does not embrace a commitment to realism (257). Thus, Wright accepts certain realist intuitions, but cannot affirm realism with all of its metaphysical assumptions, and in this regard we can view him as being at most a minimalist realist (258). Czerniawski guides the reader insightfully through the exchanges between Wright and Putnam to finally show how they play so-called “burden tennis”: that is to say, they are unable to agree about who should feel the burden of obligation to provide a warrant for their position—the realist or the anti-realist (263).

Czerniawski’s book deserves attention, as it not only offers a broad introduction to the problem of truth in contemporary analytical philosophy, but also amounts to a highly systematic piece of work in that field—one that gives a detailed insight into the evolution of different philosophical ideas relating to the Epistemic Theory of Truth. Czerniawski has managed to describe Dummett’s, Putnam’s and Wright’s philosophies in a lively and engaging way, and has shown how their theories came to be shaped by various arguments and influences. The book can thus be recommended as an excellent choice for those not so familiar with this specific issue in analytical philosophy who nevertheless wish to broaden their knowledge about recent developments pertaining to the Epistemic Theory of Truth.

Jakub Pruś


Urszula Zbrzeźniak’s Genealogy and Emancipation: The Studies in Contemporary Political Philosophy is a plaidoyer for a diverse and possible world, in which the hermeneutics of emancipation and liberation happens within the horizon of the tension between liberation and domination. The task of philosophy is to undertake an interpretative challenge that involves an understanding of a human being as homo interpretativus. Dasein has to face a political way of being in the world, clarifying the lan-
guage of politics by turning it into a language of emancipation as κοινή or lingua franca not only for philosophy, but for the human being per se in the 21st century.

After Martin Heidegger, who diagnosed the dominance of calculative thinking (rechnendes Denken) and its disastrous consequences, which ensue from forgetting the meditative way of life (besinnliches Denken), Zbrzeźniak asks about the place of utopian and emancipatory discourse in the contemporary way of thinking. With the help of Foucault’s genealogy as a way of analyzing current political projects, she draws attention to the heterogeneity of contemporary political reflection, especially in relation to the pursuit of the principle of equality. Referring to Hannah Arendt’s and Giorgio Agamben’s interpretative intuitions, she further situates herself in the research horizon between poststructuralism, postmodernism, and radical hermeneutics. A departure from the radical narrative in the reflection on emancipation in the direction of aberration and of its internal reconfiguration poses a question about its inclination or even prejudice (Vorurteil) as suggested already in the Latin word clinamen (clinare).

Zbrzeźniak’s book has a transparent structure. Her reflections focus on three main motives which are expounded in the book’s three chapters. The first one is a genealogical reading of contemporaneity. Chapter two discusses the various concepts of the subject of emancipation. Chapter three addresses emancipatory politics in its prevalent intention—being at the service of democracy. In conclusion, Zbrzeźniak underlines the aesthetic character present in the political thinking of emancipatory projects. At the same time, she pays attention to the fundamental role of the emotions in the emancipatory imagination. The erudite value of the book does not merely lie in the array of discussed authors (Hannah Arendt, Giorgio Agamben, Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, Jean-François Lyotard, Richard Rorty, Gianni Vattimo, Ernesto Laclau, Antonio Negri, and Michael Hardt), but also in the selection of interpretative paths and bibliographic resources that deserve high acclaim. They accentuate the complexity of the research problem itself. Tradition bestowed Duns Scotus with the title of doctor subtilis because of his output, which was full of distinctions, polemics, and versatility. Zbrzeźniak fits perfectly into this ingenious horizon by faithfully following the hermeneutic logic of argumentation as well as creating an original vision of emancipatory consciousness.

Zbrzeźniak precisely diagnoses an impasse associated with departing from nihilism as she draws here on Gianni Vattimo by recognizing his importance in the research on the very possibility of emancipation. The key issue is to understand the interpretative effort required for reconstructing
the realities of one’s own personal history, which is the *conditio sine qua non* for any emancipatory reflection.

Even if I do not share Slavoj Žižek’s opinion that Gianni Vattimo’s and Santiago Zabala’s *Hermeneutic Communism* is a book which anyone who thinks about radical politics needs desperately to read, one cannot omit the import of the hermeneutic reflection on communism as if it were simply “more of the same.” As an alternative, anti-foundationalist, and unceasingly attractive idea for coming to terms with the world, the hermeneutic reflection has a life of its own. The idea is attractive as we live in a world that is not ruled by the unchangeable laws of history but, rather, by the hermeneutic logic which constantly calls for interpretation. Zbrzeźniak illustrates perfectly how successfully Vattimo’s proposition for hermeneutic communism intervenes against violence and authoritarianism, thereby accentuating an interpretative character of truth (*interpretativer Wahrheitsanspruch*). It is Vattimo’s “weak thought” (*pensiero debole*), which allows to notice the transformative and politically effective potential of communism. It happens via anarchic hermeneutics (*ermeneutica anarchica*) that grows out of the “end of truth” (*il tramonto della verità*) as well as weak communism (*comunismo debole*). Its unflagging popularity in the environment of contemporary philosophers of politics has undoubtedly to be seen in Francis Fukuyama’s intellectual attitude and his declaration of the end of history as a neoliberal victory. Of course, one does not mean here a return to communism (*Rückkehr*), but it is, rather, a Heideggerian repetition (*Wiederholung*), which can be understood as the possibility of emancipation from the neoliberal entanglements. In this sense one can say, after Heidegger, that the “possibility stands higher than reality” (*Möglichkeit sei höher als die Wirklichkeit*).

Critical reflection on Vattimo truly situates Zbrzeźniak’s thinking within the horizons of hermeneutic philosophy of politics. For her, this is not just an intellectual challenge, but a concrete colliding with the political way of being a human being in the world (*Hermeneutik im Vollzug*). She bravely offers a vision of radical politics that points the way beyond political eurocentrism or philosophical imperialism.

Following in Michel Foucault’s footsteps, and appreciating genealogy as the privileged topic of contemporary thinking, allow Zbrzeźniak to combine differing philosophical perspectives and to present a coherent vision of the philosophy of emancipation. An upgrading of the elements that blend the trends of thinking that are often alien to one another, and viewing the reflection on contemporary emancipation through the prism of genealogy, make it possible to pursue both the status and the ethos of
contemporary emancipatory thought. When posing the question about the possibility of formulating an emancipatory project within the framework of contemporary political philosophy, Zbrzeźniak emphasizes the problematic nature of the undertaking due to the emergence of specific historical circumstances (the fall of the Eastern Block, the appearance of neo-liberalism, globalization, as well as the interpretations which accompany those phenomena, and which explain them as a peculiar destiny of the world). Paying attention to the development of twentieth century continental philosophy—with its efficient critique of the concepts which constitute the backdrop of emancipatory thought (i.e., reason, progress, human nature, universalism)—and to the development of reflecting on history as the privileged object of philosophical study, Zbrzeźniak highlights an important relationship that exists between an interpretation of history and the formulation of a specific project on emancipation. One can see here her firm grip on Foucault’s thought, especially in the relation between the reading of history and the determination of the philosopher’s position as part of the historical process described by him. The transposition of such an approach into a general thesis concerning, out of necessity, an incomplete nature of emancipation and the suggestion that history becomes its only point of support, can be described as a turn (Kehre) in the interpretation of the philosophy of emancipation. Zbrzeźniak explicates clearly the consequences of such a turn, showing a re-definition of the subject of emancipation. It ceases to be understood as a reversal, or the fight against alienation, and becomes a realization of the objectives of a purely contingent, historical character.

The question remains, however, to what extent, in the analyzed concepts, there appears a point of reference in the form of at least an outline of social ontology, serving as a measure according to which we evaluate the success of this process. Showing that emancipatory thinking paradoxically takes the form of dystopian thinking, Zbrzeźniak underlines the recognition of the historicity and contingency of the goal which the process of emancipation is supposed to realize. This leads to a redefinition of politics that ceases to be a space for reaching consensus but becomes predominantly a place for dispute. That is why language, symbols, and the emotions above all, play such an important role in constructing emancipatory imagination. The central problem is not the emancipatory program, but the specifically understood imagination that needs some discursive means to be able to mobilize the emotions.

In opposition to the theses of some researchers (Enzo Traverso, Left-Wing Melancholia: Marxism, History, and Memory, New York: Columbia
University Press, 2017), we do not necessarily have to approve that we live in a time of utopian thinking, simply because it is required and expected to appear, at least in some form, everywhere. However, due to the intellectual horizon of modernity, determined by anti-foundationalism, it seems necessary to recognize historicity and the inevitable rootedness-in-the-past of thinking. The formulation of new projects becomes a complicated game with tradition, from which we are liberating ourselves, while trying, at the same time and in a certain way, to realize ideas, or meet the goals, that are its products.

Understanding the language of emancipation as lingua franca of modern philosophy fits perfectly into a broadly understood education toward democracy and emancipation as a hermeneutics and not an instructional guide (vademecum) for a contemporary human being on the complicated pathways of reaching for an understanding of oneself (Erziehung ist sich-erziehen).

Andrzej Wierciński