Janusz SalamonCorresponding author

Philosophical Problems with Disembodied Existence and Survival of Death

Article
11 - 2006, pages 81-94
Date of online publication: 15 juin 2015
Date of publication: 01 novembre 2006

Abstract

The article discusses the philosophical problems associated with the dualistic conception of the person dominant in traditions influenced by Platonism. The key suggestion made in the article is that opting for an embodied rather than a disembodied posthumous existence for the human person will in no way hinder the theistic philosopher when it comes to arguing that God (and/or other spiritual beings) exists in a disembodied form.

Keywords

Cite this article

Salamon, Janusz. “Philosophical Problems with Disembodied Existence and Survival of Death.” Forum Philosophicum 11 (2006): 81–94. doi:10.35765/forphil.2006.1101.6.

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Copyright

Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License