

Überblick über die philosophischen Auseinandersetzungen inklusive eine Übersicht über die jüngsten Kontroversen aus den 90er Jahren z.B. über Schwangerschaftsabbruch, Todesstrafe, Euthanasie, Klonen, Transplantation, Strafrecht usw. Das unter der Leitung von Witold Mackiewicz vorbereitete Werk ist insgesamt von großem Format: bahnbrechend, mutig und zuverlässig.

Ich glaube, dass viele Generationen von Landsleuten für dieses Werk dankbar sein werden.

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Übersetzt von Ulrich Schrade

**Józef Bremer SJ, *Problem umysł-ciało. Wprowadzenie*** [The Body-Mind Problem. An Introduction], IGNATIANUM – WAM, Kraków 2002, 170 p.

The body-mind problem goes back to the beginning of philosophy. However, the most known contemporary formulation of this problem comes out of the linguistic investigations of Anglo-Saxon analytical philosophy, which leaves the natural sciences their specific mode of analysis, but also uses the results of interdisciplinary investigations. The various aspects of the body-mind problem point up a whole range of questions, such as the existence of mental universals, the problem of ontological mental states and their epistemological availability, intentionality and so on.

The author of this book – Józef Bremer SJ – is a lecturer on formal logic and the general methodology of sciences at the Faculty of Philosophy of the University School of Philosophy and of Education *Ignatianum* in Cracow. In his book, he is particularly interested in possible solutions to the problem of causality between mental and physical states as formulated in analytical philosophy. He indicates briefly and succinctly the epistemological question of the introspection status, and problems of contents of phenomena. The author's reflection is primary meta-theoretical. Wittgenstein's conception of the aim and the task of philosophy seems to be very important in this. Bremer does not refer to the conclusions of the natural sciences, but remains on the level of analysis of theories context. After describing different solutions, he takes the following approach: first, he introduces the process of finding answers, then brings the most significant explanations of some leading philosophers and describes what is typical of each of their solutions. Finally, he asks critical questions, making comparisons with other solutions to the mind-body problem and offering his own criticism. Bremer's book illustrates the complexity of the problem and the difference between the concept of the body-mind problem in common language (*manifest image*) and the other one in the language of scientific theories (*scientific image*).

The book is composed of five chapters. In chapter 1, there is the philosophical definition of the problem and the introduction to the current terminology and – in section 1.4 – proposed solutions. In the center of the chapter there is the

trilemma which helps us to classify and to find the different solutions of the problem. Before that, Bremer formulates the definitions of basic terms such as „causality”, „body”, or „mind” (the author uses Chalmers’ demarcation between the „psychological” and the „phenomenal” concept of mind). The trilemma is based on three theses: (1) mental events and properties are really different from physical events and properties; (2) mental events and properties cause physical events and properties; and (3) the area of physical events and properties is causally and explanatorily closed. These theses are manifestly incompatible, and the truth of any two of these rule out the third one. The denial of some of these theses leads to dualism, panpsychism, or materialism and so on. The trilemma is repeatedly mentioned as he introduces various solutions.

In chapter 2, Bremer adumbrates two concepts of body-mind relations, namely those of Descartes and Aristotle (the relation of body to soul). The reference to the history of philosophy seems to be indispensable in pointing out Descartes’ body-mind separation, which led to a kind of dualism that was not so prominent in earlier philosophy. Introducing Aristotle’s philosophy of mind, Bremer shows us another view of the body-mind problem that as such is not present in contemporary philosophy, but its consequences are still there. Then, describing Eccles’ concept of „psychon”, he gives us an example of a contemporary dualism.

Historically, there is an alternative to dualism, namely a form of materialism which is satisfied that mental states can be reduced to physical states. Bremer’s book touches on the alleged solutions of reductionist materialism in chapter 4, and those of irreductionist materialism in chapter 5. Reductionist materialism is introduced by way of Ryle’s *linguistic dualism* (4.1); C. G. Hempel’s philosophy gives an example of logical behaviorism – the most radical form of materialism (4.2); Bremer also describes identity theory, so called *type-type* theory, represented by W. Sellars and J. J. Smart, and a weak form of the *type-type* theory called the *token-token* theory (4.3). Eliminative materialism (4.4) is presented as the most excessive manifestation of scientific realism. Bremer points out P. Feyerband’s „strong”, and W. V. Quine’s „weak” eliminative materialism. The last theory introduced in chapter 4 is functionalism, represented especially by H. Putnam (4.5.1), and it is seen as a comfortable position, containing elements of dualism and materialism.

Davidson’s *anomalous monism* (5.1) appears in the beginning of the part dedicated to irreductionist materialism. Davidson proposes separating the ontological area from the terminological one in order to understand mental states, which are the same as ontologically physical states. This thesis is very popular today. The author then goes on to consider theories of supervenience – strong, global and weak (5.2). In 5.3 Bremer discusses the theory of emergence, a popular form of materialism. Representatives of this theory assume „downward causation” from the mental to the physical and also insist on the impossibility of the irreducibility of the mental to the physical. Properties of emergence are not just terminological, but rather parts of experience.

5.4. is dedicated to the „mystery of consciousness”, and thus Bremer leaves the analysis of the causal aspect of the body-mind problem. Quoting R. Penrose, D. C. Dennett and P. Bieri, Bremer turns our attention to the concept of

consciousness in the first person perspective. Along with Bieri, he is satisfied that the existence of inner experiences and our view of such experiences from the perspective of „I” are mysterious.

Wittgenstein's theory of mental states (chapter 3), taken especially from *Philosophical Investigations*, seems to be a key for all of Bremer's book. Its function is to arrange different solutions in order and to indicate criteria for analysis. In his *Philosophical Investigations*, L. Wittgenstein uses intersubjective verification and emphasizes the necessary intersubjectivity of every science. He also accepts introspection. But in this way, he does not reject the thesis of immediate access to our own mental states. In his concept of philosophy, one of the most discussed topics is common language and its complex grammatical construction. The access to dates for philosophical analysis is possible, and they have to be just adequately arranged. If we want to understand what a mental state means, then we have to look at the use of its term and the context in which we use it. We have to enter into the adequate „language game” in which the use of the mental state makes sense. Philosophy must avoid situations where areas of different language games are not adequately separated. In this way it would be possible to resist empty solutions. In chapter 3, there is an attempt to show the way how the body-mind problem could be solved out of dualism or materialism. Using Wittgenstein's point of view, Bremer talks about the need for a new formulation of the body-mind problem because of its insolvability in contemporary concepts.

As the title indicates, Bremer's book is a philosophical introduction to the body-mind problem, and it is one of the first one on the Polish market. The book is directed primarily to students of philosophy or psychology. Clear and systematic arrangement of different theories makes finding their foundation easier, and the rich bibliography is a starting point for further research. Obviously, we have to remember that the point of view on causality is decisive for the body-mind problem introduced historically and systematically. The pity is that others materialistic points of view (e.g. Th. Nagel or C. McGinn) are not analyzed here. The arrangement of the book makes it possible to read just the part that someone wants to study or that he/she is interested in. Bremer's questions concern on the one hand the coherence of different theories, and on the other arguments against the theories put forward by representatives of other theories. These questions are inspiring and help the reader to be critical and to form his/her own opinion.

Grzegorz OLEKSY SJ

**Stanisław KOWALCZYK, *Wolność naturą i prawem człowieka. Indywidualny i społeczny wymiar wolności*** [Freedom – A Human's Nature and One's Right. The Individual and Social Aspects of Freedom], Wydawnictwo Diecezjalne. Sandomierz 2000, pp. 214.

The book by professor Stanisław Kowalczyk, renowned scholar in the field of social philosophy, is without doubt one of the most important studies on the