have tried to build such consistent views. Among them is William R. Stoeger, Staff Astrophysicist and Adjunct Associate Professor, member of Vatican Observatory Research Group, Steward Observatory, University of Arizona, Tucson.

The book contains three lectures presented in Fourth Series of Lectures named in Honour of Fr. George V. Coyne, S. J., Director at the Vatican Observatory. This series focuses on integration of our scientific knowledge with other forms of knowledge. Stoeger particularly deals with three issues: understanding the laws of nature, seeking an epistemology adequate to all our knowledge and description of God's action in the world in the context of natural science. Stoeger's primary point is to examine the character of the laws of nature in order to provide a more fruitful scientific and philosophical context to consider divine action in the world. He tries to indicate two related illusions, which are deeply rooted in our convictions. The first illusion says that the theories we construct and laws we discover are the patterns for reality as it is in itself, while the second one states that these laws control, govern and ground that reality.

In five paragraphs, Stoeger first presents a general view of the problem; then he considers more particular and advanced issues. His reflections are illumined by questions about: ontological status and the weight carried by the laws of nature, the extent to which well-confirmed physical theories and laws describe what really occurs in reality, how these laws prescribe the way in which reality behaves or can behave, and how these laws can be independent in existence of the objects they govern. More general questions in this context refer to the problem of realism, of explanation, of inference, of identification, of relationship between logical and physical necessity. These reflections lead Stoeger to conceive the laws of nature as elements of description and of models, which only imperfectly represent the underlying regularities of physical world. So the prospect of constructing a theory of everything is an illusion, the program of the ontological reductionism and determinism is scotched and philosophical weight of the Anthropic Principle becomes significantly diminished. This conception of the laws of nature provides a view within which God can be conceived as acting not only through 'our laws', but also through the underlying relationships and regularities in nature itself. These realities God experiences and knows intimately in all their relationships and connections.

In his second lecture Stoeger makes some preparations for answering the question about which characteristics provide an adequate epistemology for science, philosophy and theology/spirituality. First, he discusses in general terms a few different types and levels of experience and of knowledge; second, what makes them different from one another and what makes them similar. Then he briefly analyses their experiential roots, the way of employing different criteria, their reliance on an absolute norm and on their social and communal context, and their interactions in their common cultural field. A necessary condition for an adequate epistemology is to precisely describe and give due attention to the similarities and differences between different types of knowledge and recognising, articulating and determining their consequences.
The different modes of knowledge and understanding always modify one another and help us to determine their areas of strength and competency, their methods, evidential grounds, boundaries, limitations, and respective criteria of validation. This is an important ingredient for the adequate epistemology Stoeger seeks. An adequate epistemology must help us to avoid unreasonably including or excluding areas of experience as sources of legitimate knowledge, or elevating an area to a privileged status on the basis of narrow interests, or uncritically accepted cultural, social or religious myths.

He argues that all areas of experience and knowledge must be taken seriously, as long as they are subjected to critical examination in terms of standards and principles appropriate to them. Epistemology should take into account also the human natural drive to unify knowledge coherently in light of ultimate commitments and principles. Stoeger votes for an epistemology that gives an account of knowledge as it is actually experienced personally, socially, and culturally, not as we think it should be in the ideal order.

In the third lecture, the aim of the author's discussion is to describe God's action in the world in terms that are faithful to Christian sources of revelation and consistent with what we know about reality, its structure, evolution and processes, from the sciences.

Stoeger's general conclusion is that at the level of the sciences there are no gaps, except the ontological gap between absolutely nothing and something. Divine intervention is not needed in the world. Nature itself is open to and capable of realising new possibilities in a whole variety of ways. Secondly, he counts what we know from revelation and from our reflection upon it concerning these same things. Next, Stoeger deals with an analysis of interaction between these two points of view. Particularly important in this context is divine causality within the world, as we know it. Especially interesting is the question – can we conceive of modelling God's direct action in the world? This question seems to encounter an insuperable barrier: we have no a helpful analogy or model for what divine direct action must be, but we know that any action will always have a direct component and indirect components. Stoeger states that we would never be able to determine if a particular consequence were the result of God's direct action. However, the concepts of divine immanence and transcendence may provide the key to understanding this problem of what is called the "causal joint". Here there may be help in understanding of how mind-body issues can be resolved. The immanent presence of God in created beings and in their interrelationships is at the same time their limited and specific participation, their inclusion, in God's own existence and interrelationship as Trinity.

Within the context of Christian revelation, the focus of divine action is on the personal and the communal. But Stoeger claims we cannot solely concentrate on anthropocentrism. Indeed, a part of our commitment must be to emphasise our profound unity with the rest of creation.

The articles seem rather weakly connected to one another, although they have the same aim: to prepare the grounds for an integral view of the universe. This is expressed by the title of the book. Stoeger approaches his topics generally from one philosophical discipline: epistemology that is understood
firstly in the wide and secondly in the strict sense as a theory of all human knowledge and as a methodology. The author presents a Kantian metaphysics: only God knows any entity in itself. Here arises a weighty question: can we build any universal view without explicitly developing a strong metaphysical foundation. Here, I want to indicate that there are more sophisticated and elaborated Platonic interpretations of natural laws than Stoeger has presented (e.g. see Michael Heller’s analyses of mathematical structures of quantum theory in Mechanika kwantowa dla filozofów [Quantum Mechanics for Philosophers], Tarnów 1996).

Stoeger intends to develop an integrated view of the world and of human experience and intends to elaborate an adequate epistemology, but he (and many others who deal with this issue) does not take seriously (and perhaps he forgot) the knowledge that we have from art, poetry, literature, theatre, and other streams of philosophy. These represent a significant part of human experience, of self-determining and self-understanding in all ages and cultures. Furthermore, is epistemology an adequate ground for constructing such a general view? Is it possible to unify the epistemologies of such different kinds of knowledge?

It seems to me that Stoeger too easily passes through the so-called gaps problem in the scientific account. Philosophers distinguish a few kinds of gaps and the discussion about this topic is not accomplished yet. Especially alive are they in the context of theory of chaos, quantum theory, top-down causality, and so-called holistic explication (the opposite of reductionism).

Each article contains its own references. The book’s cover, decorated with a few green maple-leaves, can give an odd impression, rather remote from the considered topic.

In my opinion, these papers can be useful to the scientific community. The philosophical categories and standards of analyses that are used in these essays are acceptable and reasonable for them. The articles also constitute a way of showing the possibility of religious experience consistent with science (but not a vision for all our culture). Theologians can also profit from reading these articles because they show one more way of thinking about God in the context of science and one more way of unifying theology and results of science after ages of controversy.

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