Joshua Seigal

Skeptical Theism, Moral Skepticism, and Divine Deception

Article
15/2 - Fall 2010, pages 251–274
Date of online publication: 20 décembre 2010
Date of publication: 20 décembre 2010

Abstract

Skeptical theism—a strategy for dealing with so-called “evidential arguments from evil”—is often held to lead to moral skepticism. In this paper I look at some of the responses open to the skeptical theist to the contention that her position leads to moral skepticism, and argue that they are ultimately unsuccessful, since they leave the skeptical theist with no grounds for ruling out the possibility of maximal divine deception. I then go on to argue that the situation is particularly bleak for the skeptical theist, since the most prominent ways of dealing with this pervasive type of skepticism are not available to her. Furthermore, since this pervasive type of skepticism entails moral skepticism, it follows that moral skepticism will after all have found a way in “through the back door.” In order to solidify my case, I go on to outline and deal with three potential objections.

Keywords

Cite this article

Seigal, Joshua. “Skeptical Theism, Moral Skepticism, and Divine Deception.” Forum Philosophicum 15, no. 1 (2010): 251–274. doi:10.5840/forphil20101521.

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