https://forumphilosophicum.ignatianum.edu.pl:443/docannexe/file/3695 Opis...2 fr https://forumphilosophicum.ignatianum.edu.pl:443/docannexe/file/3695//7609-cfp-christian-philosophy-2026.html Call for Papers In September 2024, the Institute of Philosophy of Ignatianum University in Cracow (Poland) hosted the third international conference “Christian Philosophy Facing Naturalism.” The conference gathered over 40 philosophers from all around the world. During the event, participants explored the long-standing debate between naturalism and anti-naturalism. Papers analyzed how today’s cultural dominance of naturalism challenge Christian philosophy to engage critically with its principles and implications. Contributions also examined naturalism’s potential to both challenge and enrich Christian philosophy, offering opportunities to reassess traditional solutions and develop new perspectives. Discussions included historical and systematic dimensions of the naturalism vs. anti-naturalism dispute, emphasizing the evolving position of Christian thought within this framework. Some of these papers and discussions inspired and motivated the elaboration of the articles which we have the pleasure to introduce in the following issue. We do wish you a stimulating and fruitful read! Guest Editors Jacek PoznańskiSzczepan Urbaniak Mon, 17 Mar 2025 00:00:00 +0100 https://forumphilosophicum.ignatianum.edu.pl:443/docannexe/file/3695//7609-cfp-christian-philosophy-2026.html https://forumphilosophicum.ignatianum.edu.pl:443/docannexe/file/3695//74-boards.html Editorial Board Jakub Pruś, Editor-in-Chief University Ignatianum in Cracow, Poland Szczepan Urbaniak SJ, Deputy Editor University Ignatianum in Cracow, Poland Maciej Jemioł, Editorial Secretary University Ignatianum in Cracow, Poland Férdia Stone-Davis, International Assistant Editor  Margaret Beaufort Institute of Theology, Cambridge, UK Daniel Spencer, International Assistant Editor University of St Andrews, UK Rev. Mark Sultana, International Assistant Editor  University of Malta, Faculty of Theology, Malta Anna Varga-Jani, International Assistant Editor Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Hungary Magdalena Jankosz, Language Editor Pontifical University of John Paul II, Poland Michał Zalewski SJ, Associate Editor for Reviews University Ignatianum in Cracow, Poland Advisory Board Andreas Wilmes West University of Timisoara, Romania Christopher Wojtulewicz Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium Marcin Podbielski, University Ignatianum in Cracow, Poland Petr Dvořák Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic Dariusz Łukasiewicz Kazimierz Wielki University in Bydgoszcz, Poland David Pratt Georgetown University, WA, USA Andrey Tikhonov Southern Federal University at Rostov-on-Don, Russia Elizabeth Burns Department of Theology and Religious Studies, King’s College London, UK Alex R Gillham St. Bonaventure University, NY, USA Joeri Schrijvers, North-West University of Potchefstroom, South Africa Till Kinzel, Technische Universität Braunschweig, Germany Tue, 07 Jan 2025 00:00:00 +0100 https://forumphilosophicum.ignatianum.edu.pl:443/docannexe/file/3695//74-boards.html https://forumphilosophicum.ignatianum.edu.pl:443/docannexe/file/3695//7495-2902-00.html Mon, 23 Dec 2024 00:00:00 +0100 https://forumphilosophicum.ignatianum.edu.pl:443/docannexe/file/3695//7495-2902-00.html https://forumphilosophicum.ignatianum.edu.pl:443/docannexe/file/3695//7492-2902-00.html Mon, 23 Dec 2024 00:00:00 +0100 https://forumphilosophicum.ignatianum.edu.pl:443/docannexe/file/3695//7492-2902-00.html https://forumphilosophicum.ignatianum.edu.pl:443/docannexe/file/3695//7559-2902-08.html This paper offers an Aristotelian-Thomistic response to the question whether AI is capable of developing virtue. On the one hand, it could be argued that this is possible on the assumption of the minimalist (thin) definition of virtue as a stable (permanent) and reliable disposition toward an actualization of a given power in the agent (in various circumstances), which effects that agent’s growth in perfection. On the other hand, a closer inquiry into Aquinas’s understanding of both moral and intellectual virtues, and a more detailed analysis of the ontological status of AI, show that it is highly unlikely to envision the design of specifically human-like reason-based and/or behavioral-based (“strong”) AI that would possess properly human virtues. Still, virtuous “weak AI” might be possible, although a question ought to be asked whether we should classify artifacts’ virtues using categories developed in reference to specifically human dispositions and actions. Mon, 23 Dec 2024 00:00:00 +0100 https://forumphilosophicum.ignatianum.edu.pl:443/docannexe/file/3695//7559-2902-08.html https://forumphilosophicum.ignatianum.edu.pl:443/docannexe/file/3695//7502-2902-01.html Ernest Nagel’s two-part article entitled “Impressions and Appraisals of Analytic Philosophy in Europe” undoubtedly played a crucial role in the development of analytic philosophy in both Europe and the United States. Nagel articulates the shared metaphilosophical assumptions embraced by philosophers from various centres, including Prague, Vienna, Lviv, Warsaw, and Cambridge. Nevertheless, it is important to note that philosophers began to describe themselves using the term “analytical philosopher,” or a similar term, particularly within the intellectual centre of Cambridge, in the early 1930s in Britain.  In this article, I shall compare how these philosophers conceptualized “analytic philosophy” with the metaphilosophical assumptions outlined by Nagel. Then, I shall draw a comparison between the understanding of analytic philosophy in the early 1930s in Britain, and contemporary conceptions such as “conceptual creativity” and “conceptual engineering.” As it turns out, a part of contemporary analytic philosophy is more open to social-practical issues than it was in the early 1930s in Britain, especially in the intellectual centre that was Cambridge. Mon, 23 Dec 2024 00:00:00 +0100 https://forumphilosophicum.ignatianum.edu.pl:443/docannexe/file/3695//7502-2902-01.html https://forumphilosophicum.ignatianum.edu.pl:443/docannexe/file/3695//7510-2902-02.html In this paper, I consider a number of philosophical critiques of language and describe how their criticisms compare. In particular, I discuss how the current trend in the philosophy of language known as conceptual engineering fits into this tradition and to what extent it can be considered a critique of language per se, rather than a method of addressing dissatisfactions with certain individual terms. I suggest that criticisms can be divided allegations of two types of shortcoming: dangers and deficiencies. In the category of dangers, I consider some well-known examples from the history of philosophy, and suggest that they partly rely on an unexpressed from of Linguistic Determinism. I then move on to the deficiencies highlighted in the critiques offered by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and Mauthner in his Contributions to a Critique of Language. These form a pair of apparently opposite ways of considering the flaws in language, but I shall argue that they have much in common. I then describe the conceptual engineering movement and its mission to provide ‘improved’ meanings of certain terms. I show that implicit in the assumptions behind conceptual engineering are criticisms of language of both varieties – current meanings are seen as dangerous as they represent a threat to social justice, and the system of allocation of meaning is seen as flawed and in need of external intervention. Mon, 23 Dec 2024 00:00:00 +0100 https://forumphilosophicum.ignatianum.edu.pl:443/docannexe/file/3695//7510-2902-02.html https://forumphilosophicum.ignatianum.edu.pl:443/docannexe/file/3695//7516-2902-03.html Amodality is the thesis that concepts are not constituted by modal-specific representations. In this paper I assess the prospects for uncovering support for this claim in language by two different means. First, I examine the question of the amodal character of abstract concepts, but find it to be inconclusive pending a clearer account of the role of sensorimotor representations in language processing. Second, I evaluate the possibility of there being amodal primitive concepts in the context of Carey’s account of representational primitives in core cognition. Despite their alleged iconicity, which seems to favor a modal view, I contend that there are grounds for regarding them as amodal in nature. I also challenge the discontinuity thesis that regards early primitives as being unrelated to mature, newly linguistically created primitives. Mon, 23 Dec 2024 00:00:00 +0100 https://forumphilosophicum.ignatianum.edu.pl:443/docannexe/file/3695//7516-2902-03.html https://forumphilosophicum.ignatianum.edu.pl:443/docannexe/file/3695//7525-2902-04.html Despite the fact that natural language has always been one of the most important resources for the study of ontology, many authors continue to regard it as a deceptive guide to the inquiry into what there is. The notion of natural language as a trap is carried over into contemporary metaontological studies, which typically reject natural language as ontologically committing. From a deflationary perspective, this paper aims to argue that ontological commitment occurs in natural languages, with implications for the linguistic relativity hypothesis. To this end, a view based on naturalized epistemology and other aspects of Quine’s philosophy is presented. The perspective of Natural Language Ontology proposed by Moltmann is also introduced, with the goal of offering a new approach that allows a specific analysis of the ontological commitments of natural languages. While Moltmann herself indicates some motivations for this, its potential attractiveness for the study of linguistic relativity will be emphasized here. Finally, it will be suggested that there may be a linguistic bias around the proposed criteria of ontological commitment. Mon, 23 Dec 2024 00:00:00 +0100 https://forumphilosophicum.ignatianum.edu.pl:443/docannexe/file/3695//7525-2902-04.html https://forumphilosophicum.ignatianum.edu.pl:443/docannexe/file/3695//7535-2902-05.html Vague names, like “Everest” and “Belle Epoque” seem to refer to objects without clear boundaries. Supervaluationism claims that this vagueness is a feature of language, not of the objects referred to; vagueness in names is just ambiguity between many possible referents. This general idea admits of two more specific versions. Both give similar treatments of standard uses of vague names, but have very different results for other cases, such as reference achieved by descriptions including mentioned names. Considering two examples, I show neither variant of supervaluationism can account for the truth of all types of sentences about those names themselves. If I am right that these types exhaust supervaluationism, the theory is shown to be false. This problem closely resembles others in the super-valuationist literature about disquotation failure for truth. Treatments of vague truth and vague reference come apart though, and I show that the two problems are different enough that none of the popular solutions will succeed for reference. I consider—and reject—several specific objections, and two more general ways to recover supervaluationism following my arguments. I conclude that supervaluationism is at best a useful formalism for some kinds of vagueness reference, but fails as a general account. Mon, 23 Dec 2024 00:00:00 +0100 https://forumphilosophicum.ignatianum.edu.pl:443/docannexe/file/3695//7535-2902-05.html