Yishai Cohen

Skeptical Theism and the Threshold Problem

Article
18/1 - Spring 2013, pages 73–92
Date of online publication: 10 décembre 2013
Date of publication: 10 décembre 2013

Abstract

In this paper I articulate and defend a new anti-theodicy challenge to Skeptical Theism. More specifically, I defend the Threshold Problem according to which there is a threshold to the kinds of evils that are in principle justifiable for God to permit, and certain instances of evil are beyond that threshold. I further argue that Skeptical Theism does not have the resources to adequately rebut the Threshold Problem. I argue for this claim by drawing a distinction between a weak and strong version of Skeptical Theism, such that the strong version must be defended in order to rebut the Threshold Problem. However, the skeptical theist’s appeal to our limited cognitive faculties only supports the weak version.

Keywords

Cite this article

Cohen, Yishai. "Skeptical Theism and the Threshold Problem." Forum Philosophicum 18, no. 1 (2013): 73–92. doi:10.5840/forphil20131815

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