In his philosophical works Wilfrid Sellars (1912-1989) – like Ludwig Wittgenstein – clearly distinguishes the domain of philosophy from that of empirical sciences. Within the framework of this differentiation he insists on a further sharp distinction between the concepts of empirical or factual linguistics and those of pure semiotic. It is quite clear – thus Sellars’s example – that formal logic and pure mathematics are not empirical sciences nor do they constitute branches of any such science. This distinction was historically gained from the development of pure syntax. According to Sellars, pure syntax is concerned with “rules defining the formal structure of calculi rather than languages” (Sellars, PPE 182). In a syntactic system understood in this sense we use neither the concepts of designation or truth, nor of verifiability or meaningfulness. The concepts used in logic and mathematics – taken as examples of such systems – are clarified through identification with concepts which occur in the formation and transformation of definitive rules of calculi. In this context, logic and mathematics are normative rather than factual sciences. The basis of their norms is grounded in humanly conceived rules.

Sellars’s aim is to develop a similar linguistic program for philosophy. He searches for a kind of philosophical behavioristic psychology – i.e. a psychology of rule-regulated behavior and a functional conception of meaning resulting from it. In this sense he supports Husserl’s program to separate philosophy from empirical psychology. At the same
time, he asserts that this program should be secured not through the Husserlian reductions of transcendental phenomenology, but by the pure theory of language, more precisely, by the pure theory of meaning.

In this paper predominantly I am going to concentrate on Sellars's early articles that are less commented on in philosophical works concerning the functional kinds of semantics. In these articles Sellars asks for – implicitly or not – a special 'via media' between a rationalistic understanding of meaning and the understanding of this term in philosophical schools of thought like empiricism or descriptivism. The philosophical method Sellars propagates consists of this 'via media' and is used to achieve philosophical clarification. It usually consists of three dialectical steps: constructing models of contrasting positions, modifying them, and integrating them into one theory. If we answer negatively the question of the possibility of such a 'via media' in philosophy, we will, according to Sellars, confront, among other things, the following dilemma: we will have to assert the existence of concepts which do not belong to empirical science, but without admitting the existence of a domain of non-empirical objects or qualities together with mental acts and intuitions for cognizing them.\(^2\) Strictly speaking, as the modern history of philosophy shows, that's not a dilemma. It is, of course, a problem.

1. Psychologism

In the factual (e.g. psychological) context, language is for Sellars a set of causally related events and habits. Furthermore, the distinction between language and meta-language is in this context a factual distinction between habits of different levels. The meta-language habits are built upon the former in a causal sense. A task of empirical psychology here is to characterize the factors leading to the adoption and abandonment of language habits. For example 'formal' meta-languages might be characterized, tentatively, by empirical psychology as habits relating to the 'clarification' or 'unpacking' of linguistic phenomena.\(^3\)

An important point in Sellars's semantic analyses is the criticism and rejection of psychologism. Psychologism, as a theory of language, mistakenly identifies philosophical – or in Sellars's language „epistemological” – categories with the categories of psychology.\(^4\)

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\(^2\) Cf. Sellars, LRB 290.

\(^3\) Cf. Sellars, RNWW 448.

\(^4\) „Psychologism as the confusion of epistemology with psychology” (Sellars, RNWW 430).
regardless of whether or not introspective or behavioristic psychology is empirically on target. The basic error of psychologism is the treatment of philosophical concepts as factual rather than metalinguistic concepts. To continue with introspective psychology and with the theme of 'introspective reports', we need, in the analysis of such reports, to add semantic discourse to strictly behavioral language. This means discourse which consists of such terms as 'means', 'true', 'stands for'. The introduction of a semantic language requires for its part the introduction of a metalanguage. The latter is necessary for human reflectivity and for becoming a rational person.

According to Sellars, philosophical psychologism permeates both the classical philosophical rationalist and classical empiricist traditions. In the rationalist conception, psychologism appears in the account of such terms as 'meaning', 'truth', and 'existence' and it leads finally to doctrines involving 'direct awareness' and 'intuition' of abstract entities (e.g. universals, propositions). The rationalist account includes a psychological relation of 'direct awareness' between mind and abstract entities and in the end it comes to the mistaken conclusion that philosophical statements are factual statements, albeit of a peculiar kind. Their conception in fact gives the grammar of philosophical predicates, but mixes up this grammar with platonizing factualism. The psychological relations about which the rationalistic conception is speaking, are really "Platonistic". The source of this fact lies in the nonsense of speaking of apprehending universals and propositions. On the other hand – in accordance with Sellars – we have in Platonism a sound logical or epistemological realism with respect to universals and propositions.

Psychologism in the classical empiricist tradition leads to the false conception that all 'genuine' concepts are 'factual'. Empiricism dismissed indeed the platonistic misconception, but it still undertakes to factualize semantics and epistemology. The result is the well-known attempt to identify the grammar of philosophical predicates with the grammar of psychological predicates. Classical rationalism – as noted – is for Sellars essentially sound as a naive syntax of philosophical predicates and it should be integrated into the empiricist tradition. The important duty for each rationalist is to put away the illusion that he is making factual

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5 Sellars's reconstruction of the classical rationalist argument gives this argument the form: 1st. premise – concepts relating to meaning and truth are significant, 2nd. premise – these concepts do not belong to the empirical sciences, 3. conclusion – therefore there exists a domain of non-empirical qualities and a corresponding apparatus of acts and intuitions. Cf. Sellars, LRB 290.

6 Cf. Sellars, ENWW 649.
statements. Nevertheless, to integrate the rationalistic and empiricistic positions, the latter position must assume one thing: that there exists a certain group of concepts which, when they are recognized at all to fall within the province of the philosopher, are hurled into the psychological dump known as pragmatics. These concepts are as genuinely philosophical and non-factual as those of pure syntax.

2. Reconciliation of rationalism and empiricism

The appropriate 'model' for the reconciliation of rationalism and empiricism Sellars finds in the use of the ethical 'ought' (in its categorial sense). He rejects both ethical naturalism, where 'ought' is logically reducible to descriptive 'is', and ethical non-naturalism (intuitionism), where 'ought' is neither logical nor causally reducible to 'is'. His own position is of the non-naturalistic kind: 'ought' is not logically reducible to 'is' (or general to descriptive concepts), but it is causally reducible. Ethical 'ought' has a cognitive meaning, which is not definable in descriptive terms. 'Ought' is first understood as ''the observance of a rule'' (Sellars, LRB 294). This means that by using 'ought' we have to do normative discourse. Users of this discourse may be conveying about themselves and their community that which cannot be said without using this kind of discourse. 'Ought' could be assimilated to the logical and physical 'musts'. The Wittgensteinian task of the philosopher is to exhibit the complex relationships which exist between normative and other modes of discourse – and above all – between mentalistic discourse, and semantic discourse, with these two discourses now being closer to each other.

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7 Cf. Sellars, ENNW 647. Empiricism, like rationalism, Sellars concludes that, has to lose its factual illusions. Traditional empiricists assume that each element of the grounding observation knowledge can be acquired independently of other grounding perceptual knowledge. On the contrary, Sellars insists that there is a logical dimension in which observed propositions are basic and that there is another logical dimension in which the observed reports rest on the world view that is grounded on them, cf. Sellars, EPM 170.

8 Cf. Sellars, SSMB 221n. „Thus, a Non-naturalist who holds that the only way in which moral obligation can enter into the causal explanation of human history is via facts of the form Jones thinks (feels) that he ought to pay his debt, would be holding that Ought is, in the above sense, causally reducible to Is“ (ibidem, 222).

9 Really this is a Kantian assimilation. „Now Kant saw this quite clearly. He pointed out that moral action is action because of a rule, and said that to say this is equivalent to saying that to act morally is to act 'so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law'. If he had said instead that to act morally is to act as though the truth of the corresponding generalization depended only on the occurrence of that action, his claim would have been essentially identical with ours“ (Sellars, LRB 299f.).
The term 'rule' is for Sellars internally bound to the term 'action'. He distinguishes between actions which merely conform to a rule and actions which occur because of a rule. To the first type belong many of the trained animal behaviors. The second types of activities – Sellars calls them 'rule-regulated activities' – are of a higher level than those which are produced by simple animal training procedures. This situation is attributed to the fact that perhaps all animal behavior is tied to the environment in a way which much characteristically human behavior is not. Also human beings learn habits of response to their environment – in Sellars's terminology 'tied behaviors' – in a manner which is essentially similar to that in which animals learn. In the case of human beings, any such 'behaviors' will be indeed modifiable by rule-regulated symbol activity, i.e. the human mind in action. But they remain the basic tie between the complex symbol behavior and the environment in which the humans act. Besides tied behaviors, the human being has a structure of developed systems of rule-regulated activity. This activity makes up human intellectual symbolic activity and Sellars calls it 'free' activity. 'Free' doesn't mean uncaused – in contrast to the trained animal tied behavior. The structure of rule-regulated activity constitutes our human understanding of the world in which we live, and also our history and future.

So far, as an action merely conforms to a rule, a rule is not a rule but a mere generalization (with the supplement – a rule is not something totally different from a generalization). A rule, on the one hand, exists as a generalization written e.g. in nerves. And existing in its proper element a rule has the logical form of a generalization. On the other hand, the rule is not merely a generalization formulated in the language of neurophysiology, or a generalization that finds its well-known expression in a declarative sentence. A rule finds its expression only in declarative grammatical forms complete with such terms as 'correct', 'right'. The last terms distinguish the grammatical forms of a rule from that of a generalization. The formulations of rules suggest, according to Sellars, that a rule is an embodied generalization which "...tends to inhibit the occurrence of such events as would falsify it – if it weren't already false, that is, for the generalizations which lie at the core of rules are rarely if ever true, and unless they could (logical or physical possibility) be false, they could scarcely function as rules" (Sellars, LRB 299). With this background, Sellars specifies his own semantic position which he calls New Nominalism:

10 Cf. Bremer, Rekategorisierung statt Reduktion, 81ff; Bremer, W. Sellars' behavioristische Gedankentheorie, 156ff.
(NN) „The New Nominalism takes ‘means’ or ‘designates’ to be a purely formal term, that is to say, a term which as little stands for a feature of the world as ‘implies’ or ‘and’. It has nothing to do with psychological acts, intuitions, or, indeed, with experience of any kind. It refers to no psychological act, intuition or transaction of any sort” (Sellars, RNWW 431).

As nobody would say that such syntactical predicates as ‘and’, ‘implies’, or ethical ‘ought’ are empirical or factual predicates, so it would be with purely semantic ‘means’. Who would say that ‘implies’ stands e.g. for a feeling of an abstract entity called ‘implies-ness’?

On the other hand, Sellars does not deny that ‘means’ in certain contexts is an empirical predicate. But the formal concept of ‘designation’ is essentially bound up with that of the conformation rule. This type of rule does two things: (i) it distinguishes the primitive predicates of a language from one another and (ii) it restricts the formation of compound sentences out of atomic sentences which involve these predicates. The meanings of the (primitive) predicates of a language are now formally specified in terms of conformation rules which discriminate between them in terms of the structures of relational sentences.

3. Versions of nominalism and realism

The different versions of philosophical psychologism commonly assume that the analysis of meaning is essentially a factual issue. The complete avoidance of psychologism can be achieved by drawing a clear distinction between the epistemological (philosophical) and the factual sense of meaning. Although the epistemological use of ‘meaning’ is a reconstruction of the psychological use, the two must be kept conceptually distinct. Sellars differentiates between two forms of philosophical psychologism in semantics: nominalism and realism. Both of these identify the meaning of a linguistic expression with an object of immediate awareness. Such identification is for Sellars unacceptable. His leading contradistinction comes directly from his theory of meaning and above all from his theory of abstract entities. To show his position we have to distinguish between three types of nominalism and two of realism.

(a) Ontological nominalism negates not only the existence of extralinguistic abstract entities and their postulation but also the existence of linguistic meanings.

11 Cf. Sellars, ENWW 652.
(b) Psychological nominalism denies that we learn the meaning of linguistic expressions through direct intellectual awareness of the abstract entities.

(c) Logical nominalism, or "psychologism in the narrower sense" (Sellars, RNWW 431), assumes a relational theory of meaning, but it turns down the pretended mental experience of abstract entities. Logical nominalism then identifies the extralinguistic terms of semantic relations with subjective private ideas and thus loses intersubjectivity of linguistic meaning. This type of nominalism restricts the objects of immediate awareness to immanent ideas, to individual non-repeatable mental contents. The content of a linguistic expression is also identified with an idea in the mind of its possessor. The ideas vary from one individual to another and in the same way vary the uses of expressions with the effect of excluding the intersubjectivity of language.

(d) Ontological realism recognizes the need for intersubjective discourse, but it accepts the relational theory of meaning. The objects of direct acquaintance are nonlinguistic terms of the semantic relation. There exist constant, publicly accessible abstract entities which are objects of immediate knowledge and which form the intersubjective senses of linguistic expressions. These entities are the intentional contents of classically conceived mental acts. For Sellars "the intentional is that which belongs to the conceptual order" (Sellars, SM 23). In his BBK, Sellars formulates a conception of intentionality in terms of the Thomistic conception of "intellectual words" (ibidem, 49, 51). The intentionality of intellectual acts is then determined by the semantics of the intellectual words. 'Epistemologism' in Sellars's terminology is a philosophical theory that asserts the direct knowledge of abstract entities and leads to ontological realism with respect to such entities.  

(e) Logical realism sees the entities of language as a universal instrument for understanding the world.

To preserve intersubjective linguistic meaning, (that is, logical realism) ontological realists enlarge the domain of direct awareness to include concepts and propositions as well as perceivable objects and

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12 Cf. Sellars, RNWW 431.

13 Sellars explicitly accused Husserl of epistemologism while acknowledging that Husserl's conceptualism differs from ontological realism by making objective noematic contents distributively but not collectively independent of mental acts (cf. Sellars, RNWW 430-431). He wavered about Frege's status as an ontological realist. "Although Frege insists that the entities he calls senses have a being which is independent of being conceived by particular minds of particular occasions - thus correctly insisting on their public character - he does not seem to take the tough early Russell line that they are independent of thought altogether" (Sellars, SM 65-66).
private ideas. For Sellars, the common point uniting these different approaches is the confusion of the semantic and psychological frames of reference. He argues that in logico-epistemological contexts statements about the meaning of terms are non-factual statements, statements "which are true or false in a purely formal sense, and decidable (in principle) on purely formal grounds" (Sellars, ENWW 652). If we do not see these two different concepts of 'meaning', we run the risk – sooner or later – of falling into the classical misconception of mind as apprehending universals and propositions. On the other hand, to be clear, Sellars insists that: "The classical conception of mind as apprehending universals and meanings is based on a confusion of the logical with the psychological frame of reference. To deny that universals 'exist' when speaking in the framework of logical analysis (logical nominalism) is as mistaken as to assert that universals 'exist' when speaking in the framework of the psychological description of thought (ontological realism or Platonism)" (Sellars, APM 567).^{14}

With regard to abstract entities, Sellars's position – called "psychological nominalism" – avoids both logical nominalism and ontological realism. At bottom he defends, with regard to universals, logical or epistemological realism, and assumes after all that each of the following three sentences is true: (1) Universals exist; (2) Some mental events mean universals; (3) It is nonsense to speak of any psychological relationship between mental events and universals. The proposed key to solving the problem of universals, and indirectly the problem of meaning, makes explicit the ambiguities of the two terms 'existence' and 'meaning', with 'meaning' as a term from the domain of epistemological analysis (more exactly, 'epistemological semantics'), and from the domain of empirical psychology. In the latter case, 'meaning' is a descriptive term in empirical psychology, relating to habits of response to and manipulation of linguistic symbols.

The 'via media' between descriptive and semantic analyses of meaning constitutes Sellars's thesis: it is nonsense to speak of meanings or senses as data, or as intuited objects of any kind. The formal linguistic alternative to psychologism is the endorsement of logical realism together with psychological nominalism. The general strategy is to put together realistic talk about universals and nominalistic discourse about linguistic expressions, while preserving a sharp distinction between semiotic and psychological analysis. Keeping logical realism does not lead to the intuition of some ideal contents. The "new

^{14} In APM see also for Sellars's interpretation of the difference between Platonist and Aristotelian accounts of universals (ibidem, 567).
way of words" – on which Sellars's 'via media' concentrates – provides an alternative understanding of the familiar metaphorical claim that the mind apprehends universals. Sellars's argumentation referring to this subject has two steps: first, he turns the contents of classically conceived mental acts into the intentions of linguistic expressions, and second, he treats intensions as interlinguistic rather than extralinguistic entities. The intensions are interlinguistic in the special sense of language as model type and they have to be distinguished from the specific sign-designs that embody them in the natural languages.\(^\text{15}\)

\section*{4. Nonrelational conception of semantics}

When we usually say that a term means or stands for something, we think, that we catch the sense of this term. How does this work? On one traditional account, in this way: a linguistic act in which this term or expression occurs has a particular directness toward extralinguistic entities. Semantic sentences relate then the terms they deal with to extralinguistic entities and in this sense the phrases '... means ...' or '... stands for ...' are relational. If the terms that stay to the right of 'means' were used in the way they are used in ordinary discourse, we could assume that they refer to certain extralinguistic entities. Linguistic acts would then be able to be directed to such entities and the sentences could be taken to present relations between these entities and the terms mentioned on the left side. On the traditional account normally the terms that stay on the right of 'means' are used in an ordinary way (and not in that way which is found in Sellars's account of semantic sentences). The sentence, as such, confirms then a relation between the expression mentioned on the left-hand side and something in the extralinguistic order, which is mentioned by a standard use of the expression on the right hand side.

Sellars's conception is a different one. The terms to the right of 'means' are neither used in such an ordinary way, nor are they mentioned. Suppose that they were only mentioned. Then we could understand what semantic sentences express without understanding what determinate relationship to non-linguistic reality is said to be enabled by the expressions that the sentence deals with, in the linguistic acts in which those expressions occur. But such understanding is, according to Sellars, not possible. The terms that stay on the right-hand side are used in a special way – they are "exhibited".\(^\text{16}\)

\(^{15}\) Cf. Sellars, SM, cap. 3, 4.
\(^{16}\) In Sellars's words: "not mentioned but used – used in a unique way; exhibited, so to speak" (Sellars, EPM 163).
A semantic sentence of the form '..." means ---' is not to be understood as expressing a relation between '...' and ---; but as using a version of the copula is to express a sortal classification of linguistic roles having the form: '...' is a ---'. Expressions like 'means' or 'stands for' are versions of the copula. Terms on the left side of is mention a word or phrase whose meaning is unknown, while terms on the right side function as a predicate-term, using a known word or phrase to illustrate and so to convey the meaning. The semantic 'relations' are ultimately illustrative or functional classifications. 'E" stands for ___' like 'E" means ---' classifies the tokens of graphical types 'E" as tokens of determinate types of linguistical function, which is illustrated through ---. Both of these sentences have the same logical form: they contain the functional dot-quotation (the last term will soon be explained).

The exhibited-use is therefore different from using words in general because it doesn’t refer to an object or entity. The terms are supposed to exhibit their own rule-governed use. If the relevant rules were formulated explicitly, it could be said that there must be certain relations between: (i) uses of the expression in question, now as elements in the real (non-linguistic) order and (ii) other elements in this order, elements which can be – in contrast to elements in (i) – throughout extralinguistic. Sellars calls the linguistic terms of these relations "natural linguistic objects", and the relations itself – "picturing" relations. These relations are kinds of causal correlations between the material realisation of sign-designs (natural linguistic objects) and "natural objects" in the surroundings of the language user. The problem is with the properly capturing of Sellars' understanding of the relationship between linguistic rules and picturing relations. It is crucial to his story that picturing relations are extensional, while rules are formulated in terms of intentional 'ought's. Picturing relations are kinds of causal correlations.

The rules require a certain determinate relatedness to extralinguistic reality on the part of occurrences in the real order in which speakers

\[\text{\textsuperscript{17}}\text{ I would say that in such semantic sentences we have also to do with a different kind of mentioning, different from mention words in general. We suppose, namely, that this mentioning is for persons who understand the terms mentioned.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{18}}\text{ Specifically, although we may, indeed must, know that these linguistic objects are subject to rules and principles – are fraught with 'ought' – we abstract from this knowledge in considering them as objects in the natural order. Let me introduce the term 'natural linguistic object' to refer to linguistic objects thus considered (Sellars, TC 212). For the theory of picturing, cf. Sellars, SM 136nn.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{19}}\text{ I be indebted to prof. dr. J. Rosenberg for this specification.}\]
make ordinary use of the expression that figures on the right-hand side of a semantic sentence. By dint of such nonordinary use to which the term is put there, the certain determinate relatedness to non-linguistic reality is reflected into what the sentence says about the term mentioned on its left-hand side. But the sentence itself relates that term only to another term. In that way, a sentence that claims a relation between terms is able to bring up the share made by the term mentioned on its left-hand side to the intentional character of linguistic acts in which the term figures.

To show what is technically going on and to achieve clarity about the occurrences of words in various linguistic or metalinguistic capacities, Sellars makes use of various quoting devices. Why will our common practice of mentioning words by double quotes not do here? Because there is first off all a distinction between word tokens and word types, a distinction which concerns: (i) the natural order and (ii) the order of signification (or in other words — logical, or functional order). To mention written words as tokens of written marks in natural order Sellars usually uses hyphens (e.g. r-e-d). To mention words in the natural order as types of designs he uses asterisk quotes (e.g. *red*). *Red* refers to items of the design-type illustrated between this quotes. When he mentions words as tokens in the signification-order, he usually uses double quotes (e.g. „red”). To mention word as belonging to a type in this order (he calls them „linguistic kinds”), he uses dot-quotes (e.g. •red•). It is important to remember that star- and dot-quotes form common-nouns, which take articles and plurals. The relevant logical grammar is illustrated by: In English, a *red* (or: *red*s) is a •red• (or: are •red•s).

The semantic sentences are consequently put in the order of signification: they classify words as role players. The linguistic types are capable of realization in different languages, and so we have a formal method for dealing with interlinguistic questions of meaning-identity. The terms *czerwony* and *rot* express then the same conceptual intension, •red•, if they play the same linguistic roles in their natural languages that *red* is playing in English. In the preceding sentence, for instance, the star- and dot-quoted expressions are being used as

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20 Sellars introduced also the order of thought, where word tokens are mentioned by <red> and word types by <<red>>. The last types form sortal predicates pertaining to conceptual episodes, cf. Sellars, SM 160.

21 „I shall use dot quotes to form the names of the expressions ... which is realized in English by the sign design illustrated between them. I shall use asterisk quotes to form the name of the sign design illustrated between them, thus *red* is the name of the sign design which in English is the written word „red” (Sellars, AE 627).
abstract singular terms (roughly, as if they were proper names of such abstract entities as types, roles, intensions, or kinds) rather than as common-nouns classifying natural linguistic objects. Terms between the asterisks (*—*) refer to sign-designs in a given natural language. Dot quoted terms, (•red•), are sortal predicates which are used to classify the items which play the role played in our language by the sign-design between the dot quotes. Descriptively different sign-designs in the same or different languages can play the same semantic role. The metalinguistic rules define types of linguistic roles and they leave undefined the real character of the sign-designs that can be used to play that role. The sign-designs indicate these types when they are governed by the same metalinguistic rules rather than define the interlinguistic intensions. Functional linguistic types are able to be structurally realized in different languages.

Dot quoting is one of Sellars's inventions used in specifically semantic contexts. To see its enlightened ability and advantage, we must return to the semantic phrase with which we began: '„E” (in L) means ....'. In many arguments and papers, Sellars points out the varied cases of "the meanings of the meaning" (to use Putnam's well-known phrase). From the beginning of his publishing, with regard to this point, he worked with two principles: (i) the irreducibility of the semantic predicate 'means' to an object-linguistic psychological predicate is similar to the irreducibility of normative 'ought', (ii) 'means' as a semantic predicate plays significantly different conceptual roles in different linguistic contexts. These roles include among other things: 'means' as a translation phrase, as 'stands for', as 'names', as 'connotes' and as 'denotes'.

Sellars focuses his attention on 'means' as 'stands for' or 'denotes' phrases in which '„E” (in L) means .... is equivalent to '„E” (in L stands) for its sense' or '„E” (in L) denotes triangularity' or '„E” (in L) denotes triangular items'. The term to the right of 'stands for' is an abstract singular term in L or in another natural language. With his well-known example where: '„Dreieckig" (in German) stands for triangularity' Sellars argued that the usual analysis of such phrases like: (linguistic item) R (non-linguistic item) is syntactically unperspicuous and philosophically misleading. Abstract terms („-ity") are also special illustrating-contexts and serve the same purposes as functional quotation. The abstract terms are illustrative meta-linguistic kinds of designs for linguistic functions.

In that way e.g. the extensional Carnap-Tarski semantics according to Sellars assumes that two types of entity, standing in some relation

R to each other, can be identified: an item in the language and an item in the world. The proposed analysis of semantic phrases stands in need of rational reconstruction. This reconstruction could be shown through the following steps:

- The abstract singular term 'triangularity' will be replaced by a distributive singular term (DST) – the •triangular•. Sellars calls such terms distributive singular terms (DSTs) “... for the predications made of them distribute over the many objects which satisfy the predicates from which they are formed” (Sellars, BLM 18).
- The dot quoting (•triangular•) indicates that it is a special sort of DST – a metalinguistic DST.
- The phrase 'stands for' is strictly speaking a nonperspicuous classificatory copula used to classify the phrases on the left-hand side by the metalinguistic DST.
- DSTs in the place of predicates are treated as special type of classificatory predicates; and metalinguistic DSTs are treated as sortal predicates that classify a linguistic expression in terms of the conceptual role it plays. The conceptual role itself is determined by the appropriate set of metalinguistic rules.

Accepting these premises Sellars reconstrues the sentence “Dreieckig” (in German) stands for triangularity as ‘A “dreieckig” (in G) is a •triangular•’. The metalinguistic sortal predicate a •triangular• will be now used to classify the sign-designs in a given language which play the same conceptual role played in the base language (i.e., the language being used) by *triangular*s. Semantic statements of this classificatory type require for their full understanding an insight into the Wittgensteinian irreducibility of different types of linguistic statements or modes of discourse (e.g. descriptive and explanatory, normative and metalinguistic). These modes are functionally complementary, although logically distinct. We can draw up three such types of linguistic statements.

The first of these types expresses the matter-of-factual uniformities involving sign-designs and the circumstances in which they are used. Thus we have empirical generalizations which do not involve 'means' as a semantic predicate. These generalizations are not semantic sentences in the strict Sellarsian sense, but object-linguistic relational statements. They assert a connection between linguistic items in the spatiotemporal

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23 Sellars implies that the kernal idea of this semantics (he frequently put both of these names together) and its word-world relations is “quite Augustinian” (Sellars, EPM 162). That is in my opinion not correct because also in Tarski-Carnap semantics we can say that the concept of such word-world relation is made clear only in terms of how these relations help us understand the possibility for operations with words in a language game.
order and the extralinguistic occasions of their use. Here’s where picturing belongs. Such specifications of picturing relationships are not actually semantic statements at all.

The second type are strictly semantic statements which contain 'means' as an irreducible metalinguistic predicate. These statements are — see my reconstruction — non-relational but classificatory sentences. They are used to classify sign-designs in terms of their rule-governed conceptual roles. The semantic sentences are indeed logically irreducible to factual statements asserting semantic uniformities, but they entail statements of a factual sort.

The third type of statements are metalinguistic rules. They constitute the conceptual roles played by the sign-designs and in the case of language as type, they are stipulated rules formulated in the metalanguage. These rules could be found out empirically and then explicitly investigated to find out the sense of controversial linguistic phrases.

The result of Sellars's reconstruction is a many-leveled psychological-nominalistic linguistic theory that preserves logical realism in his framework. Sellars adopts the three-dimensional semantics of Frege, but incorporates it within the analysis of meaning which Wittgenstein proposes in his *Philosophical Investigations*. He connects in a very sophisticated way logical realism and nominalism. That fact differentiates him from e.g. Quine and Carnap. Quine substitutes the theory of reference for the theory of meaning, while Carnap indeed preserves the theory of meaning but gives it a relational interpretation. The synthesis accomplished by Sellars modifies Carnap by constructing a non-relational semantics and completes Quine's theory by showing that it presupposes a reconstructed theory of meaning.24

5. The naturalistic philosophy of mind

Within the framework of his "theoretical mentalism" Sellars models unexpressed thought episodes (either "conceptual episodes" or "intellectual acts") on the model of expressed linguistic acts. The structure of this account of meaning carries over into how we conceive the intentional character (the "aboutness") of unexpressed thought. A thought episode's being intentionally directed toward an element in the real order is analogous to, say, a linguistic episode's containing an expression that functions as a name of an element in the real order. Such "aboutness" does not have be conceived as a relation between an element in the conceptual order and an element in the real order.

24 Cf. Sellars, SM 60-115.
However, according to Sellars's theoretical mentalism, the content of the relation (wholly within the conceptual order) that is affirmed by a statement of aboutness is more or less constituted by relations that would appropriately connect conceptual episodes considered as entities in the real order to other entities in the real order. But if the semantic relations between the conceptual order and the real order do not exist, then we also get a nonrelational conception of intentionality.

Sellars's program concerns not only the reconstruction of nonrelational, functionalistic semantics, but also the problem of abstract entities. His conception of the status of linguistic intensions finds repercussions—through the account of the intentionality of openly linguistic terms—in the philosophy of the mind. One of the central problems in this philosophical area is to ask for an naturalistic conception of intentionality.

"... the problem whether intentional concepts relating to minds can be reduced to nonintentional concepts, whether concepts of sense qualities, or physicalistic concepts, or both, and if so, in exactly what sense of 'reduced'" (Sellars, MMB 84).25

It is important to remember that in Sellars's account of semantic elements in the conceptual order can stand in content-involving or semantic relations only to other elements in the conceptual order. Even so he claims to be an empiricist regarding the philosophy of the mind. In particular, he accepts irreducible intentionality as the mark of mentalistic discourse, but rejects the classical theories of the mind. A semantic analysis of intentional discourses proposed in this way has to both be an alternative to the classical theories of the mind and give support to a naturalistic theory of the mind. Sellars asserts that acceptance of intentionality coincides with a naturalistic account of the mind. In this manner the developed argument will avoid on the one hand the consequences of substantive and logical behaviorism and on the other the traditional body-mind dualism. Sellars's concepts of intentionality and, bound with it, the concept of mentalistic discourse represent a special kind of behavioristic account. He will "... show exactly in what sense it includes something (reference or aboutness) which is not to be found in the language of behavioristics".26 The analysed theory of the mind can be better called 'nonpsychologistic naturalism'.

25 Sellars argues that the "non-relational character of 'meaning' and 'aboutness'" is "to be the key to a correct understanding of the place of mind in nature" (Sellars, SM ix).

26 Chisholm/Sellars, ITM 508.
Sellars's semantic approach to the philosophy of the mind integrates scientific realism with a many-leveled linguistic pluralism. The 'via media' method that he proposes takes a provisional model of the classical theory of the mind. That model is put together from three premises:

1. Public linguistic episodes can be characterized in semantic terms.
2. Mental acts can be characterized in the terms of intentionality. Mental acts are expressed by public linguistic episodes (so called 'performances of overt speech').
3. Semantic discourse about public linguistic episodes is to be analyzed in terms of discourse about the intentionality of the mental episodes.27

In his theory of the mind – which could also be called 'semantic theory of intentionality' – Sellars abandons the third premise and modifies premisses one and two. The theory is based on the reconstruction of classically conceived mental acts as mental speech episodes. He reconstructs the intentional contents of those episodes as the interlinguistic intensions of both outer and inner speech. Such reconstructed categories of philosophical semantics then are used to analyze the intentionality of the mental acts reconceived as episodes in inner speech.

Sellars's semantic theory of intentionality sees meaningful public linguistic acts (thinkings-out-loud) – which he calls „thoughts2” – as the expression (in the sense of 'causal expression') of inner episodes. The inner episodes, 'that p' – he calls these episodes „thoughts,” – are inner speech episodes, i.e. the mental expression 'that p'. Thoughts, are characterized by the categories of intentionality, and they are conceived in an analogous way as theoretical entities which are postulated by scientific theory. They are not of course merely theoretical entities, because e.g. we have direct access to our thoughts. Sellars's Genius Jones introduced the framework of these thoughts as a proto-theory in order to explain:

„... the fact (among others) that a person's verbal propensities and dispositions change during periods of silence as they would have changed if he had been engaged in specific sequences of various types of candid linguistic behaviour called 'thinkings-out-loud ...” (Sellars, SM 151).

At first (as Genius Jones introduced them) the framework of thoughts1 was only theoretical. Later its users were trained in the first-person-

27 Sellars, EPM 177-178.
reporting use of this framework. Thoughts₁ are only functionally but not descriptively similar to public acts of thinking-out-loud. The same semantic categories – the same semantic roles – can be applied to thoughts₁ as to thoughts₂. Thoughts₂ are propositional intensions which are expressed (in the sense of 'express their meaning') by sentential public linguistic episodes.²⁸ According to Sellars, it is possible to analyze and to understand semantic discourse about public linguistic acts without the classical idea that imperceptible inner speech episodes are the cause of such acts.

The semantic sentence ""E" (in L) expresses [in the sense that a linguistic episode semantically expresses its meaning] the thought₂ that p>> is an irreducible special quality of all kinds of mental and out-loud discourse. That special quality can be applied as equally well to out-loud as to mental speech episodes and it cannot be reduced to linguistic factual discourse. If such be the case, we will be in a framework of various kinds of psychologism. Why? Because the semantic sentence does not assert behavioral facts. It only signifies that such and such facts about the role of "E" (in the behavioral economy of L-users) are taking place. As Sellars concludes, the categories of intentionality are semantic categories in terms of which we speak about public speech acts.

Sellars's naturalistic philosophy of the mind is based on the conceptual priority of thoughts₂ (thinkings-out-loud) and contrasts it with the causal priority of thoughts₁ (inner episodes). To use the Aristotelian differentiation we can say that, in the Aristotelian order of being, unobservable thoughts₁ are causes of thoughts₂; whereas, in the Aristotelian order of understanding, our concept of thoughts₁ are derived from concepts of the observable use of thoughts₂. Each person has inner intentional episodes to which they have direct but not infallible epistemic access, and that access can occur without being expressed by public episodes. The model for inner episodes is semantic and not behavioral discourse about public linguistic episodes. That explains why intentionality is an irreducible special quality of inner episodes. Certain behavioral facts about episodes of thinking-out-loud are signified but not asserted by the semantic sentences. These behavioral facts are the model for the inner episodes, with the inner episodes being conceived as in the order of causes. Semantic sentences indeed convey behavioral information, but they cannot be reduced to pure behavioral terms.

6. Conclusions

The naturalistic philosophy of the mind avoids psychologism by accepting the irreducibility of the language of metalinguistic discourse (and its semiotic terms) to the language of behavioral discourse (e.g. behavioral descriptions).

Sellars's theory of nonrelational semantics states that when we use abstract concepts we do not refer to abstract entities. His theoretical mentalism claims that our language about states of consciousness (thoughts) does not refer to abstract entities. According to Sellars, to say that states of consciousness constitute a kind of evidence which is independent of a language is the same as to say that thought refers to abstract entities, which would be an example of "myth of the given". The myth of the given can be in this context characterized as the assumption that the intentionality of consciousness is a primary special quality, a kind of foundation for the intensionality of linguistic expressions. Sellars denies this. He claims that mental episodes are episodes of inner speech and that their intentionality comes from their intensionality (i.e. from the linguistic functions of inner speech). Such a thesis does not represent reductive but only "methodological" behaviorism: the mental episodes are not only dispositions to public linguistic performances but they are also "occurrent events", which we model on the basis of such linguistic performances. Ontologically, these entities have a status analogous to the status of theoretical entities (e.g. molecules) and they have to be conceived as causally relevant entities.

Sellars's endorsement of the primary intentionality of language works against the classically conceived primary intrinsic intentionality of thought. The intrinsic intentionality of thought can be expressed via the derivative intentionality of language. This makes his philosophy of the mind more interesting from the explanatory point of view than e.g. the accounts of nonreductive materialism, because it avoids metaphysical confusions about the irreducibility of the intrinsic, autonomous intentionality of thoughts. Sellars maintains his theory of the manifest mind against the reductionist attack without supposing that thoughts by themselves carry over their intentionality on the derivatively intentional expression of thought in language. His "methodological behaviourism" detaches the intrinsic intentionality of thoughts from the psychology and phenomenology of the manifest image of the mind. Thoughts do not walk ahead of language, and language is not a vehicle for the expression of them. Through such an account of thoughts, the

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29 R. Chisholm is dedicated to the thesis that without intentionality, the terms and the
problems of psychology could be explored in a new way. This account would call attention to the fact that the description of the relation between the intentionality of thought and the intentionality of language takes place in a metalinguistic theory. This theory is about language and does not presuppose an ontology of mental phenomena.\(^{30}\)

'Means' or 'denotes' expresses a connection between elements of the linguistic order. The idea of this connection is burdened with the normative 'ought' and its irreducibility to descriptive language. That connection allows that in semantic sentences we do not have to take into account the Carnap-Tarski semantics, as Sellars understands this semantics. The idea of such a connection makes sense only in the context of the way in which it enters into determining the conditions under which whole sentences are correctly or rightly asserted. The 'means' of semantic sentences should be seen as a sentential operator, in whose domain come to pass specifications of relation which hold between linguistic items. Sellars views semantic sentences as 'ought' sentences whereby linguistic patterns governed behaviour, formulable in nonsemantic terms.\(^{31}\) These patterns constitute the semantics of linguistic expressions.

7. Bibliography


Sellars, W.,


denotes. Chisholm’s well-known metaphor: „... whereas both thoughts and words have meaning,..., the meaning of the words is related to the meaning of thoughts just as the light of the moon is related to that of the sun“ (Chisholm/Sellars, ITM 524).

\(^{30}\) According to Chisholm, a metalinguistic model of the meaning of language can’t be successful if it doesn’t embody intentional concepts deriving ultimately from thought’s intrinsic intentionality. He tries to explain that „... it would be unfounded psychological dogma to say that infants, mutes and animals cannot have beliefs and desires until they are able to use language“ (ibidem, 524).

\(^{31}\) Sellars distinguishes three types of such patterns: language entry transitions, intra-linguistic transitions, language departure transitions, cf. Sellars, SM 114.


MMB – Mind, Meaning, and Behavior, „Philosophical Studies”, 3 (1952), 83-95.


Józef BREMER SJ

W. SELLARSA SEMANTYCZNE ROZWIĄZANIE PROBLEMU CIAŁO-UMYSŁ

Streszczenie


W moim artykule koncentrujemy się przede wszystkim na wczesnych pismach Sellarsa (tj. do ukazania się jego EPM/1956), które prawie nie są omawiane w literaturze. Sellars poszukuje w nich drogi pośredniej pomiędzy racjonalistycznym rozumieniem znaczenia a rozumieniem empiryczno-psychologicznym, postępując według dialektycznej metody: konstruowanie modeli ujęć przeciwnych, modyfikowanie ich i tworzenie własnej teorii. Jeżeli takiej drogi, zdaniem materialisty Sellarsa, nie znajdziemy, to staniemy w końcu przed problemem konieczności uznania istnienia pojęć należących do nauk empirycznych bez równoczesnej możliwości dopuszczenia istnienia nie-empirycznych obiektów razem z mentalnymi aktami dla ich poznania. W gruncie rzeczy poszukiwanie owej *via media* to poszukiwanie określonego rodzaju antypsychologistycznej semantyki. Psychologizm niesłusznie utożsamia filozoficzne kategorie semantyczne z kategorią psychologicznymi. Obojętnym przy tym jest, czy chodzi o psychologię behawioralną, empiryczną czy introspektywną. W psychologii racjonalistycznej psychologizm prowadzi do semantycznych też o "bezpośredniej świadomości"
wielkości abstrakcyjnych (np. uniwersaliów), w psychologii empirycznej
do traktowania pojęć jako czegoś faktycznego, do identyfikacji orzeczeń
psychologicznych z orzeczeniami filozoficznymi.

Poprzez dialektyczne łączenie empirycznego i racjonalistycznego
rozumienia pojęć Sellars poszukuje dla swojej semantyki podobnie nie-
empirycznych pojęć jak te z czystej syntaktyki. Modelem takiego
połączenia może być, jego zdaniem, połączenie etycznego naturalizmu
('powinien' jest logicznie redukowalne do 'jest') oraz intuicjonizmu
('powinien' nie jest ani logicznie ani przyczynowo redukowalne do 'jest').
Sellars jest antynaturalistą: 'powinien' nie jest definiowalne w termiach
empirycznych, lecz jest określone poprzez przestrzeganie reguł. Dyskurs,
w którym występuje 'powinien', jest tym samym dyskursem normatywnym,
a zadanie filozofii Sellars widzi w realizacji wittgensteinowskiej
metody przejrzystej ekspozycji, to jest w ukazaniu związków pomiędzy
dyskursem normatywnym i innymi rodzajami dyskursu; szczególnie
pomiędzy dyskursem mentalnym a semantycznym, które są ze sobą
ściśle łączone. Termin 'reguła' jest dla Sellarsa wewnętrznie związany
z terminem 'działanie', przy czym chodzi mu – w odróżnieniu od
wyćwiczonych zachowań zwierząt – o działania kierowane regułą.

Zakładając powyższy model Sellars określa swoje własne stanowisko,
nazywając je nowym nominalizmem: 'znaczy' jest czysto formalnym
teremin, który tyleż samo oznacza cechy przedmiotów, co logiczne
termini typu 'implikuje' czy 'i' - Termin ten nie ma również nic współ­
ego z psychologicznymi akta czy intuicjami. Oczywiście Sellars nie
neguje, iż w pewnych kontekstach 'znaczy' może być empiryczno-
psychologicznym orzeczeniem, ale nie jest on takim w jego semantyce.
Według Sellarsa semantyczne zdanie '..., znaczy ---' nie jest – jak
w semantyce klasycznej – jakąś relacją pomiędzy elementem językowym
a pozajęzykowym. Termy występujące po prawej stronie 'znaczy' nie
są jego zdaniem ani używane ani cytowane (klasyczne rozróżnienie
w zdaniach ze 'znaczy'), lecz są one używane w specyficzny sposób, są
one 'wystawione'. 'Wystawione' użycie nie odnosi się do jakiegoś obiektu,
a wyrażenie 'znaczy' można traktować jako specjalny przypadek łącznika
'jest', który po prostu wyraża klasyfikację ról językowych. Na przykład
w zdaniu '„red” znaczy czerwony’ słowo 'czerwony' spełnia te same role
(funkcje) w języku polskim, co słowo 'red’ w języku angielskim, dlatego
może ono być zapisane jako (w liczbie mnogiej): „red’s” są •czerwo­
ny•mi", gdzie punktowy sposób cytowania wskazuje, że „czerwony” nie
jest nazwą, lecz tzw. dystrybutywnym pojedynczym terminem. Seman­
tyczne relacje okazują się więc być funkcjonalnymi klasyfikacjami
wyrażeń.

Funkcjonalna semantyka jest dla Sellarsa częścią naturalistycznej
filozofii umysłu, w której podstawowym pytaniem jest pytanie o status

Podkreślanie przez Sellarsa pierwotnej intencjonalności myśli stoi w sprzeczności z klasycznymi (Brentano, Chisholm) teoriami, przypisującymi właśnie myślom pierwsztą intencjonalność. Opis relacji pomiędzy intencjonalnością myśli i intencjonalnością języka zachodzi u Sellarsa w teorii metajęzykowej. Teoria ta jest o języku i nie potrzebuje ontologicznych założeń o fenomenach mentalnych. 'Znaczy' wyraża połączenie pomiędzy elementami porządku językowego. Połączenie to pozwala zauważyć, że zdania semantyczne nie możemy analizować za pomocą semantyki Carnapa-Tarskiego. Zdania semantyczne nie dotyczą faktów behawioralnych. 'Znaczy' w zdaniach semantycznych może być traktowane jako operator zdaniowy, w którego zakresie dokonują się specyfikacje relacji zachodzących pomiędzy terminami językowymi, które jednak poprzez odpowiednie reguły są związane z postrzeganiem otoczenia i z działaniami. Tak rozumiana semantyka jest podstawową cechą charakteryzującą Sellarsowskie rozwiązanie problemu ciało-umysł.